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INTRODUCTION: THE CASE OF JACOB'S SONS
Consider the following hypothetical.
In the early part of the twentieth century a man named Jacob lives
with his wife, baby daughter, and infant son near the city of Roman on
the Moldova river in Romania. Jacob and his wife are very poor, and
because they are Jewish, they have been subject to government-
sanctioned harassment, depredation, and oppression all their lives.
Determined to ensure a better life for their children, they decide to
emigrate to the United States. Because they can afford only one
passage, Jacob travels to America alone in the hope of earning
enough money to pay for his family's subsequent emigration.
Upon disembarking at Ellis Island, Jacob sees a man holding a sign
written in Yiddish that says, "Do you come from Romania? If so,
speak to the man holding this sign." Jacob approaches the man with
the sign and tells him that he is from Romania. The man explains that
he is a representative of the Erste Romaner Kranken Unterstutzung
Verein (First Romanian Health and Support Association), a fraternal
society of Romanian Jewish immigrants, and asks Jacob whether he
has the $100 necessary to gain admission to the United States. When
Jacob responds that he has no money, the Verein representative offers
to give Jacob $100 to be returned after his interview with the
immigration officials. He further offers to help Jacob, who speaks no
English, find a place to live and get a job.
Jacob desperately wants to accept the offered help, but he is a
proud man who has been raised to believe that accepting charity is
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dishonorable. Before he can respond, however, the Verein
representative explains,
You must understand that the Verein is not offering charity, but a
contract. We will help you get established in America. In return,
you must agree that you will help future immigrants as we are
helping you. I am here today discharging my family's obligation to
the Verein for the help it gave my father when he came to America.
Will you make a commitment to do the same when you are able?
To this, Jacob unhesitatingly agrees.
With the help of various members of the Verein, Jacob finds cheap
lodgings and gets a job repairing sewing machines and other
mechanical devices. Within two years, he saves enough money to
bring his wife and children to America. Over the next several years,
the couple has three more children, a girl and two boys. As his
children grow up, Jacob frequently tells them of the help he received
from the Verein and impresses upon them the family's obligation to
pay for that help by assisting Jewish immigrants from Romania when
they are financially able to do so.
Although very poor, the family saves enough money over time to
slowly move into better housing and to put the oldest son through
electrician school after high school. He and Jacob then start their own
small business repairing electrical devices, which Jacob's other two
sons join when they graduate from high school. Over the following
decades, the family business evolves into a small, closely-held
corporation that purchases and reconditions used motors, generators,
and transformers for resale to heavy industry. Before his death in the
1950's, Jacob makes each of his sons promise that when the company
is financially sound, they will use its resources to discharge his debt to
the Verein. Even though the Verein itself no longer exists, his sons
agree that the debt remains and must be paid.
By the 1970s, the company is a successful small business employing
more than twenty people in addition to the brothers. Located on the
Brooklyn waterfront next to the Brooklyn Navy Yard, the company
generates part of its income by supplying the Coast Guard and Navy
with motors and generators used on board ship. It draws its
employees from the local neighborhood, which means that, with the
exception of the brothers, almost all employees are either African-
American or Hispanic. Because many of the employees perform
unskilled labor, there is a high turnover rate, and as a result, the
company is virtually always looking to hire new employees.
At this time, the partial thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations engineered by
the Nixon administration is producing a trickle of new Eastern
European immigrants into the neighborhood, including some
Romanian Jews. Because the company has been returning a
consistent profit for several years, the brothers agree that the time has
come to pay their father's debt to the Verein. Accordingly, they make
2002]
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it their policy to offer employment to recently arrived Romanian
Jewish immigrants, even when the immigrants may not be the most
qualified candidates for the job. In fact, because the brothers consider
it their duty to help the immigrants learn English and gain the job
skills that could not be obtained in the old country, it would be
accurate to describe them as actively seeking out the least qualified
candidates.
The company is much too small to support an in-house counsel, so
the brothers rely on the eldest's personal attorney to prepare their
contracts and answer whatever other legal questions they have.
Legally unsophisticated themselves, they have no idea that by
according hiring preference to Romanian Jews they are violating both
federal and local law. In the first place, the brothers are consciously
and purposely hiring less qualified Caucasian Jews of Romanian
extraction rather than more qualified African-Americans and
Hispanics. And precisely because this policy derives from what the
brothers believe to be a moral obligation to their father and the
Verein, they can offer no business-related justification for it.
Therefore, their hiring practices constitute illegal discrimination on
the basis of race, religion, and national origin in violation of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
Furthermore, the brothers are completely unaware of a New York
City municipal ordinance designed to counteract the effects of past
discrimination by the construction industry's trade unions. Until the
passage of the Civil Rights Act, many of these unions excluded
African-Americans and women from membership, resulting in an
extreme underrepresentation of members of both groups among the
construction industry's workforce. In response, the City passed an
ordinance requiring all businesses involved in or supplying equipment
to the construction industry to hire one woman or African-American
for every Caucasian hired until such time as the percentages of these
minorities employed in the construction industry corresponds to the
percentage of qualified minorities in the New York metropolitan area
workforce.' Because the brothers supply equipment to the
construction industry, they are subject to this ordinance, and because
they are hiring Romanian Jews in preference to all others, their hiring
practices are clearly in violation of it.
Finally, the brothers are also unaware that their contracts with the
Coast Guard and Navy make them subject to a federal regulation that
1. This ordinance is fictitious and is designed to raise the constitutional questions
that will be discussed in the body of this article. It is loosely drawn from the
"Philadelphia Plan" instituted by the Nixon Administration's Department of Labor
governing federal contractors in the construction industry in Philadelphia. For an
account of the Philadelphia Plan and the Labor Department's Order No. 4 extending
its requirements to all federal contractors, see Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights
Era ch. 13 (1990).
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requires all those doing business with the federal government to hire
according to an affirmative action program designed to increase the
number of women and people of color in the workforce.2 Because
virtually all of the company's employees have been African-
Americans or Hispanics in the past, this has never before been an
issue. However, their new practice of giving hiring preference to
Romanian Jews constitutes a clear violation of this regulation.
The brothers' new hiring policy is clearly illegal. Should it be?
The purpose of this article is to answer this question. To this end, I
will attempt to determine both what makes discrimination morally
objectionable and the circumstances under which it is appropriate for
the state to suppress such morally objectionable discrimination. I
propose to make these determinations by examining the nature and
history of the anti-discrimination principle that is embodied in the
Constitution and laws of the United States-specifically, in the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.
In doing so, I will not be engaging in constitutional or statutory
analysis. I possess neither the inclination nor the expertise to
comment usefully on the quality of the courts' legal interpretations of
the Equal Protection Clause and Civil Rights Act. I propose, rather,
to undertake a purely normative analysis of each provision.
Disregarding the intent of the framers, previous judicial
interpretations, the constraints of stare decisis, and the politics of anti-
discrimination law, the question I propose to answer is how each
provision should be interpreted if it is to correspond to the dictates of
morality. The conclusions I reach are that the Civil Rights Act should
be understood as an anti-oppression principle and the Equal
Protection Clause should be understood as an anti-differentiation
principle.
These terms are defined in Part I of this article, in which I describe
the basic nature of the anti-discrimination principle and identify the
three ways that it may be understood-i.e., as an anti-differentiation
principle, an anti-oppression principle, or an anti-subordination
principle. In Part II, I trace the history of the judicial understanding
of the anti-discrimination principle contained in the Equal Protection
Clause and the Civil Rights Act from 1868 to the present. This will
show that the courts originally understood the anti-discrimination
principle as an anti-oppression principle, that over the first half of the
twentieth century this understanding gradually evolved into that of an
anti-differentiation principle, and finally, that for the past three and a
half decades there has been no dominant judicial understanding of the
2. Once again, this regulation is fictitious and created to present issues to be
subsequently discussed. We may assume it was adopted by the Department of Labor
pursuant to Executive Order 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (2000).
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anti-discrimination principle, but rather a fluctuating mix of the three
possible interpretations. In Part III, I perform the normative analysis
that leads to the conclusion that the Civil Rights Act is properly
interpreted as an anti-oppression principle and the Equal Protection
Clause as an anti-differentiation principle. In Part IV, I offer an
explanation for the ideological strife that has beset the issue of
discrimination during the last generation and draw some implications
for the way both the Civil Rights Act and Equal Protection Clause
should be applied. Finally, I apply the results of the analysis to the
case of Jacob's sons and conclude.
I. THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE AND THE DEFINITION OF
DISCRIMINATION
The two main provisions of American law that address the problem
of discrimination are the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As a constitutional
provision, the Equal Protection Clause places restrictions on state
action.3 By enjoining government from denying any person the equal
protection of the laws, it prohibits state officials from engaging in
actions that discriminate against any citizen or group of citizens. As a
federal statute, the Civil Rights Act places restrictions on the behavior
of the individual members of society and private, non-governmental
entities. It prohibits private parties from discriminating against others
with regard to employment, public accommodations, and education.4
Both of these legal provisions are thought to embody a fundamental
moral principle that prohibits discrimination: the anti-discrimination
principle.5
The Equal Protection Clause and the Civil Rights Act reflect a
profound national commitment in the United States to eradicate
3. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
4. This article will focus exclusively on Titles VII and IX of the Civil Rights Act,
which prohibit discrimination in employment and education respectively.
5. Terminology will be a continual problem throughout this article. Many of the
terms I employ have been used by other commentators, often with a variety of distinct
and sometimes incompatible meanings. For example, some commentators employ
the term "anti-discrimination principle" to refer to what I call in this article the "anti-
differentiation principle." See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107 (1976). Further, many commentators address some of
the principles I discuss under different names. For example, what I call the "anti-
subordination principle" has also been referred to as the "antisubjugation principle,"
see Ankur J. Goel, Maintaining Integration Against Minority Interests: An Anti-
Subjugation Theory for Equality in Housing, 22 Urban Lawyer 369 (1990), the
"antihierachy" principle, see Nadine Taub & Wendy W. Williams, Will Equality
Require More Than Assimilation, Accommodation or Separation from the Existing
Social Structure?, 37 Rutgers L. Rev. 825, 831 (1985), and the "anticaste principle,"
see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410 (1994).
Accordingly, I will be careful to provide a definition for each term I use as it is
introduced. It should be understood that these definitions are for the purposes of this
article only. I make no claim that they represent standard usage.
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discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.6 If there is a moral position that commands anything close to
universal assent in our contemporary political culture, it is the belief
that it is wrong to discriminate against individuals on these bases.
Yet, despite this consensus, discrimination remains the most divisive
political issue facing our polity. Whether society should be structured
so as to guarantee strict equality of opportunity, i.e., whether we
should have a "color-blind"7 society, or whether affirmative action or
benign racial, ethnic, or sexual classifications should be permitted (or
perhaps required) is a perennial source of political strife. For the past
half century, the United States has been in the paradoxical situation of
having simultaneously reached a national consensus on the need to
incorporate the anti-discrimination principle into the law of the land
and an utter lack of agreement on what it means to give this principle
effect. Why is this the case? What precisely is the anti-discrimination
principle?
We might begin to answer this question by asking what it means to
say that something is a moral principle. Moral principles place
restrictions on the means we may use to achieve our ends. They
instruct us that regardless of the desirability of these ends, there are
certain things we may not do in order to attain them. Like the foul
lines on a baseball field, moral principles distinguish fair means from
foul by ruling certain ways of pursuing our ends as morally out of
bounds. Thus, moral principles trump efficiency concerns.' By
forbidding the use of the most efficient means to an end when those
means contravene a moral principle, moral principles impose
additional costs on both the efforts of individuals to realize their
personal ends and those of society to realize collective ends. This
reflects the fact that moral principles protect values of exceptional
moral significance-values whose preservation is important enough to
justify reductions in the ability of others to satisfy their desires.9
By recognizing the anti-discrimination principle to be a moral
principle, we are recognizing that, whatever our ends, we are morally
prohibited from pursuing them by means that involve discrimination.
This means that to the extent that the Equal Protection Clause
6. This national commitment may extend to other categories such as age or
disability as well, although it does not yet extend to more controversial categories
such as sexual orientation. For purposes of simplicity and expediency, I will limit my
discussion to the five categories enumerated in the Civil Rights Act.
7. For purposes of this article, the term "color-blind" should be read expansively
to include blindness not merely to one's color, but to one's race, religion, sex, and
national origin as well. Thus, a color-blind society would be one in which none of
these characteristics serve as a basis for the distribution of benefits and burdens,
8. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, in Taking Rights Seriously 184
(1977).
9. The relevance of this will be made clear in Part Ili. See infra note 247 and text
accompanying notes 259 and 303.
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embodies the anti-discrimination principle, it instructs us that the
government may not pursue legitimate state interests by means that
involve discrimination even if this would be the most efficient way to
realize those interests. And to the extent that the Civil Rights Act
embodies the anti-discrimination principle, it instructs us that
individuals and other private entities may not pursue their legitimate
personal or corporate ends by means that involve discrimination even
though it is more costly to do so by non-discriminatory means.
Of course, at this level of generality, the anti-discrimination
principle is a purely formal principle, empty of content. It tells us that
we may not pursue our ends by means that involve discrimination, but
it does not tell us what discrimination is. In this respect, it is much like
Aristotle's definition of justice as treating equals equally and unequals
unequally."° Although this is clearly true, it is also completely
uninformative without a substantive standard of measure, without an
answer to the question: equal or unequal with respect to what?
Similarly, although the anti-discrimination principle's prohibition
against the use of discrimination is unimpeachable, it cannot guide
action until a substantive definition of discrimination has been
supplied.
Supplying such a definition, however, is far from an easy task. In
fact, controversy over precisely this point has generated a myriad of
law review articles over the past few decades." The Equal Protection
Clause and the Civil Rights Act are intended to prohibit morally
objectionable discrimination, but precisely what makes discrimination
morally objectionable? In the abstract, "discrimination" is a
completely neutral term referring to "perceiving, noting, or making a
distinction or difference between things."' 2 Few would object to
discriminating between African-Americans and Caucasians for
purposes of treating sickle cell anemia. Almost all would object to
such discrimination for the purposes of assigning the right to vote.
What, then, is the characteristic that renders an act of discrimination
morally objectionable? When is discrimination invidious
discrimination?
A careful survey of the legal and philosophical literature on
discrimination turns up three candidates for the definition of
10. Aristotle, The Nichomacian Ethics, bk. 5 (David Reiss trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 1998).
11. See, e.g., Paul Brest, Foreward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle,
90 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1976); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All. Sex, Race, and
Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1003 (1986); Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and
Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1327 (1986);
Sunstein, supra note 5; William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme
Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775 (1979); Richard A. Wasserstrom,
Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L.
Rev. 581 (1977).
12. IV Oxford English Dictionary 758 (2d ed. 1989).
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discrimination that the anti-discrimination principle is designed to
eliminate: 1) unequal treatment on the basis of irrelevant
characteristics, 2) oppressive unequal treatment directed against
individuals because of their membership in a minority group, 3 and 3)
conduct that has the effect of subordinating or continuing the
subordination of a minority group. Each of these definitions gives rise
to a different interpretation of the anti-discrimination principle. If the
first definition is correct, the anti-discrimination principle functions as
an anti-differentiation principle. 4 If the second is correct, it functions
as an anti-oppression principle. And if the third is correct, it functions
as an anti-subordination principle. 5
A. Interpretation 1: The Anti-Discrimination Principle as an Anti-
Differentiation Principle
The first definition of discrimination identifies it as unequal
treatment on the basis of irrelevant characteristics. This transforms
the anti-discrimination principle into an anti-differentiation principle
that prohibits classifications based on irrelevant characteristics of the
people being classified. Whether a characteristic is relevant or not is
determined by the context in which the anti-differentiation principle is
being applied. If the context is employment discrimination, then a
characteristic is irrelevant if it has no bearing on an individual's ability
to do the job under consideration. If the context is education, then a
characteristic is irrelevant if it has nothing to do with an individual's
ability to learn or meet the academic requirements of the educational
institution concerned. Under this interpretation, the anti-
discrimination principle holds that it is morally impermissible to treat
individuals differentially on the basis of characteristics unrelated to
the tasks they will be called on to perform.
The anti-differentiation interpretation of the anti-discrimination
principle is the basis of the call for a "color-blind" society. This
interpretation views racial, ethnic, or sexual classification (on
irrelevant grounds) as wrong per se and therefore would require
governmental action and private employment decisions to be made
completely independently of such considerations. From this
perspective,
13. For purposes of this article, the phrase "minority group" will be used to refer
to any identifiable social subgroup other than the politically or societally dominant
one, rather than merely to groups that constitute a numerical minority of the
population. Thus, women can be considered a minority group despite being a
numerical majority.
14. I borrow this appellation from Ruth Colker. See Colker, supra note 11, at
1005.
15. Like the anti-differentiation label, I take this designation from Colker's
article. See id. at 1007.
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[O]ne gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now: by a complete,
resolute, and credible commitment never to tolerate in one's own
life-or in the life and practices of one's government-the
differential treatment of other human beings by race. Indeed, that is
the great lesson for government itself to teach: in all we do in life,
whatever we do in life, to treat any person less well than another or
to favor any more than another for being black or white or brown or
red, is wrong.
16
The anti-differentiation interpretation of the anti-discrimination
principle is most often, although not exclusively, 7 associated with a
conservative ideological viewpoint. Thus, we find it supported by
commentators such as Lino Graglia, "[a] racially discriminatory act is,
quite simply, an action taken on the basis of race,"' 8 Richard Posner,
"I contend, in short, that the proper constitutional principle is... no
use of racial or ethnic criteria to determine the distribution of
government benefits and burdens,"' 9 William Bradford Reynolds, "I
regard government tolerance for favoring or disfavoring individuals
because of their skin color, sex, religious affiliation, or ethnicity to be
fundamentally at odds with this country's civil rights policies," ''1 and
Edwin Meese, "if we can preserve the even-handed decisions through
which the Supreme Court has moved us toward a color-blind society,
then we really will have approached a new frontier in civil rights and
overall prosperity."'"
Under the anti-differentiation interpretation, the anti-
discrimination principle requires a strict adherence to equality of
16. Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 809-10.
17. See, e.g., Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social
Engineers, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1312 (1986).
18. Lino A. Graglia, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: From Prohibiting to
Requiring Racial Discrimination in Employment, 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 68, 71
(1991).
19. Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential
Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 25.
20. William Bradford Reynolds, The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights:
Winning the War Against Discrimination, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1001, 1014 (1986).
21. Edwin Meese 111, Civil Rights, Economic Progress, and Common Sense, 14
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 150, 156 (1991); see also Thomas Sowell, Civil Rights:
Rhetoric or Reality? 37 (1984) ("[A]II individuals should be treated the same under
the law, regardless of their race, religion, sex or other such social categories."); Terry
Eastland, The Case against Affirmative Action, 34 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 33, 43-44
(1992).
Thurgood Marshall argued in the 1948 case of Sipuel v. Board of Regents, a
forerunner to Brown v. Board of Education, that "[c]lassifications and
distinctions based on race or color have no moral or legal validity in our
society." Embedded in this statement was the moral truth that the mere race
of a person tells us nothing morally important about him or her that should
compel either negative or positive treatment.
Id. (alteration in original and footnotes omitted); see also Charles Fried, Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 107 (1990).
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opportunity and prohibits affirmative action.22  By prohibiting
classification on the basis of irrelevant characteristics, the anti-
differentiation interpretation requires meritocratic decision-making.
Differential treatment of individuals or classes of individuals must be
justified by differences in the individual's or class's ability to serve the
ends being sought. Thus, if the government wants to exclude a certain
class of people from serving on juries, it must show that the members
of that class are not capable of the type of impartial deliberation jury
service requires. This can be done for children and for members of a
crime victim's family. It cannot be done for African-Americans or
women. Similarly, if a private employer wants to give hiring
preferences to certain classes of people, he or she must show that
members of those classes are better able to perform the tasks required
by the job. Giving preferential treatment to those with a degree in
accounting for a position as an accountant can be justified on this
basis. Giving preferential treatment to members of a particular
church cannot. The requirement that differential treatment be based
on distinctions in merit means that all people must be accorded an
equal opportunity to attain the relevant benefits, e.g., to serve on
juries or be hired. Thus, the anti-differentiation interpretation
requires that all individuals be evaluated by the same set of merit-
based decision criteria.
This, of course, implies that affirmative action, as we are using the
term, is impermissible. Affirmative action involves giving preferential
treatment to members of minority groups on the basis of
considerations other than the individual's ability to perform the
relevant tasks. These considerations may be the desire to counteract
the effect of past discrimination or unjust treatment, e.g., setting aside
a certain percentage of government contracts for minority-owned
businesses; to combat present or prospective prejudice, e.g.,
establishing hiring ratios to ensure that members of minority groups
are not unfairly excluded from the workforce; to create a racially or
ethnically diverse environment, e.g., giving preference in university
admissions to members of underrepresented groups; or merely to
create what is believed to be a more just society. But in each case,
preferential treatment is being accorded because of the individual's
race, ethnicity, or sex, and not because of a merit-based evaluation of
his or her relevant abilities. Thus, under the anti-differentiation
interpretation, affirmative action is itself discrimination, so-called
reverse discrimination, 23 and is forbidden.
22. For purposes of this article, the phrase "affirmative action" will be used to
refer to preferential treatment given to members of minority groups because of their
status as minorities. Thus, in this article, affirmative action refers to more than
merely outreach programs designed to encourage minorities to enter an application
process in which decisions are made on an entirely meritocratic basis.
23. See Ken Feagins, Affirmative Action or the Same Sin?, 67 Denv. U. L. Rev.
20021
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B. Interpretation 2: The Anti-Discrimination Principle as an Anti-
Oppression Principle
The second definition of discrimination identifies it as oppressive
unequal treatment directed against individuals because of their
membership in a minority group. This transforms the anti-
discrimination principle into an anti-oppression principle that
prohibits classificatory distinctions designed to oppress or impose
disadvantages on minority groups. This interpretation focuses on the
intention and motivation behind the classification. Classifications
made for the purpose of degrading or dehumanizing minorities,
reducing them to second-class political or social status, or otherwise
exploiting them for the benefit of the dominant political or social
group are prohibited. Other classifications are not. Thus, the anti-
oppression interpretation of the anti-discrimination principle holds
that it is morally impermissible to treat individuals oppressively
because of their minority status.
The anti-oppression interpretation is concerned not so much with
the inequality of the treatment as with the oppressive use to which it is
put. From this perspective,
[T]he primary evil of the various schemes of racial segregation
against blacks that the courts were being called upon to assess was
not that such schemes were a capricious and irrational way of
allocating public benefits and burdens.... The primary evil of these
schemes was instead that they designedly and effectively marked off
all black persons as degraded, dirty, less than fully developed
persons who were unfit for full membership in the political, social,
and moral community.
24
421, 422 (1990) ("'Affirmative action' is the 'samesin'-the continuation and
propagation of 'separate but equal' race- and sex-consciousness. It is Plessy v.
Ferguson in reverse." (footnotes omitted)); Martin Schiff, Reverse Discrimination Re-
Defined as Equal Protection: The Orwellian Nightmare in the Enforcement of Civil
Rights Laws, 8 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 627, 686 (1985) ("[I]n the impatience to
complete the abolition of discrimination based on race, we must not abandon the
principle of non-discrimination itself."); see also Robert K. Fullinwider, The Reverse
Discrimination Controversy: A Moral and Legal Analysis (1980); Lisa H. Newton,
Reverse Discrimination as Unjustified, 83 Ethics 308 (1973); George Sher, Justifying
Reverse Discrimination in Employment, 4 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 159 (1975).
24. Wasserstrom, supra note 11, at 593. In another context, Wasserstrom further
illustrates this point with the example of slavery.
The primary thing that was wrong with the institution [of slavery] was not
that the particular individuals who were assigned the place of slaves were
assigned them arbitrarily because the assignment was made in virtue of an
irrelevant characteristic, their race. Rather, ... the primary thing that was
and is wrong with slavery is the practice itself .... And the same can be said
for most if not all of the other discrete practices and institutions which
comprise the system of racial discrimination even after human slavery was
abolished. The practices were unjustifiable -they were oppressive-and




Unlike the anti-differentiation interpretation, the anti-oppression
interpretation does not view racial, ethnic, or sexual classification as
wrong per se. The wrongfulness of a classification comes from its
oppressive purpose rather than a failure to make all classificatory
decisions strictly in accordance with merit. Therefore, the anti-
oppression interpretation would require governmental actions and
private employment and educational decisions to be made
independently of racial, ethnic, or sexual animus, but not necessarily
independently of all racial, ethnic, or sexual considerations.
The anti-oppression interpretation of the anti-discrimination
principle is most often associated with a liberal ideological viewpoint.
Thus, we find it supported by commentators such as Paul Brest, "[t]he
heart of the anti-discrimination principle is its prohibitions of race-
dependent decisions that disadvantage the members of minority
groups," 5 Laurence Tribe, "the equal protection clause asks whether
the particular conditions complained of, examined in their social and
historical context, are a manifestation or a legacy of official
oppression,"26 Ronald Dworkin, "[racial discrimination consists in]
racial classifications that are invidious, because they reflect a desire to
put one race at a disadvantage against another, or arbitrary, because
they serve no legitimate purpose, or reflect favoritism, because they
treat members of one race with more concern than members of
another,"27 and John Hart Ely, "the express preoccupation of the
framers of the amendment was with discrimination against Blacks,
that is, with making sure that Whites would not.., continue to
confine Blacks to an inferior position."28
Richard Wasserstrom, A Defense of Programs of Preferential Treatment, in Social
Ethics: Morality and Social Policy 213, 215 (Thomas A. Mappes & Jane S. Zembaty
eds., 3d ed. 1987).
25. Brest, supra note 11, at 2.
26. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1.516 (2d ed. 1988).
27. Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 318 (1985).
28. John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 723, 728 (1974); see also Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen To Be
Black, 97 Yale L.J. 420, 433-34 (1988); Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1336 ("Brown and
its progeny do not stand for the abstract principle that governmental distinctions
based on race are unconstitutional. Rather, those great cases, forged by the gritty
particularities of the struggle against white racism, stand for the proposition that the
Constitution prohibits any arrangements imposing racial subjugation .... ").
Racism is the difference that the most oppressive racial categorizations
make. The rationality or irrationality of a categorization has nothing to do
with whether it is racially oppressive in practice....
... But whatever the source of racism, to count it the same as racialism, to
say that two centuries of struggle for the most basic of civil rights have been
mostly about freedom from racial categorization rather than freedom from
racial oppression, is to trivialize the lives and deaths of those who have
suffered under racism.
Id.; see also J. Skelly Wright, Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies, 47
U. Chi. L. Rev. 213,220 (1980).
Now it is agreed and solemnly enacted into law that racism-both
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Under the anti-oppression interpretation, the anti-discrimination
principle does not require equality of opportunity and permits
affirmative action. Because this version of the principle prohibits only
unequal treatment designed to oppress, it says nothing about the
standards that may be used for making non-oppressive distinctions
among individuals or classes of individuals. Specifically, it does not
demand that all distinctions be made on the basis of merit. Although
it would forbid an employer from excluding African-Americans from
the workforce because of racial prejudice, it would not forbid the
employer from giving hiring preference to the members of his or her
soccer team. This means that the anti-oppression interpretation
would permit classification on the basis of irrelevant characteristics as
long as the purpose of classification was not to oppress minorities.
Thus, the anti-oppression interpretation does not require a strict
adherence to equality of opportunity.
This implies that affirmative action is permissible. Whether the
preferential treatment given to minorities is for the purpose of
counteracting the effect of past discrimination or unjust treatment,
combating present or prospective prejudice, or creating a more
diverse environment or more just society, it is certainly not for the
purpose of oppressing them. Although affirmative action is by
definition unequal treatment, it is not oppressive unequal treatment.
Thus, under the anti-oppression interpretation, it does not violate the
anti-discrimination principle. This also means that affirmative action
is not accurately described as reverse discrimination. Because
discrimination is oppressive unequal treatment and affirmative action
is not oppressive, it is not discrimination, and therefore, is not reverse
discrimination.
C. Interpretation 3: The Anti-Discrimination Principle as an Anti-
Subordination Principle
The third definition of discrimination identifies it as any conduct
that has the effect of subordinating or continuing the subordination of
a minority group. This transforms the anti-discrimination principle
into an anti-subordination principle that prohibits all actions that
undermine the social or political standing of minorities. Under this
interpretation, the prohibited conduct is not limited to that designed
to oppress minorities. Because such conduct does undermine the
position of minorities, it would, of course, be forbidden. However,
even conduct that is not purposely directed against minorities, but
which has the unintended consequence of increasing or preserving
governmental and private-is wrong, and that the government should
employ its power to eradicate it. The purpose of this legislation cannot be
denied: to help blacks and members of other minority groups overcome the
prejudice that oppresses them.
[Vol. 71
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their socially disadvantaged position is proscribed. Thus, the anti-
subordination interpretation of the anti-discrimination principle holds
that it is morally impermissible to do anything that adds to or
continues the social or political subordination of members of minority
groups.
The anti-subordination interpretation focuses not so much on the
way individuals are treated as on the consequences governmental and
private actions have on the societal status of minority groups. For this
reason, it functions not only negatively as a bar to oppressive action,
but positively as a call for action to alleviate social subordination.
Under the anti-subordination perspective, it is inappropriate for
certain groups in society to have subordinated status because of
their lack of power in society as a whole. This approach seeks to
eliminate the power disparities between men and women, and
between whites and non-whites, through the development of laws
and policies that directly redress those disparities. From an anti-
subordination perspective, both facially differentiating and facially
neutral policies are invidious only if they perpetuate racial or sexual
hierarchy. 29
This means that under the anti-subordination interpretation, the anti-
discrimination principle is viewed as a means to the social goal of
creating a more egalitarian society. Accordingly, the anti-
subordination interpretation would not only prohibit actions that
aggravate or perpetuate subordination, but require actions to
eliminate it.
The anti-subordination interpretation of the anti-discrimination
principle is most often associated with a critical or radical left-wing
ideological perspective. Thus, we find it supported by commentators
such as Robin West, "'[e]qual protection,' for the progressive, means
the eradication of social, economic, and private, as well as legal,
hierarchies that damage,"3 Cass Sunstein, "the anticaste principle
forbids social and legal practices from translating highly visible and
morally irrelevant differences into systematic social disadvantage,"'"
Owen Fiss, "what is critical.., is that the state law or practice
aggravates (or perpetuates?) the subordinate position of a specially
disadvantaged group,"32  and Dorothy Roberts, "the anti-
subordination approach considers the concrete effects of government
policy on the substantive condition of the disadvantaged."33
29. Colker, supra note 11, at 1007-08 (footnote omitted).
30. Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 Mich. L. Rev.
641, 694 (1990).
31. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 2411.
32. Fiss, supra note 5, at 157.
33. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1453-54 (1991); see
also Catherine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, in Feminism Unmodified 146
(1987); Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979
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Under current social conditions, the anti-subordination
interpretation of the anti-discrimination principle would prohibit
equality of opportunity and require affirmative action. This is because
there presently are relatively disadvantaged or subordinated groups in
our society. For example, the legacy of legally-enforced slavery, Jim
Crow legislation, and privately-held racial prejudice has produced a
society in which African-Americans as a group have a lower socio-
economic status and less political and economic power than
Caucasians. This past oppression means that African-Americans
come to the job market with relatively lower skills, educational
attainments, and credentials than Caucasians and that there are
disproportionately few African-American owned businesses. Under
these circumstances, if private employment opportunities and
government contracts are assigned on a purely meritocratic basis, e.g.,
on the basis of job qualifications and low bids respectively, African-
Americans will receive a disproportionately small share of each.34
Thus, a strict adherence to equality of opportunity would preserve
their subordinated social status." Because the anti-subordination
interpretation prohibits conduct that preserves subordination, it
therefore forbids a strict adherence to equality of opportunity. But
this immediately implies that affirmative action is required. For if
racially oppressive action creates subordination and neutral, "color-
blind" action preserves existing subordination, then only action that
reduces subordination, i.e., affirmative action, is permissible. This, of
course, is equivalent to saying that such action is required.
D. Comparing the Interpretations
A comparison of the three interpretations shows the anti-
subordination interpretation to have the broadest scope and most
Wash. U. L.Q. 659; David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev.
99 (1986).
34. An early statement of this argument was provided by Daniel Patrick
Moynihan when he was an assistant secretary of labor.
In this new period the expectations of the Negro Americans will go beyond
civil rights. Being Americans, they will now expect that in the near future
equal opportunities for them as a group will produce roughly equal results,
as compared with other groups. This is not going to happen....
... [T]hree centuries of sometimes unimaginable mistreatment have
taken their toll on the Negro people. The harsh fact is that as a group, at the
present time, in terms of ability to win out in the competitions of American
life, they are not equal to most of those groups with which they will be
competing.
Office of Policy Planning & Research, U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Negro Family: The
Case for National Action (1965) [hereinafter The Moynihan Report] (quote taken
from unpaginated summary introduction).
35. Similar arguments can be made for women and other ethnic and religious
minorities to the extent that social stigma and official or unofficial persecution has
rendered them relatively less qualified and financially self-sufficient than the socially
dominant group of Caucasian males.
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wide-ranging effects. By prohibiting not only oppressive, but in many
cases, entirely neutral classifications, the anti-subordination
interpretation places significant restrictions on the actions
governments or individuals can take in pursuit of their ends. Under it,
governments or individuals must screen all their actions to ensure that
they neither intentionally nor inadvertently add to or perpetuate the
subordination of any minority group. The anti-differentiation
interpretation has the second largest range of application. Although
not as broad as the anti-subordination interpretation, it also places
powerful restrictions on permissible governmental and individual
action. By prohibiting classifications based on anything other than
merit, it requires governments and individuals to screen their actions
to ensure that nothing other than a person's ability to serve the ends
being sought play a role in his or her classification. Not only
oppressive, but all personal motivations must be excised. The anti-
oppression interpretation has the narrowest scope and places the least
restrictions on governmental and individual actions. It prohibits only
unequal treatment designed to oppress members of minority groups.
Under it, individuals are permitted to classify others on the basis of
purely personal preference and governments can classify citizens on
the basis of political or social interests other than merit as long as this
is not done to degrade or exploit people because of their membership
in a minority group.
Note that in the context of the Civil Rights Act, the anti-
differentiation interpretation places much greater restraints on
business behavior than does the anti-oppression interpretation. The
anti-differentiation interpretation prohibits employers from
considering anything other than an applicant's ability to do the job in
making hiring and promotion decisions, preventing employers from
acting on either their personal preferences or other business-related
considerations. Under the anti-differentiation interpretation, an
employer could not give preference to his or her nephew, or to an
applicant with the same heritage or culture as current employees as a
means of reducing governance costs36 because neither consideration is
relevant to the applicant's ability to do the relevant job. On the other
hand, the anti-oppression interpretation of the Act provides business
people with much more freedom of action. As long as they are not
acting out of racial animus or attempting to degrade or exploit
applicants because of their minority status, they are free to indulge
their personal preferences, e.g., hire their nephews, or consider
business effects unrelated to an applicant's abilities, e.g., his or her
effect on "corporate culture."
This relationship suggests something odd about the ideological
36. See Richard Epstein, Forbidden Grounds 61-69 (1992). Considerations such
as this are discussed at greater length subsequently. See infra text accompanying notes
260-265.
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alignments behind the various interpretations of the Civil Rights Act.
Conservatives, who typically oppose government regulation of
business, tend to support the more regulative anti-differentiation
interpretation,37 while liberals, who typically favor government
regulation of business, tend to support the less regulative anti-
oppression interpretation.3" How did this seemingly incongruous
alignment come to be the case? I believe the answer to this question
lies in the way the legal understanding of the anti-discrimination
principle changed over time in the United States.39
II. THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE
Undertaking a review of the legal history of the anti-discrimination
principle must appear a foolhardy endeavor. The meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause has been a subject of scholarly debate for the
entire course of the twentieth century,4" something that was intensified
by the Supreme Court's request for historical briefs in Brown v. Board
of Education.41 This debate has produced such a notable lack of
37. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
39. I return to this question in Part IV. See infra text accompanying notes 329-333.
40. Early major works considering the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
were Horace Edgar Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment (1908) and
Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. L.
Rev. 341 (1949).
41. 345 U.S. 972 (1953). In ordering Brown to be reargued, the Court stated,
In their briefs and on oral argument counsel are requested to discuss
particularly the following questions insofar as they are relevant to the
respective cases:
1. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and the State
legislatures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
contemplated or did not contemplate, understood or did not understand,
that it would abolish segregation in public schools?
2. If neither the Congress in submitting nor the States in ratifying the
Fourteenth Amendment understood that compliance with it would require
the immediate abolition of segregation in public schools, was it nevertheless
the understanding of the framers of the Amendment
(a) that future Congresses might, in the exercise of their power under
section 5 of the Amendment, abolish such segregation, or
(b) that it would be within the judicial power, in light of future conditions,
to construe the Amendment as abolishing such segregation of its own force?
Id. A sampling of the scholarly literature on the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment since Brown includes, Chester James Antieau, The Original
Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment (1981); Judith A. Baer, Equality under
the Constitution: Reclaiming the Fourteenth Amendment (1983); Raoul Berger,
Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1977);
Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the
Bill of Rights (1986); Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind Constitution (1992); William E.
Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principle to Judicial Doctrine
(1988); Michael J. Perry, We The People: The Fourteenth Amendment and the
Supreme Court (1999); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the
Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1955); Robert J. Kaczorowski,
Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61
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agreement as to be described by one of the nation's leading
constitutional historians as being at an impasse.42 And although the
intention of the authors and sponsors of the Civil Rights Act is
considerably clearer, 43 any consensus as to how the statute should be
read broke down almost immediately upon its passage.
Nevertheless, I have reason to believe that the review I propose to
undertake can escape the scholarly quagmire. This is because most of
the historical controversy over the Equal Protection Clause and, to a
lesser extent, the Civil Rights Act arises from questions about their
respective authors' intentions with regard to specific legal
applications. Thus, to the extent that academic disputation has been
intractable, it has usually concerned matters such as whether the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to abolish segregated public
schools,' guarantee African-Americans the right to vote, 45 apply the
Bill of Rights to the states,46 or be restricted to state action.47 I have
no intention of addressing any such issues. Rather, I propose to
examine how the legislative and judicial understanding of the moral
principle at the core of the Equal Protection Clause and the Civil
Rights Act has changed over time. I believe that the
contemporaneous understandings of the moral ends being served by
these legal provisions was, until fairly recently, considerably clearer
than similar understandings of either provision's legal effects.
Specifically, I will contend that at the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the anti-discrimination principle was
understood as an anti-oppression principle, that over the ensuing
century, the anti-discrimination principle gradually came to be
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 863 (1986); Alfred H. Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment
Reconsidered: The Segregation Question, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 1049 (1956); Earl A. Maltz,
The Concept of Equal Protection of the Laws-A Historical Inquiry, 22 San Diego L.
Rev. 499 (1985) [hereinafter Maltz, Concept of Equal Protection]; Earl A. Maltz, The
Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise-Section One in the Joint Committee
on Reconstruction, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 933 (1984) [hereinafter Maltz, Fourteenth
Amendment]; William W. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" to
Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-ninth Congress, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 33;
Michael P. Zuckert, Congressional Power Under the Fourteenth Amendment- The
Original Understanding of Section Five, 3 Const. Comment. 123 (1986).
42. See Nelson, supra note 41, at 4 ("Historical scholarship on the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment is now at an impasse.").
43. See Kull, supra note 41, at 182.
44. This is the line of disputation set off by the Supreme Court's request in Brown.
See supra note 41. For a recent iteration, see Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and
the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 947 (1995) [hereinafter McConnell,
Originalism]; Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1881 (1995); and Michael W.
McConnell, The Originalist Justification for Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81
Va. L. Rev. 1937 (1995).
45. See, e.g., Maltz, Concept of Equal Protection, supra note 41; Maltz, Fourteenth
Amendment, supra note 41; Van Alstyne, supra note 41.
46. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 41; Curtis supra note 41.
47. See, e.g., Kaczorowski, supra note 41; Zuckert, supra note 41.
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understood as an anti-differentiation principle, and that over the past
three and half decades, this understanding shattered into a confused
amalgam of anti-differentiation, anti-oppression, and anti-
subordination interpretations of the principle.
A. The Original Understanding: The Thirty-ninth Congress
Although there is serious academic disagreement about the legal
consequences the Equal Protection Clause was intended to produce, I
believe it is clear that the Clause was originally understood to embody
an anti-oppression principle.4" Despite "the vagueness and ambiguity
of section one's language and the failure of the framing generation to
settle how it would apply to a variety of specific issues,, 49 there can be
little doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
incorporate into the law of the land the principles for which the North
had fought the Civil War.
What was politically essential was that the North's victory in the
Civil War be rendered permanent and the principles for which the
war had been fought rendered secure, so that the South, upon
readmission to full participation in the Union, could not undo them.
The Fourteenth Amendment must be understood as the Republican
party's plan for securing the fruits both of the war and of the three
decades of antislavery agitation preceding it.50
At least one of the North's war aims was to end slavery and the
oppression of the African-American race sanctioned by the southern
state governments. Slavery was abolished by the Thirteenth
Amendment. This left the other forms of official oppression to be
addressed by the Fourteenth. Thus, the most natural reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and hence the Equal Protection Clause, was
as a constitutional anti-oppression principle designed to keep state
governments out of the business of persecuting African-Americans, or
more generally, any disfavored segment of their population. On the
other hand, it would be quite a stretch to see the North as fighting to
impose on the southern states an anti-differentiation principle that
required all official classificatory decisions to be made on a purely
48. It is probably anachronistic to talk about the intentions of the Thirty-ninth
Congress with regard to the Equal Protection Clause, rather than § 1 of the
amendment as a whole. It was not until the Supreme Court interpreted the Privileges
and Immunities Clause narrowly to guarantee only the rights of national citizenship in
the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), that the Equal Protection
Clause began to be construed independently. For purposes of consistency with the
following sections, however, I propose to talk in terms of the Equal Protection
Clause, even though the evidence I will be examining applies to all of section 1.
Because the Thirty-ninth Congress's understanding of the anti-discrimination
principle contained in section 1 would be the same for any of its clauses, this should
pose no problem.




meritocractic basis, especially since the northern states themselves did
not adhere to such a standard.
This general reason for believing that the Equal Protection Clause
was originally intended as an anti-oppression principle is reinforced by
the precipitating event that provided the impetus for the passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment, President Andrew Johnson's veto of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Civil Rights Act was designed to
eliminate the notorious "black codes" that had been adopted in
several of the southern states. These codes consisted in legislation
specifically directed against the ex-slaves and designed to keep them
in a subjugated state. As subsequently described by the Supreme
Court, the codes
imposed upon the colored race onerous disabilities and burdens, and
curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty, and property to
such an extent that their freedom was of little value ....
They were in some States forbidden to appear in the towns in any
other character than menial servants. They were required to reside
upon and cultivate the soil without the right to purchase or own it.
They were excluded from many occupations of gain, and were not
permitted to give testimony in the courts in any case in which a
white man was a party.51
To combat this type of oppressive state legislation, the Civil Rights
Act guaranteed all persons
the same right ... to make and embrace contracts, to sue, be parties,
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
51. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 70. The black codes were
typically designed to return the freedmen to a condition of servitude. Thus,
provisions permitted officers to "'arrest and carry back to his or her legal employer
any freedman, free negro, or mulatto who shall have quit the service of his or her
employer before the expiration of his or her term of service without good cause' and
allowed "'any freedman, free negro, or mulatto' convicted of a misdemeanor to "'be
hired out by the sheriff or other officer, at the public outcry, to any white person who
will pay said fine and all costs, and take the convict for the shortest time."' Perry,
supra note 41, at 50 (quoting Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials 22 (William
Cohen & Jonathan D. Varat, eds., 10th ed. 1997)). In addition,
[t]he provisions to which Congress most repeatedly objected were the
vagrancy laws; these laws defined "vagrant" in a way that included virtually
any adult who was not gainfully employed, and provided that anyone
convicted of vagrancy would be punished by up to one year of forced labor
in the service of some private individual. Congress was also concerned with
statutes that made it a crime to induce an employee to leave his or her
present employer and that authorized forfeiture of all wages if a worker
failed to complete the terms of his or her contract. All of these provisions
tended to "lock" former slaves into the service of their old masters.
Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 828, 832 (1983)
(footnotes omitted).
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pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.5 2
Johnson vetoed the bill, however, on the ground that Congress lacked
the constitutional authority to enact it. The Thirty-ninth Congress
responded to the veto not only by overriding it, but by passing the
Fourteenth Amendment to remove any doubt about its power to pass
such legislation.53 Thus, the reason for enacting the Fourteenth
Amendment was to empower the Congress to act against oppression
by state governments, rather than to require states to engage in
exclusively color-blind decision-making.54
Furthermore, the Thirty-ninth Congress consistently rejected
proposals that suggested an anti-differentiation approach. In the first
place, Congress had amended the Civil Rights Act to remove a
provision that suggested that all race-based classifications were
prohibited.5 In doing so, "the Thirty-ninth Congress did what it could
to ensure that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 would be what the
Republican leadership had represented: a measure directed primarily
at the Black Codes. 5 6  Thus, "[w]hen the issue was joined, an
52. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
53. See Perry, supra note 41, at 51 ("The Congress-the Thirty-ninth Congress-
overrode the veto and then, leaving nothing to chance, proposed the Fourteenth
Amendment, which, when ratified two years later, in 1868, not only constitutionalized
the 1866 Act but also removed any doubt about congressional power to enact
legislation like the 1866 Act."); see also McConnell, Originalism, supra note 44, at 960
("To be sure, the principal purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
constitutionalize the 1866 Act .... "); Kull, supra note 41, at 68 ("Political objectives
shared by all Republicans in December 1865, from the radicals to the conservatives,
provided the immediate inspiration for [the Fourteenth Amendment]. Laws
depriving one race of ordinary civil rights, exemplified by the 'Black Codes' enacted
that year in some southern states, must be prohibited ... .
54. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 2435.
The Civil War Amendments were based on a wholesale rejection of the
supposed naturalness of racial hierarchy. The hierarchy was thought to be a
function not of natural difference but of law, most notably the law of slavery
and the various measures that grew up in the aftermath of abolition. An
important purpose of the Civil War Amendments was the attack on racial
caste. Thus Senator Howard explained that the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to "abolish[] all class legislation in the States and [do] away
with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable
to another." The defining case of the Black Codes, placing special disabilities
on the freedmen's legal capacities, exemplified the concern with caste
legislation.
Id. (alterations in original and footnote omitted).
55. See Kull, supra note 41, at 75-76.
It was the demonstrable consensus of the Thirty-ninth Congress that section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment "constitutionalized" the Civil Rights Act of
1866.... For present purposes it will be sufficient to recall the single most
notable incident in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866: the
amendment of the civil rights bill in the House ... to delete from the original
proposal its broad antidiscrimination provision.
56. Id. at 79.
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unqualified rule of nondiscrimination mustered no measurable
support in the Thirty-ninth Congress."57  And in formulating the
Fourteenth Amendment itself, "Congress in 1866 considered and
rejected a series of proposals that would have made the Constitution
explicitly color-blind."58 Thus, the language of § 1 of the amendment
was changed from initial proposals that included a broad ban on
distinctions based on race 9 to the present wording suggested by
Representative John Bingham, which was recognized as a more
narrowly targeted ban on racially oppressive measures.6'
For Bingham and others, a constitutional amendment guaranteeing
the natural rights of citizens against infringement by the states
(however such rights were identified) may conceivably have been
the paramount object. The Republican consensus as a whole-the
votes that carried the Fourteenth Amendment in the Thirty-ninth
Congress-chose Bingham's formula as the lesser of two evils.
Requiring a constitutional provision that would make Black Codes
impossible, Republicans embarked on the perilous course of
protecting undefined rights against state infringement, despite their
fundamental disinclination to disturb the federal structure, because
the straightforward alternative had consequences that were clear but
unacceptable. The effective way to secure the equality of the races
before the law was to impose a rule of nondiscrimination.
Contemplating the consequences of such a rule in 1866, Republicans
decided that what they wanted after all was only a selective and
partial equality before the law. The way to achieve this, they
discovered, was to guarantee "equality," leaving it to others to
determine what "equality" might entail.6'
The conclusion that the Thirty-ninth Congress saw the Equal
Protection Clause as an anti-oppression rather than an anti-
differentiation principle is also supported by the fact that the very
same Congress enacted race-conscious legislation. During
Reconstruction, Congress enacted a series of social welfare programs
whose benefits were limited to African-Americans. 62  For present
57. Id.
58. Id. at 69.
59. One early proposal stated, "'All national and state laws shall be equally
applicable to every citizen, and no discrimination shall be made on account of race
and color."' See Kull, supra note 41, at 67 (quoting Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
10 (1865)). A later proposal contained language stating, "'No discrimination shall be
made by any state, nor by the United States, as to the civil rights of persons because
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."' Id. at 83 (quoting Benjamin B.
Kendrick, The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction 85
(1914)).
60. See id. at 69 ("[Tihe evidence shows that an open-ended promise of equality
was added to the Constitution because to its moderate proponents it meant less, not
more, than the rule of nondiscrimination that was the rejected radical alternative.").
61. Id. at 87.
62. See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 71 Va. L. Rev. 753 (1985) [hereinafter Schnapper,
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purposes, the most significant of these was the 1866 Freedmen's
Bureau Act, "the most far-reaching, racially restricted and vigorously
contested of those programs,' 63 which the Thirty-ninth Congress not
only passed, but supported by a margin sufficient to override
President Johnson's veto. 4 Because "Congress, fully aware of the
racial limitations in the Freedmen's Bureau programs, could not have
intended the [Fourteenth] amendment to forbid the adoption of such
remedies by itself or the states, 65 it could not have understood the
Equal Protection Clause to embody an anti-differentiation principle.66
Even those scholars who argue that the Equal Protection Clause
was originally understood to be broad enough to prohibit racial
segregation do so on anti-oppression rather than anti-differentiation
grounds. To the generation that drafted the Fourteenth Amendment,
what was objectionable about racial segregation, if anything, was its
oppressive purpose, not that it drew distinctions between groups on
irrelevant grounds. Thus, to support his contention that the original
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause was consistent with the
intention to prohibit segregation in public schools, Michael
McConnell appeals to the arguments of the contemporaneous
opponents of segregated schools who
Affirmative Action].
63. Id. at 784.
64. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3842 (1866) (Senate vote); id. at 3850
(House vote).
65. Schnapper, Affirmative Action, supra note 62, at 785.
66. Schnapper reinforces this argument as follows:
The terms of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 also make clear that
the race-conscious Reconstruction programs were consistent with the
fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection. Proponents of the
fourteenth amendment repeatedly emphasized that one of its primary
purposes was to place in the Constitution the principles of section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act. Unlike the fourteenth amendment, section 1 of the Act
contains no state action requirement, and is thus enforceable against federal
officials as well as private parties. Therefore, if the Civil Rights Act had
forbidden benign race-conscious programs, it would have virtually shut
down the Freedmen's Bureau. For example, section 1 of the Act assured all
persons the right to contract, but only blacks could contract for education by
paying tuition to Bureau schools. Because Congress could not have
intended the Civil Rights Act to prohibit the Bureau's activities, the
amendment that constitutionalized the Act should not be construed to
invalidate other race-conscious programs.
Id. at 788 (footnotes omitted); see also Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 Yale
L.J. 427, 430 (1997).
In July 1866, the Thirty-Ninth Congress-the selfsame Congress that had
just framed the Fourteenth Amendment-passed a statute appropriating
money for certain poor women and children. Which ones? The act
appropriated money for "the relief of destitute colored women and
children." ... Year after year in the Civil War period-before, during, and
after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment-Congress made special
appropriations and adopted special procedures for awarding bounty and
prize money to the "colored" soldiers and sailors of the Union Army.
Id. at 430-31 (footnote omitted).
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had no difficulty declaring that racial segregation was a plain effort
"to defeat equal rights" to which all citizens are entitled under the
Fourteenth Amendment. They professed to consider the point
obvious and "self-evident." In his first major introductory speech,
Sumner stated that "[i]t is easy to see that the separate school
founded on an odious discrimination and sometimes offered as an
equivalent for the common school, is an ill-disguised violation of the
principle of Equality." He recounted an "incident occurring in
Washington, but which must repeat itself where ever separation is
attempted," where black children living near the public school were
"driven from its doors, and compelled to walk a considerable
distance ... to attend the separate school." Not only was this "super-
added pedestrianism and its attendant discomfort" a "measure of
inequality in one of its forms," but more importantly, "[t]he
indignity offered to the colored child is worse than any compulsory
exposure, and here not only the child suffers, but the race to which
he belongs is blasted and the whole community is hardened in
wrong.... This is plain oppression," Sumner declaimed, "which you,
sir, would feel keenly were it directed against you or your child. 67
It is also clear that the Equal Protection Clause was not originally
intended as an anti-subordination principle. Being designed to ensure
that Congress had the power to eliminate the black codes, it was
intended as a restriction on state legislative power,6" not as a mandate
that either the state or federal governments act to advance the social,
economic, or political prospects of the newly freed slaves. Such a
mandate would have been inconceivable in 1866.
But the Civil War Amendments were targeted at caste legislation,
that is, at specific laws that embodied discrimination and in this way
helped to create caste.... There was no general understanding that
these amendments imposed on government a general duty to
remove caste status or banned nondiscriminatory laws that
contributed to caste status-even if it was understood that Congress
would have the power to counteract the legacy of slavery with
affirmative legislation.6 9
Thus, whatever disagreements there may be about the original
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, there is consensus that the
anti-discrimination principle it embodied was understood as an anti-
oppression principle and that the discrimination it was intended to
prohibit was understood as the oppressive unequal treatment of
67. McConnell, Originalism, supra note 44, at 997 (alterations in original and
footnotes omitted).
68. This is indicated by the expression of section 1 of the Amendment as a
negative injunction: "[n]o state shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
69. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 2436.
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African-Americans (or, more generally, the members of any minority
group) intended to degrade, subjugate, or exploit them.7 '
[T]he history of the Fourteenth Amendment makes it clear that
section one was at least partly an antidiscrimination provision-that
whatever else section one was meant to do, it was meant to achieve
and protect, against the states, a fuller measure of equality for a
particular group of Americans, a group that had long been regarded
and treated as less than truly, fully human.71
At the time the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, the stronger,
more restrictive anti-differentiation interpretation was simply not in
contemplation.
The available historical evidence fails to support the proposition
that the generation of "We the people" that made the Fourteenth
Amendment a part of the Constitution understood the Amendment
to ban laws (or other governmental actions) based on race without
regard to whether the laws were racist.72
Thus, we can conclude, with Cass Sunstein, that "[o]riginally the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was understood as an
effort to eliminate racial caste-emphatically not as a ban on
distinctions on the basis of race. 73
B. Early Judicial Understanding: The Slaughter-House Cases to Plessy
Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, the courts
interpreted the anti-discrimination principle contained in the Equal
Protection Clause precisely as its drafters intended, as an anti-
oppression principle. Although, as the notorious case of Plessy v.
Feguson74 makes clear, there might be judicial disagreement about
whether or not legislation should be regarded as oppressive, there was
consensus that the legislation that the Equal Protection Clause barred
was legislation that was intended to oppress. There is almost no
instance of a court interpreting the Equal Protection Clause as
containing an anti-differentiation principle banning non-oppressive
classifications based on race.
During the thirty years that separated the drafting of the Fourteenth
Amendment from Justice Harlan's opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson,
70. See Perry, supra note 41, at 75.
What discrimination-what discriminatory laws-did they ban? It captures
at least a part of what they were getting at-indeed, the central part-to say
that they banned any discriminatory law based on the view that those against
whom the discrimination operates are "innately" or "inherently" or "by
nature" degraded or defective human beings, if human beings at all.
Id.
71. Id. at 84.
72. Id. at 100.
73. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 2439.
74. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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state and lower federal courts were repeatedly called upon to
determine whether the amendment embodied [an anti-
differentiation principle]; quite naturally, from a lawyer's point of
view, they found that it did not....
... The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had declined to
write the [anti-differentiation] principle into the Constitution, and
the first generation of judges to construe the amendment declined to
read what had not been written.75
The Supreme Court first construed the Fourteenth Amendment in
the Slaughter-House Cases,76 in which butchers challenged a Louisiana
law that favored certain business interests with the grant of a
monopoly on the operation of livestock yards and slaughterhouses in
the vicinity of New Orleans. Although the Slaughter-House Cases did
not involve racial discrimination and are remembered more for the
narrow construction the Court gave to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause than for its treatment of the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court began its analysis by explicitly characterizing the Fourteenth
Amendment as a measure directed against oppressive action by the
state governments. After recounting the depredations imposed on the
freed slaves by the black codes,77 the Court went on to identify the
purpose of the amendment as the alleviation of this type of
oppression.
These circumstances, whatever of falsehood or misconception may
have been mingled with their presentation, forced upon the
statesmen who had conducted the Federal government in safety
through the crisis of the rebellion, and who supposed that by the
thirteenth article of amendment they had secured the result of their
labors, the conviction that something more was necessary in the way
of constitutional protection to the unfortunate race who had
suffered so much. They accordingly passed through Congress the
proposition for the fourteenth amendment ....
We repeat, then, in the light of this recapitulation of events,
almost too recent to be called history, but which are familiar to us
all; and on the most casual examination of the language of these
amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading
purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and
without which none of them would have been even suggested; we
mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm
establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made
75. Kull, supra note 41, at 88-89.
76. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
77. See supra text accompanying note 51.
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freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly
exercised unlimited dominion over him.78
Interpreting the Equal Protection Clause in light of this purpose, the
Court clearly regarded the Clause as embodying an anti-oppression
principle.
In the light of the history of these amendments, and the pervading
purpose of them, which we have already discussed, it is not difficult
to give a meaning to [the Equal Protection Clause]. The existence
of laws in the States where the newly emancipated negroes resided,
which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them
as a class, was the evil to be remedied by this clause, and by it such
laws are forbidden.79
Indeed, the Court went even further to describe the Equal Protection
Clause as an anti-oppression principle created specifically for the
benefit of African-Americans.
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by
way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of
their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this
provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that
emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its application
to any other. But as it is a State that is to be dealt with, and not
alone the validity of its laws, we may safely leave that matter until
Congress shall have exercised its power, or some case of State
oppression, by denial of equal justice in its courts, shall have claimed
a decision at our hands."
This race conscious formulation of the purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause is the clearest possible indication that the Court
could not have seen it as an anti-differentiation principle. 1
The Court reconfirmed its view of the Equal Protection Clause as
an anti-oppression principle seven years later in Strauder v. West
Virginia,82 which involved a West Virginia statute that barred African-
Americans from serving on juries. As in the Slaughter-House Cases,
the Court began by characterizing the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment as the elimination of state government oppression.
This is one of a series of constitutional provisions having a common
purpose; namely, securing to a race recently emancipated, a race
that through many generations had been held in slavery, all the civil
78. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 70-71.
79. Id. at 81.
80. Id.
81. Furthermore, by characterizing the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause as
the elimination of oppressive state legislation, the Court made it clear that it did not
conceive of the Clause as an anti-subordination principle mandating action to
eliminate social inequality, something the Court made explicit in the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See infra text accompanying notes 93-97.
82. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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rights that the superior race enjoy. The true spirit and meaning of
the amendments.., cannot be understood without keeping in view
the history of the times when they were adopted, and the general
objects they plainly sought to accomplish. At the time when they
were incorporated into the Constitution, it required little knowledge
of human nature to anticipate that those who had long been
regarded as an inferior and subject race would, when suddenly
raised to the rank of citizenship, be looked upon with jealousy and
positive dislike, and that State laws might be enacted or enforced to
perpetuate the distinctions that had before existed. Discriminations
against them had been habitual. It was well known that in some
States laws making such discriminations then existed, and others
might well be expected .... They especially needed protection
against unfriendly action in the States where they were resident. It
was in view of these considerations the Fourteenth Amendment was
framed and adopted. It was designed to assure to the colored race
the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed
by white persons, and to give to that race the protection of the
general government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should be
denied by the States.83
The Court then condemned the West Virginia statute as precisely the
type of oppressive legislation the amendment was intended to
eradicate, characterizing it as: "unfriendly legislation against [African-
Americans] distinctively as colored,.., implying inferiority in civil
society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which
others enjoy, and [imposing] discriminations which are steps towards
reducing them to the condition of a subject race." 4
Admittedly, Strauder contains language that frequently has been
offered as evidence that the Court viewed the Equal Protection
Clause as embodying an anti-differentiation principle,85 specifically,
[The Fourteenth Amendment] ordains that no State shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,
or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws. What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall
be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether
colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and,
in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment
was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against
them by law because of their color?86
This interpretation is sustainable, however, only by taking these
sentences completely out of context and ignoring the immediately
following language quoted above87 that makes it clear that what was
83. Id. at 306.
84. Id. at 308.
85. See Kull, supra note 41, at 93.
86. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307.
87. See supra text accompanying note 84.
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objectionable about the statute was its assumption of African-
American inferiority, not that it made a distinction on the basis of
race. The Court's apparent endorsement of an anti-differentiation
approach is easily explained in the context of jury service since it is
only by forbidding distinctions on the basis of race that rules
governing the selection of jurors can be purged of their oppressive
character. The Court makes it evident that this, rather than an anti-
differentiation interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, is the
basis for its decision when it states,
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly
denied by a statute all right to participate in the administration of
the law, as jurors, because of their color, though they are citizens,
and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practically a brand
upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a
stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing
to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to
secure to all others. 8
Additional evidence of the Court's anti-oppression interpretation
came three years later in Pace v. Alabama,9 in which the Court
upheld the constitutionality of a statute that increased the penalties
for adultery and fornication when the participants were of different
races. As in the previous cases, the Court described the purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause in anti-oppression terms, stating,
The counsel is undoubtedly correct in his view of the purpose of the
clause of the amendment in question, that it was to prevent hostile
and discriminating state legislation against any person or class of
persons. Equality of protection under the laws implies not only
accessibility by each one, whatever his race, on the same terms with
others to the courts of the country for the security of his person and
property, but that in the administration of criminal justice he shall
88. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308. The anti-oppression interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause was reinforced in Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), a
companion case to Strauder, in which the Court again declared that the
[o]ne great purpose of these amendments was to raise the colored race from
that condition of inferiority and servitude in which most of them had
previously stood, into perfect equality of civil rights with all other persons
within the jurisdiction of the States. They were intended to take away all
possibility of oppression by law because of race or color.
Id. at 344-45. This was something with which even the dissenting Justices agreed.
To remove the cause of them; to obviate objections to the validity of
legislation similar to that contained in the first section of the Civil Rights
Act; to prevent the possibility of hostile and discriminating legislation in
future by a State against any citizen of the United States, and the
enforcement of any such legislation already had; and to secure to all persons
within the jurisdiction of the States the equal protection of the laws,-the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.
Id. at 364-65 (Field, J., dissenting).
89. 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
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not be subjected, for the same offense, to any greater or different
punishment. 90
The Court found that the Alabama statute did not run afoul of this
prohibition because it applied the same penalty to the members of all
races:
The defect in the argument of counsel consists in his assumption that
any discrimination is made by the laws of Alabama in the
punishment provided for the offense for which the plaintiff in error
was indicted when committed by a person of the African race and
when committed by a white person.... [T]he offense.., cannot be
committed without involving the persons of both races in the same
punishment. Whatever discrimination is made in the punishment
prescribed in the two sections is directed against the offense
designated and not against the person of any particular color or race.
The punishment of each offending person, whether white or black, is
the same.91
This constitutes a clear, if implicit, rejection of an anti-differentiation
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. Such an interpretation
would prohibit legislation involving racial distinctions not relevant to
the end to be achieved. Because race is clearly irrelevant to the goal
of discouraging adultery and fornication, an anti-differentiation
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause would require the Court
to invalidate the Alabama statute. By not doing so, the Court made it
clear that it was not irrelevant racial classification per se that violates
the Clause, but racial classification designed to oppress.9 2
That same year, the Court made it equally clear that it did not view
the Equal Protection Clause as an anti-subordination principle in the
Civil Rights Cases.93  The Civil Rights Act of 1875 contained
provisions prohibiting private individuals from discriminating against
African-Americans in the furnishing of transportation or public
accommodations.94 In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court invalidated
these provisions on the grounds that they exceeded the power
conferred on Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment. In doing so,
the Court construed the Equal Protection Clause as applying
90. Id. at 584.
91. Id. at 585.
92. Of course, the statute in question was surely designed to oppress African-
Americans. By punishing more harshly intercourse between the races, it was
designed to discourage such intercourse, and was part of a larger scheme of legislation
intended to isolate and marginalize the African-American minority. The Court's
failure to recognize this greatly curtailed the effectiveness of the Equal Protection
Clause as an anti-oppression principle, something that is discussed subsequently. See
infra text accompanying notes 105-107. This, however, only reinforces the
observation that the Court could not have seen the Equal Protection Clause as
embodying the even more stringent anti-differentiation principle.
93. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
94. Id. at 9-10.
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exclusively to state action-as denying states the power to act
oppressively toward minorities, rather than as empowering Congress
to act directly to remedy social subordination.
[The Fourteenth Amendment] nullifies and makes void all State
legislation, and State action of every kind, which impairs the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or which
injures them in life, liberty or property without due process of law,
or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws. It
not only does this, but, in order that the national will, thus declared,
may not be a mere brutum fulmen, the last section of the
amendment invests Congress with power to enforce it by
appropriate legislation. To enforce what? To enforce the
prohibition. To adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the
effects of such prohibited State laws and State acts, and thus to
render them effectually null, void, and innocuous. This is the
legislative power conferred upon Congress, and this is the whole of
it. It does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects
which are within the domain of State legislation; but to provide
modes of relief against State legislation, or State action, of the kind
referred to. It does not authorize Congress to create a code of
municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but to provide
modes of redress against the operation of State laws, and the action
of State officers, executive or judicial, when these are subversive of
the fundamental rights specified in the amendment. Positive rights
and privileges are undoubtedly secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment; but they are secured by way of prohibition against
State laws and State proceedings affecting those rights and
privileges, and by power given to Congress to legislate for the
purpose of carrying such prohibition into effect: and such legislation
must necessarily be predicated upon such supposed State laws or
State proceedings, and be directed to the correction of their
operation and effect.
9 5
Far from interpreting the Equal Protection Clause as an anti-
subordination principle that mandated federal action to remedy the
subordination of African-Americans, the Court held that it did not
even permit Congress to take such action, declaring it "absurd to
affirm that... because the denial by a State to any persons, of the
equal protection of the laws, is prohibited by the amendment,
therefore Congress may establish laws for their equal protection."96
Although the Court clearly saw the Clause as prohibiting official
oppression, it just as clearly rejected the notion that the Clause
conferred the power to enact egalitarian legislation.
The truth is, that the implication of a power to legislate in this
manner is based upon the assumption that if the States are
forbidden to legislate or act in a particular way on a particular
95. Id. at 11-12.
96. Id. at 13.
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subject, and power is conferred upon Congress to enforce the
prohibition, this gives Congress power to legislate generally upon
that subject, and not merely power to provide modes of redress
against such State legislation or action. The assumption is certainly
unsound.9 7
Three years later, the Court amplified and extended its anti-
oppression interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause in Yick Wo
v. Hopkins," a case involving a San Francisco ordinance that
prohibited the operation of laundries in wooden buildings without the
consent of a board of supervisors. The ordinance had been applied so
as to deny consent to Chinese launderers while granting it to all
others. The Court overturned the ordinance on the ground that the
Equal Protection Clause prohibited not just explicitly oppressive
legislation, but the oppressive enforcement of putatively neutral
legislation as well. In doing so, the Court made it clear that it is the
oppressive nature of state action rather than its form that constitutes a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
[T]he facts shown establish an administration directed so exclusively
against a particular class of persons as to warrant and require the
conclusion, that, whatever may have been the intent of the
ordinances as adopted, they are applied by the public authorities
charged with their administration, and thus representing the State
itself, with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a
practical denial by the State of that equal protection of the laws
which is secured to the petitioners, as to all other persons, by the
broad and benign provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. Though the law itself be fair on
its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and
administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations
between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights,
the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution. 99
The most notorious case of this era is Plessy v. Ferguson, ' ° decided
in 1896. Plessy involved a challenge to a Louisiana statute requiring
railway companies to provide equal but separate accommodations for
Caucasian and African-American passengers. In upholding the
constitutionality of the statute, the Court limited the application of the
Equal Protection Clause to state actions intended to degrade or
subjugate African-Americans, i.e., those that "necessarily imply...
inferiority, ' '... explicitly rejecting both an anti-differentiation and anti-
subordination interpretation.
97. Id. at 14-15.
98. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
99. Id. at 373-74.
100. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
101. Id. at 544.
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The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature
of things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based
upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political
equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory
to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in
places where they are liable to be brought into contact, do not
necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have
been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the
competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police
power.1 2
The Court specifically held that benign racial distinctions, those
"enacted in good faith for the promotion for [sic] the public good"" 3
were permissible. The Equal Protection Clause banned only those
distinctions made "for the annoyance or oppression of a particular
class."" 4
Plessy is held in opprobrium not for the Court's endorsement of an
anti-oppression interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, but for
its characterization of the Louisiana statute as benign rather than as
one designed to oppress. The patent implication of legally enforcing a
separation between a disfavored minority and a politically dominant
majority is that the minority is an inferior caste with whom contact
would be repugnant. The Court turned a blind eye to this implication,
declaring,
the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the
colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by
reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored
race chooses to put that construction upon it. The argument
necessarily assumes that if, as has been more than once the case, and
is not unlikely to be so again, the colored race should become the
dominant power in the state legislature, and should enact a law in
precisely similar terms, it would thereby relegate the white race to
an inferior position. We imagine that the white race, at least, would
not acquiesce in this assumption. 5
By ruling that legislation requiring separate but equal
accommodations for Caucasians and African-Americans did not entail
the inferiority of African-Americans, the Court permitted thinly-
disguised oppressive legislation to survive constitutional scrutiny,
greatly undermining the Equal Protection Clause's effectiveness as an
anti-oppression principle. Thus, after expressly declaring the purpose
of the Equal Protection Clause to be the protection of African-
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 550.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 551.
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Americans or other minorities against oppressive state action, the
Court applied the Clause in a way that ensured that this purpose
would not be achieved.
It is this inconsistency between end and means that Justice Harlan
excoriated in his famous dissent, not the failure to interpret the Equal
Protection Clause as an anti-differentiation principle. Harlan's oft-
quoted declaration that "[o]ur constitution is color-blind" is
embedded in language that makes it clear that what the Equal
Protection Clause forbids is efforts to reduce African-Americans to a
state of second class citizenship, not racial classification per se:
But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no
caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens
are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most
powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his
surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the
supreme law of the land are involved.10 6
Harlan was furious with the majority for its interpretation of the
purpose of the statute, not its interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Thus, he declared:
What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly
create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than
state enactments which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored
citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to
sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens? That, as all will
admit, is the real meaning of such legislation as was enacted in
Louisiana....
If evils will result from the commingling of the two races upon
public highways established for the benefit of all, they will be
infinitely less than those that will surely come from state legislation
regulating the enjoyment of civil rights upon the basis of race. We
boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all other peoples.
But it is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state of the law which,
practically, puts the brand of servitude and degradation upon a large
class of our fellow citizens,-our equals before the law. The thin
disguise of "equal" accommodations for passengers in railroad
coaches will not mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong this day
done.1
0 7
In Plessy, the majority upheld the statute on the ground that,
although it separated the races, it did not degrade or oppress African-
106. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 560-62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Americans. Harlan disagreed, arguing that the statute was
unconstitutional precisely because its purpose was to denigrate
African-Americans. The Court, however, was unanimous that the
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to prevent the state
governments from creating second-class citizens or otherwise
degrading or oppressing African-Americans or other disfavored
groups; in other words, that it embodied an anti-oppression principle.
C. The Transition Period: Plessy to Brown
In the decades following Plessy, the judicial interpretation of the
anti-discrimination principle contained in the Equal Protection Clause
underwent a gradual transformation from an anti-oppression principle
to an anti-differentiation principle. As noted by Cass Sunstein,
At some stage in the twentieth century, there was a dramatic change
in the legal culture's understanding of the notion of equality under
the Constitution. The anticaste principle was transformed into an
antidifferentiation principle. No longer was the issue the
elimination of second-class citizenship. The focus shifted instead to
the entirely different question whether people who were similarly
situated had been treated similarly-a fundamental change."'
8
The reason for this transformation, I contend, is the incongruity
between end and means that cases such as Pace")9 and Plessy
introduced into Equal Protection jurisprudence. By allowing statutes
that contained technically neutral but nevertheless oppressive racial
classifications' 10 to survive constitutional scrutiny, the Court
guaranteed that an anti-oppression interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause could not fulfill its purpose of preventing
oppressive discriminatory legislation. If stigmatizing Jim Crow
legislation was regarded as unexceptionable, then the only way to
prevent the oppressive unequal treatment of African-Americans
would be to prevent the state from engaging in racial differentiation at
all. By blocking the effectiveness of the anti-oppression interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause, cases like Pace and Plessy created the
impetus for the Clause's re-interpretation as an anti-differentiation
principle.
Ironically, it was the very doctrine of separate but equal announced
in Plessy that served as the vehicle for this transformation. For,
although in the years following Plessy state-mandated segregation
survived a variety of constitutional challenges,' it almost never
108. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 2439-40 (footnote omitted).
109. See supra note 92.
110. The statutes equally prohibited Caucasians and African-Americans from
intermarrying or riding together in rail cars. See supra text accompanying notes 89,
100.
111. See, e.g., S. Covington & Cincinnati St. Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 252 U.S. 399
(1920) (upholding a statute requiring segregated railway cars against a challenge that
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survived a challenge based directly on the allegation that the
segregated facilities were not equal. 12 By continually piercing the
illusion that segregated facilities were equal, the Court transformed
the doctrine of separate but equal from a bulwark supporting state-
mandated segregation into the most powerful weapon against it."3
The process of methodically establishing that each individual instance
of Jim Crow legislation constituted unequal treatment gradually but
inexorably led the Court to the conclusion that all instances of
legislative racial classification were unconstitutional, covertly" 4 but
effectively converting the Equal Protection Clause into an anti-
differentiation principle.
This process began with the case of McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railway,"5 in which five African-American citizens of
Oklahoma challenged an Oklahoma statute that required the equal
provision of segregated railway cars, but allowed Pullman and dining
cars to be provided on the basis of demand. Because few African-
Americans could afford such accommodations, this meant that the
statute permitted railway companies to provide Pullman and dining
cars for the exclusive use of Caucasians without providing similar cars
for African-Americans. Although the Court ultimately dismissed the
challenge on procedural grounds," 16 it went out of its way to note that
the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause before doing so.
Because the statute required the segregation of the races without
ensuring that equal levels of accommodations would be open to
members of both races, the Court found that it failed to satisfy the
equality requirement of the separate but equal doctrine announced in
Plessy.
it violated the Commerce Clause); Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908)
(upholding a statute requiring segregated schools on the ground that a state has
authority to define the powers of domestic corporations).
112. The single exception may be Cumming v. Richmond County Board of
Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (upholding the Board of Education's use of funds to
maintain a high school for Caucasian children without providing a similar school for
African-American children). But see, Kull, supra note 41, at 129 ("[P]laintiffs went
out of their way to disclaim any objection to Richmond County's separate and
unequal 'primary, intermediate and grammar schools system.' Cumming presented
for decision neither the issue of segregation nor a well-founded challenge to unequal
treatment on racial lines . . ").
113. Andrew Kull has described this as "a judicial method by which a rule of
'separate but equal' might be turned against itself, and the legal shield of segregation
made the chief weapon against it." Kull, supra note 41, at 150.
114. The Court never explicitly renounced any of its early anti-oppression language
nor recognized any change in its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. Over
the period from Plessy to Brown, the Court simply ceased to articulate the meaning of
the Clause in anti-oppression terms while becoming increasingly willing to strike
down legislation that classified citizens by race.
115. 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
116. See id. at 162-63.
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Whether or not particular facilities shall be provided may doubtless
be conditioned upon there being a reasonable demand therefor, but,
if facilities are provided, substantial equality of treatment of persons
traveling under like conditions cannot be refused. It is the individual
who is entitled to the equal protection of the laws, and if he is denied
by a common carrier, acting in the matter under the authority of a
state law, a facility or convenience in the course of his journey which
under substantially the same circumstances is furnished to another
traveler, he may properly complain that his constitutional privilege
has been invaded.'
17
This reasoning represents a break with that employed in cases such
as Pace and Plessy. Those cases rested on the assumption that
legislation requiring the separation of the races affected both races
equally and therefore could not be oppressive. However, under that
assumption, there would be nothing objectionable about allowing
railway companies to supply its segregated cars in proportion to
customer demand. This would simply be a reasonable way of
adapting neutral legislation to the empirical situation."8  By
characterizing the right to the equal protection of the laws as an
individual right that is denied whenever any member of a minority
group does not have access to the same accommodations as the
majority regardless of whether that disparity arises from a reasonable
exercise of legislative discretion,"9 the Court was subjecting Jim Crow
legislation to a more stringent level of review than it applied to other
types of legislation. In thus looking askance at legislation that
classified citizens on the basis of race, the Court took its first step
toward interpreting the Equal Protection Clause as an anti-
differentiation principle.12
117. Id. at 161-62.
118. Michael Klarman has pointed out that Plessy "apparently contemplated that
unequal segregated facilities would be subject to justification just like any other sort
of inequality.... Racial classifications... were subjected to the same general
rationality test which had come to govern equal protection review of economic
regulation." Michael Klarman, An Interpretative History of Modern Equal Protection,
90 Mich. L. Rev. 213,229-30 (1991).
119. See Kull, supra note 41, at 137.
The opinion is written within a legal regime, established by Plessy, in which
Jim Crow laws were supposedly unobjectionable per se.... Yet [this]
conclusion makes sense only if laws imposing segregation are in fact
disfavored. How else could an "argument with respect to volume of traffic"
possibly be "without merit," when the issue is the reasonableness of a
regulation specifying services to be provided by common carriers?
Id.; see also Klarman, supra note 118, at 228-31.
120. See Kull, supra note 41, at 138.
Read closely, McCabe necessarily implied that laws requiring segregation
were constitutionally disfavored. If so, then the antidiscrimination content
of the Fourteenth Amendment included something more than those
minimum elements that the Court had previously acknowledged .... To
some greater but unspecified degree, the antidiscrimination principle was
already part of our constitutional law by 1914 ....
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The next step was taken in the case of Buchanan v. Warley,121 which
directly limited the range of application of the doctrine of separate but
equal. Buchanan involved a challenge to a municipal ordinance that
prohibited both African-Americans and Caucasians from residing on
a city block where most of the occupants were members of the other
race. As a straightforward segregation measure that applied equally
to both races, the ordinance appeared to fit squarely within the safe
harbor of Plessy's doctrine of separate but equal. Nevertheless, the
Court struck it down, stating,
As we have seen, this court has held laws valid which separated the
races on the basis of equal accommodations in public conveyances,
and courts of high authority have held enactments lawful which
provide for separation in the public schools of white and colored
pupils where equal privileges are given. But in view of the rights
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
such legislation must have its limitations, and cannot be sustained
where the exercise of authority exceeds the restraints of the
Constitution. We think these limitations are exceeded in laws and
ordinances of the character now before us.
122
This decision makes sense only if the Equal Protection Clause is
being read as consisting at least in part in an anti-differentiation
principle. Because Plessy's doctrine of separate but equal implied that
state-mandated segregation was not inherently oppressive, such
legislation could "exceed[ ] the restraints of the Constitution" when
applied equally to both races only if it was the racial classification
itself that was objectionable. Thus, Buchanan implies that, at least in
the context of residential housing and perhaps in all contexts other
than those of public conveyances and public schools, the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits legislation that differentiates between the
races on grounds not relevant to a legitimate, i.e., non-oppressive,
legislative end.
The trend toward reading the Equal Protection Clause as an anti-
differentiation principle continued in the case of Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada,1 23 in which an African-American applicant was
denied admission to the law school at the University of Missouri
because of his race. Under Missouri's segregated system of higher
education, the University of Missouri was reserved for Caucasian
students and Lincoln University for African-Americans. Although
Lincoln University had no law school, the state was willing to organize
a law school as soon as an African-American applied to study law and
would provide the applicant with a tuition grant to allow him or her to
attend an out of state law school in the meantime. Because the case
Id.
121. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
122. Id. at 81.
123. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
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dealt with publicly funded education, it fit squarely within what
Buchanan recognized as the realm of separate but equal. Further,
Missouri had gone as far as was possible toward providing equal
facilities for African-Americans short of maintaining a law school that
had no students. Despite this, the Court held that Missouri's
arrangement violated the Equal Protection Clause.124
In doing so, the Court completely disregarded the question of the
reasonableness of the state's efforts to provide equal facilities for
African-Americans, requiring an absolute equality of
accommodations for state-mandated segregation to pass muster.
Dismissing the adequacy of the state's alternative arrangements as
"beside the point," ' 5 the Court stated,
The admissibility of laws separating the races in the enjoyment of
privileges afforded by the State rests wholly upon the equality of the
privileges which the laws give to the separated groups within the
State. The question here is not of a duty of the State to supply legal
training, or of the quality of the training which it does supply, but of
its duty when it provides such training to furnish it to the residents
of the State upon the basis of an equality of right. By the operation
of the laws of Missouri a privilege has been created for white law
students which is denied to negroes by reason of their race. The
white resident is afforded legal education within the State; the negro
resident having the same qualifications is refused it there and must
go outside the State to obtain it. That is a denial of the equality of
legal right to the enjoyment of the privilege which the State has set
up, and the provision for the payment of tuition fees in another
State does not remove the discrimination. 1
26
In other words, when applying the doctrine of separate but equal,
separate but "reasonably" equal will not do.
In Gaines, the Court not only adopted the reasoning of McCabe as
the basis of its decision, but extended it to require the strictest degree
of equality for Jim Crow legislation to meet the constitutional
standard. By doing so, it completed the conversion of the doctrine of
separate but equal from Jim Crow's shield to a sword at his throat.
But this conversion could only be effected by reading the Equal
Protection Clause as mandating the highest degree of skepticism
toward racially differentiating legislation-that is, as containing a
fairly strong anti-differentiation principle.127
124. Id. at 352.
125. Id. at 349.
126. Id. at 349-50.
127. Support for this conclusion can also be found in Klarman, supra note 118,
where the author recognizes that McCabe and Gaines implied that "inequality was
conclusively (not even presumptively) objectionable with regard to racial
classifications, when it was not as to any others," id. at 228, and hence that "[i]n the
twentieth century... the separate-but-equal doctrine was rapidly detached from the
reasonableness requirement that had informed its inception." Id. at 230. From this,
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Following Gaines, language suggesting an anti-differentiation
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause began to appear
regularly in the Court's opinions. For example, in Hirabayashi v.
United States, 128 the Court upheld a wartime curfew imposed
exclusively on those of Japanese ancestry against a challenge on equal
protection grounds. However, in doing so, the Court stated,
Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine of equality. For that reason, legislative
classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been
held to be a denial of equal protection. 129
This sounds very much like a declaration that it is racial
differentiation itself that violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Furthermore, even in upholding the curfew, the Court appears to be
reading the Equal Protection Clause as an anti-differentiation
principle since it justifies the measure on the ground that the
distinction it draws is relevant to the legitimate legislative end of
protecting the country in time of war.
Because racial discriminations are in most circumstances irrelevant
and therefore prohibited, it by no means follows that, in dealing with
the perils of war, Congress and the Executive are wholly precluded
from taking into account those facts and circumstances which are
relevant to measures for our national defense and for the successful
prosecution of the war, and which may in fact place citizens of one
ancestry in a different category from others.... The adoption by
Government, in the crisis of war and of threatened invasion, of
measures for the public safety, based upon the recognition of facts
and circumstances which indicate that a group of one national
extraction may menace that safety more than others, is not wholly
beyond the limits of the Constitution and is not to be condemned
merely because in other and in most circumstances racial
distinctions are irrelevant. 31 1
This certainly seems to imply that all irrelevant racial distinctions
would violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
The suggestion that the Equal Protection Clause contained an anti-
differentiation principle was echoed the following year in Korematsu
v. United States,'3' in which the court upheld an exclusion order again
directed against those of Japanese ancestry. Stating that "all legal
he concludes that "by constitutionally requiring racially segregated facilities to
provide equal treatment to individuals of different races vis-a-vis each other rather
than vis-a-vis their racial group, the Justices laid the doctrinal groundwork for the
demise of segregation," id. at 231, that is, for the Equal Protection Clause to be read
as containing an anti-differentiation principle.
128. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
129. Id. at 100.
130. Id. at 100-01.
131. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect" and must be subject "to the most rigid scrutiny,"
the Court suggested that legislation that treated the races
differentially could be justified only by matters of "[p]ressing public
necessity."'32 This is quite a strong formulation indeed because, taken
literally, it suggests that racially differentiating legislation was
constitutional not when relevant, but only when necessary, to a
legitimate legislative end.
The transformation of the Equal Protection Clause from an anti-
oppression principle to an anti-differentiation principle was rendered
virtually complete by the trio of successor cases to Gaines challenging
state-mandated segregation in higher education: Sipuel v. Board of
Regents,'33 Sweatt v. Painter,'34 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents.'35 In Sipuel, the Court issued a per curiam opinion
reconfirming Gaines in holding that state-mandated segregation was
barred by the Equal Protection Clause unless there was a strict
equality of treatment between African-Americans and Caucasians. 13 6
Sweatt and McLaurin then demonstrated that the requisite equality
was so exacting as to be practically impossible to attain.
Sweatt involved an African-American who was denied admission to
the University of Texas Law School because of his race. During the
course of the litigation, Mr. Sweatt was offered admission to a law
school for African-Americans that the state court found to offer
"privileges, advantages, and opportunities for the study of law
substantially equivalent to those offered by the State to white students
at the University of Texas."' 37 The Court held that even this did not
satisfy the equality arm of the separate but equal doctrine because the
University of Texas was a better law school than the one open to
African-Americans.
Whether the University of Texas Law School is compared with the
original or the new law school for Negroes, we cannot find
substantial equality in the educational opportunities offered white
and Negro law students by the State. In terms of number of the
faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size of
the student body, scope of the library, availability of law review and
similar activities, the University of Texas Law School is superior.
What is more important, the University of Texas Law School
possesses to a far greater degree those qualities which are incapable
of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law
school. Such qualities, to name but a few, include reputation of the
faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence of
132. Id. at 216.
133. 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
134. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
135. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
136. Sipuel, 332 U.S. at 632-33.
137. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 632 (quoting the lower court).
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the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige. It is
difficult to believe that one who had a free choice between these law
schools would consider the question close.
138
Clearly, if states were required to offer African-Americans an equal
opportunity not just to attend law school, but to attend a law school
comparable in both tangible and intangible respects to that supplied to
Caucasians, no state would ever as a matter of fact meet this standard.
However, the Court went even further finding that the exclusion of
Caucasians itself was sufficient to render the law schools unequal.
The law school to which Texas is willing to admit petitioner excludes
from its student body members of the racial groups which number
85% of the population of the State and include most of the lawyers,
witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with whom petitioner
will inevitably be dealing when he becomes a member of the Texas
Bar. With such a substantial and significant segment of society
excluded, we cannot conclude that the education offered petitioner
is substantially equal to that which he would receive if admitted to
the University of Texas Law School. 13 9
But if excluding Caucasians rendered separate educational institutions
unequal, then segregated institutions could never be equal, making
the class of educational institutions that could satisfy the standard of
separate but equal look very much like the null set.
McLaurin took this even a step further, driving the penultimate nail
into the coffin of state-mandated segregation. In that case, an
African-American graduate student had been admitted to the
University of Oklahoma, which had formerly been restricted to
Caucasians, but was required to receive his education on a segregated
basis. The segregation consisted only in McLaurin being required to
sit alone in a row reserved for African-Americans in class and at
special tables in the library and cafeteria. The Court found that even
this arrangement did not meet the equality requirement because as a
result of being set apart, "appellant is handicapped in his pursuit of
effective graduate instruction. Such restrictions impair and inhibit his
ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with
other students, and, in general, to learn his profession.
140
The Court had now ruled that not only requiring separate
institutions, but separating the races within the same institution meant
that the state was treating the members of the two races unequally.
This made it clear that no arrangement could ever satisfy the
requirements of the doctrine of separate but equal and reduced the
Court's continued adherence to it to mere lip service. With
McLaurin, the Court had arrived at a point at which differential
138. Id. at 633-34.
139. Id. at 634.
140. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641.
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treatment itself was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,
something the Court recognized by declaring, "We hold that under
these circumstances the Fourteenth Amendment precludes
differences in treatment by the state based upon race."'' Having thus
effectively transformed the Equal Protection Clause into an anti-
differentiation principle, all that remained was for the Court to
announce this result explicitly, which it famously did in Brown by
declaring that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently
unequal."'42
D. The Anti-Differentiation Period: Brown to Griggs
1. The Equal Protection Clause
Much is often made of the fact that Brown did not overrule Plessy
or declare racial segregation to be unconstitutional per se. By holding
that "in the field of public education, the doctrine of 'separate but
equal' has no place,' 43 the Court ostensibly did no more than move
public education into the same category as residential housing to
which, as the Court recognized in Buchanan, the doctrine of separate
but equal did not apply.'" However, despite the court's moderate
characterization of its ruling, the practical effect of Brown was to
complete the transformation of the Equal Protection Clause into an
anti-differentiation principle that would strike down all racial
classifications that were not necessary to attain a legitimate legislative
end.
The Equal Protection Clause was clearly originally intended as an
anti-oppression principle designed to prohibit not all racial
differentiation, but only that designed to oppress African-Americans
or other minorities. However, with the acquiescence of the Court in
cases like Pace and Plessy, the states quickly learned how to continue
racially oppressive policies by disguising them as neutral measures
that affected both races equally. This meant that the only way to truly
prevent oppressive state discrimination was to prohibit states from
drawing racial distinctions at all. Thus, to realize the original anti-
oppression end of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court had to
abandon its original anti-oppression interpretation of the Clause in
favor of the stronger anti-differentiation interpretation. Accordingly,
beginning with Brown and without any explicit repudiation of its
141. ld. at 642.
142. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954).
143. Id.
144. See supra text accompanying note 79; see also Klarman, supra note 118, at 251
(arguing that "Brown represented no significant advance in equal protection
thought-that is, the Court simply added education to the panoply of rights that the
Fourteenth Amendment insulated from racial discrimination").
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earlier anti-oppression language, the Court simply applied the Equal
Protection Clause as though it contained an anti-differentiation
principle.'45
Brown may have struck down state-mandated segregation in public
schools on the ground that segregated schools were inherently
unequal, but in Brown's companion case of Bolling v. Sharpe,146 the
Court made its anti-differentiation orientation explicit by declaring
that the District of Columbia's segregated public schools violated the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because "[s]egregation in
public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental
objective."' 47  The Court then issued a series of memorandum
opinions striking down state-mandated segregation in almost all
contexts with no additional explanation. The Court simply held it to
be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause for states to mandate or
maintain segregated parks,'14  beaches and bathhouses, 49  golf
courses, 5" buses,' airport restaurants,152 courtroom seating,153 and
auditoriums.154 Only the hypothesis that the Equal Protection Clause
was now functioning as an anti-differentiation principle and that "the
entire separate but equal doctrine was invalidated, requiring that
classifications be subject to 'strict scrutiny' and prohibited,' ' 55 could
explain these results. The Court implicitly confirmed this inference in
1959 by upholding without comment a decision enjoining the
enforcement of a Louisiana statute prohibiting interracial prize
fighting on the ground that, in Brown, "the Supreme Court held that
classification based on race is inherently discriminatory and violative
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' ' 56
145. Indeed, the Court's abandonment of the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment in Brown is often remarked. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note
118, at 251 ("From a doctrinal, as opposed to a social, perspective, Brown's principal
historical significance may have been its cavalier disregard of the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also Berger, supra note 41, at
241-45; Richard Kluger, Simple Justice 634 (1976); Bickel, supra note 41.
146. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
147. Id. at 500.
148. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
149. Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
150. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
151. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
152. Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962).
153. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963).
154. Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964).
155. John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 14.8(d)(2), at 704
(6th ed. 2000).
156. Dorsey v. State Athletic Comm'n, 168 F. Supp. 149, 151 (E.D. La. 1958), affd
mem., 359 U.S. 533 (1959). Similarly, in Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964), the
Court upheld without comment a District Court decision invalidating state statutes
requiring that official records be maintained separately for African-Americans and
Caucasians on the ground that the post-Brown line of Supreme Court decisions "has
made it axiomatic that no state can directly dictate or causally promote a distinction
in the treatment of persons solely on the basis of their color." Hamm v. Va. State Bd.
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It was not long before the Court rendered this implication explicit.
It did so first in 1963 in the case of Goss v. Board of Education,' in
which the Court struck down a school transfer program designed to
defeat desegregation efforts by allowing parents to voluntarily
transfer their children to schools in which they would be in the racial
majority. In doing so, the Court declared that "[c]lassifications based
on race for purposes of transfers between public schools ... violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [because]
racial classifications are 'obviously irrelevant and invidious."'"" 8 It
reconfirmed its anti-differentiation interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause the following year in Anderson v. Martin1 59 by
striking down a statute requiring a candidate's race to be noted on
election ballots on the ground that the racial differentiation could not
"be deemed to be reasonably designed to meet legitimate
governmental interests in informing the electorate as to candidates
[because there was] no relevance in the State's pointing up the race of
the candidate as bearing upon his qualifications for office." 6 ' The
Court's shift to an anti-differentiation interpretation was underscored
by its observation that
[I]n a State or voting district where Negroes predominate, that race
is likely to be favored by a racial designation on the ballot, while in
those communities where other races are in the majority, they may
be preferred. The vice lies not in the resulting injury but in placing
the power of the State behind a racial classification that induces
racial prejudice at the polls. 161
The clear implication of the Court's locating the "vice" of the statute
not in the "injury" it did to African-Americans, but in the irrational
racial classification itself was that the anti-oppression interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause had given way to an anti-differentiation
interpretation) 62
of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156,157 (E.D. Va. 1964).
157. 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
158. Id. at 687 (quoting Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 203
(1944)).
159. 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
160. Id. at 403.
161. Id. at 402.
162. The statute in question in Anderson, unlike those previously addressed by the
Court, did not mandate racial segregation. Andrew Kull points out that not only did
it not "subject any person to distinctive treatment because of his race," it fostered "an
informed electorate by providing an identification that some voters presumably
considered as significant to their choice as the other information commonly printed
on the ballot, the candidates' names and political affiliation." Kull, supra note 41, at
165. As he observes,
That such a statute is politically offensive is not difficult to see. To find it
unconstitutional as well-for reasons independent of the disapprobation of
judges-implied a Constitution profoundly color-blind, to the point that the
government was not only forbidden to treat one citizen differently from
another because of his race .... but was moreover forbidden to suggest,
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The shift to an anti-differentiation interpretation had been
stimulated by the dislocation between end and means introduced into
equal protection jurisprudence by Plessy and Pace. With Brown and
its successors, the Court had interred Plessy. In McLaughlin v.
Florida'63 and Loving v. Virginia,"4 the Court interred Pace.
McLaughlin involved a statute that made interracial cohabitation a
criminal offense. Because the statute visited equal punishment on
both the African-American and Caucasian offender, Pace implied that
the statute was constitutional-an implication that the Court now
flatly rejected. In holding that the statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it contained an irrelevant racial
classification, the Court identified the constitutional standard being
applied as follows:
Our inquiry.., is whether there clearly appears in the relevant
materials some overriding statutory purpose requiring the
proscription of the specified conduct when engaged in by a white
person and a Negro, but not otherwise. Without such justification
the racial classification contained in § 798.05 is reduced to an
invidious discrimination forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause. 65
Loving involved a challenge to Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute
criminalizing interracial marriages. Explicitly rejecting Pace's "notion
that the mere 'equal application' of a statute containing racial
classifications is enough to remove the classifications from the
Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of all invidious racial
discriminations,' 66 the Court gave the strongest possible endorsement
to an anti-differentiation interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause:
At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial
classifications ... be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny," and, if
they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to
the accomplishment of some permissible state objective,
independent of the racial discrimination which it was the object of
the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate. 67
With McLaughlin and Loving, there remained no doubt that the
Court was reading the Equal Protection Clause as a prohibition on all
irrelevant racial classification.
68
directly or indirectly, that racial distinctions could be relevant to the citizen's
own choices in matters of public importance.
Id.
163. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
164. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
165. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192-93.
166. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
167. Id. at 11 (citation omitted).
168. Klarman identifies the decisions in McLaughlin and Loving as marking the
Court's adoption of a racial classification rule:
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2. The Civil Rights Act
There can be little doubt that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
originally intended to embody an anti-differentiation principle. At
the time of its introduction into Congress, no other interpretation of
the anti-discrimination principle was conceivable. Only an anti-
differentiation principle was consistent with the position being
advanced by the civil rights movement and only an anti-differentiation
principle stood a chance of being passed by Congress.
Consider the position of the civil rights movement first. For the
preceding decade and a half, the leaders of the struggle against Jim
Crow had been arguing that legislation allowing the states to draw
distinctions among citizens on the basis of race were unconstitutional
violations of the Equal Protection Clause. Beginning with Thurgood
Marshall's brief in Sipuel, civil rights advocates had asserted that
"[c]lassifications and distinctions based on race and color have no
moral or legal validity in our society. They are contrary to our
constitution and laws .... "I 69  Liberal academic opinion was in
agreement as indicated by the amicus brief submitted by a committee
of law professors in Sweatt, arguing, "Laws which give equal
protection are those which make no discrimination because of race in
the sense that they make no distinction because of race. As soon as
laws make a right or responsibility dependent solely on race, they
violate the 14th Amendment."''" In Brown, the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund stated as its first point that "Distinctions drawn by state
authorities on the basis of color or race violate the Fourteenth
Amendment," and argued that "[t]his Court in a long line of decisions
has made it plain that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state
from making racial distinctions in the exercise of governmental
power."'71  The Legal Defense Fund continued to argue that the
While individual Justices may have arrived there earlier, the full Court first
stated a presumptive rule against racial classifications in McLaughlin v.
Florida, where it struck down on equal protection grounds a state law
criminalizing cohabitation by unmarried interracial couples. For the first
time the Court in McLaughlin both articulated and applied a more rigorous
review standard to racial classifications, requiring as justification an
"overriding" state purpose as well as a showing that the classification was
"necessary," rather than just rationally related, to the proffered
governmental interest. This racial classification rule subsequently was
reaffirmed in Loving v. Virginia, where the Court finally resolved the
miscegenation issue that it had so unglamorously ducked in Naim and
evaded in McLaughlin.
Klarman, supra note 118, at 255 (footnotes omitted).
169. Brief for Petitioner at 27, Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (No.
369).
170. Motion and Brief of Amicus Curiae Committee of Law Teachers against
Segregation in Legal Education in Support of Petition for Certiorari at 8-9, Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (No. 44).
171. Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and for Respondents in No. 10 on
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Equal Protection Clause be read as an anti-differentiation principle in
the post-Brown series of cases, submitting its brief in Anderson v.
Martin that argued that a statute requiring a candidate's race to be
noted on election ballots was "[c]ontrary to the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, [because it] on its face classifies
persons according to race" '172 in August of 1963 while the
Congressional debate on the Civil Rights Act was already ongoing.
After fifteen years of contending that the Constitution prohibited
both state and federal1 3 legislation that classified citizens on the basis
of race, the civil rights community could not then turn around and
advocate federal legislation that allowed such classification. The idea
of the Civil Rights Act as either an anti-oppression or anti-
subordination principle was simply not within the contemplation of
the civil rights movement in 1964.
Now consider the Congressional debate. In both the House and the
Senate, one of the main strategies of the opponents of the Civil Rights
Act was to portray Title VII as containing an anti-subordination
principle. The Act's critics charged that Title VII's ban on
discrimination would empower the new Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission to order employers to hire according to race
in order to achieve a proper racial balance in the workforce. Because
it was clear that no bill containing an anti-subordination principle
could possibly pass, the supporters of the Act had to continually
reiterate that Title VII was an anti-differentiation principle that
prohibited all consideration of race in employment decisions.
In the House, the Act's opponents on the Judiciary Committee
issued a minority report claiming that under the Civil Rights Act, an
employer "may be forced to hire according to race, to 'racially balance'
those who work for him in every job classification or be in violation of
Federal law"' 74 and concluding "[t]hat this is, in fact, a not too subtle
system of racism-in-reverse cannot be successfully denied." 75 To
combat this, the proponents of the Act had to reassure the House that
the Act's "primary task is to make certain that the channels of
employment are open to persons regardless of their race and that jobs
Reargument at 16, 21, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 8); see also
Brief for Petitioners at 11, Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (No. 8) ("One of the
constitutional guarantees, which petitioners may not lawfully be deprived of the
benefit of, is that as citizens no distinctions be made between them and other citizens
because of race or color alone." (emphasis omitted)).
172. Brief for Appellants at 7, Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (No. 51).
173. See Brief for Petitioners, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (No. 8).
174. H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, pt 1, at 69 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2431,
2438.




in companies or membership in unions are strictly filled on the basis
of qualification"'176 and that
Even [a] court could not order that any preference be given to any
particular race, religion or other group, but would be limited to
ordering an end of discrimination....
... The bill would do no more than prevent... employers[ ] from
discriminating against or in favor of workers because of their race,
religion, or national origin.
It is likewise not true that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission would have power to rectify existing 'racial or religious
imbalance' in employment by requiring the hiring of certain people
without regard to their qualifications simply because they are of a
given race or religion.1 77
Thus, the Act's supporters made it as clear as was possible that the
Act was intended to work as an anti-differentiation principle.
This scenario was repeated even more vociferously in the Senate
debate. Southern Senators continued to oppose the Act on the
ground that it would require race-conscious employment practices to
achieve and maintain a racially balanced workforce'178 a charge that
was given added force by a contemporaneous decision by the Illinois
Fair Employment Practices Commission ordering Motorola to hire an
African-American applicant who had failed an employment test.179
To combat this, all of the principal sponsors of the Act repeatedly
went on record arguing that this was impossible because as an anti-
differentiation principle, the Act prohibited all consideration of race
in employment decisions and required them to be made on the basis
of ability and qualifications. Hubert Humphrey, the majority whip
and one of the two bipartisan floor managers of the bill explicitly
176. H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, pt 2, at 29 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2431,
2516.
177. 110 Cong. Rec. 1518 (1964).
178. For example, Senator Robertson charged that
It is contemplated by this title that the percentage of colored and white
population in a community shall be in similar percentages in every business
establishment that employs over 25 persons. Thus, if there were 10,000
colored persons in a city and 15,000 whites, an employer with 25 employees
would, in order to overcome racial imbalance, be required to have 10
colored personnel and 15 white. And if by chance that employer had 20
colored employees, he would have to fire 10 of them in order to rectify the
situation. Of course, this works the other way around where whites would
be fired.
110 Cong. Rec. 5092 (1964).
179. Myart v. Motorola Inc., Illinois Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, Charge
No. 63C-127 (Feb. 26, 1964) (Decision and Order of Hearing Examiner), reprinted in
110 Cong. Rec. 5662 (1964).
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defined discrimination in anti-differentiation terms, stating "the
meaning of racial or religious discrimination is perfectly clear .... [I]t
means a distinction in treatment given to different individuals because
of their different race, religion, or national origin." ' He then went
on to declare that
Contrary to the allegations of some opponents of this title, there is
nothing in it that will give any power to the Commission or to any
court to require hiring, firing, or promotion of employees in order to
meet a racial "quota" or to achieve a certain racial balance....
... In fact, the very opposite is true. Title VII prohibits
discrimination. In effect, it says that race, religion and national
origin are not to be used as the basis for hiring and firing. Title VII
is designed to encourage hiring on the basis of ability and
qualifications, not race or religion. 8'
Thomas Kuchel, the minority whip and other floor manager,
underscored this by stating that "[e]mployers and labor organizations
could not discriminate in favor of or against a person because of his
race, his religion, or his national origin. In such matters... the bill
now before us ... is color-blind."' 82 The bipartisan captains for Title
VII, Joseph Clark and Clifford Chase, filed a joint memorandum
explaining that because "[t]o discriminate is to make a distinction, to
make a difference in treatment or favor, and those distinctions or
differences in treatment or favor which are prohibited.., are those
which are based on any five of the forbidden criteria: race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin,"'8 3 it followed that
any deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever such a
balance may be, would involve a violation of title VII because
maintaining such a balance would require an employer to hire or to
refuse to hire on the basis of race. It must be emphasized that
discrimination is prohibited as to any individual1 84
180. 110 Cong. Rec. 5423 (1964).
181. Id. at 6549. Later in the debate, Humphrey reiterated these points, stating,
The title does not provide that any preferential treatment in employment
shall be given to Negroes or to any other persons or groups. It does not
provide that any quota systems may be established to maintain racial
balance in employment. In fact, the title would prohibit preferential
treatment for any particular group, and any person, whether or not a
member of any minority group, would be permitted to file a complaint of
discriminatory employment practices.
Id. at 11,848. At one point Humphrey became so exasperated with the charge that
Title VII could function as an anti-subordination principle that he famously declared,
"[i]f the Senator can find in title VII... any language which provides that an
employer will have to hire on the basis of percentage or quota related to color... I
will start eating the pages one after another, because it is not in there." Id. at 7420.
182. Id. at 6564.




Finally, in order to end debate and secure the Act's passage, a
bipartisan coalition of Senate and House leaders and representatives
of the Johnson administration agreed to a set of amendments, several
of which were designed to guarantee that the Act could not be
interpreted as an anti-subordination, and perhaps not even as an anti-
oppression, principle. Thus, the final bill contained section 703(h)
which was designed to ensure that the Act would not interfere with
merit-based hiring practices by guaranteeing employers the right "to
give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability
test [that was not] designed, intended or used to discriminate because
of race, color, religion, sex or national origin"' 5 and section 7030)
which was designed to ensure that the government would not engage
in direct anti-subordination efforts by stating "[n]othing contained in
[Title VII] shall be interpreted to require any employer ... to grant
preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of
the race... of such individual or group on account of"'86 racial
imbalance in the work force. It would be difficult to imagine what
could constitute stronger evidence that the Act was understood as an
anti-differentiation principle.
With the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the Supreme
Court's decision in Loving in 1967, it was clearly established that
within the American legal system, the anti-discrimination principle
was to be understood as an anti-differentiation principle. This
understanding survived a mere four years until the Court decided the
case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.'87
E. The Period of Confusion: Griggs to the Present
1. The Civil Rights Act
If it was ironic that the doctrine of separate but equal was to prove
the downfall of Jim Crow, it is equally ironic that the passage of the
Civil Rights Act was to prove the downfall of the anti-differentiation
interpretation of the anti-discrimination principle. As clear as it is
that the Act was intended as an anti-differentiation principle, it is
equally clear that the purpose of the Act was to improve the economic
condition of African-Americans. But after decades of public school
segregation and oppressive Jim Crow legislation had left African-
Americans with less educational attainment, fewer job skills, and less
experience than Caucasians, requiring all educational and
employment decisions to be made on a purely meritocratic basis was
obviously a poor way to achieve this purpose. This reality
undermined the mid-1960's consensus in support of the anti-
185. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1994).
186. Id. § 20O0e-2(j).
187. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
[Vol. 71
PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION
differentiation interpretation of the anti-discrimination principle
extremely rapidly;88 so rapidly, in fact, that by the time the Court
decided Griggs in 1971, it was able to construe the Civil Rights Act as
containing an anti-subordination principle.
Griggs involved a challenge to Duke Power Company's policy of
requiring either a high school education or a passing score on an
intelligence test for employment in or transfer to more favorable jobs
at its plant. Duke Power's African-American employees claimed that
because these requirements disqualified African-American applicants
at a substantially higher rate than Caucasians, they constituted a
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Given the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act, both the District Court and Court of
Appeals quite naturally interpreted Title VII as an anti-differentiation
principle prohibiting the differential treatment of job applicants and
employees on the basis of their race. This meant that a violation
consisted in an act that was intended to either advance or retard any
individual's employment opportunities because of his or her race.
Under this interpretation, intent was a necessary element of a
violation, and because Title VII banned all differential treatment, a
complainant's status as a member of a minority or dominant group
was irrelevant. Accordingly, the lower courts held that a violation
required proof of a discriminatory intent or purpose and paid no
attention to the effect of the challenged practices on African-
Americans as a group.
The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation of the statute
wholesale. It ruled both that proof of an intent to discriminate was
unnecessary and that the effect of an employment practice on
minority groups had to be taken into account.
The Court of Appeals held that the Company had adopted the
diploma and test requirements without any "intention to
discriminate against Negro employees." We do not suggest that
either the District Court or the Court of Appeals erred in examining
the employer's intent; but good intent or absence of discriminatory
intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing
mechanisms that operate as "built-in headwinds" for minority
groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.'
188. For example, by 1969, the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs' "Philadelphia Plan" imposed proportional hiring requirements
on construction companies in Philadelphia that did business with the Federal
government, something that was extended to all federal contractors in the
Department of Labor's Revised Order No. 4 in 1970. See Graham, supra note 1, at
326-29, 340-45. Further, the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission had
consciously adopted an anti-subordination definition of discrimination as "all conduct
which adversely affects minority group employment opportunities," Alfred W.
Blumrosen, Black Employment and the Law vii-viii (1971), during the Johnson
administration. See Graham, supra note 1, at 247-51.
189. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (emphasis added and citation omitted).
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According to the Court, "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to
the consequences of employment practices, not simply the
motivation,"19" and thus, "[u]nder the Act, practices, procedures, or
tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot
be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices.' ' 91 In other words, employment
practices that have the effect of continuing the subordination of
minorities violate Title VII. In thus establishing what became known
as the disparate impact theory of discrimination, the Griggs Court was
clearly reading the Civil Rights Act as an anti-subordination principle.
Two years later, the Court was called upon to decide what was
required for a complainant to establish that he or she had been subject
to an adverse employment decision because of his or her membership
in one of the Act's five protected classes. With the passage of the Act,
any employer wishing to engage in discriminatory employment
practices knew enough not to do so openly. Such an employer would
always give a neutral reason for any employment decision adverse to a
member of a protected class. How could one who was a victim of such
covert discrimination prove this in court?
The Court answered this question in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green'92 by creating a rebuttable presumption that when an adverse
employment decision is taken against a qualified minority it is for a
discriminatory reason. In McDonnell Douglas, the complainant was
an African-American who applied for a job for which he was qualified
but was not hired. He claimed he was not hired because of his race;
the company claimed it was because he had engaged in unlawful
protest activities against it. To resolve such evidentiary conflicts, the
Court established a three-step process for proving the existence of a
discriminatory motive. First, the complainant must establish a prima
facie case, which may be done by showing,
(i) that he belongs to a [protected class]; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications. "
If the complainant meets this burden, the second step requires "the
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the employee's rejection."' 94 If the employer can do so, then the third
step requires that the complainant "be afforded a fair opportunity to
show that [the employer's] stated reason for [the complainant's]
190. Id.
191. Id. at 430.
192. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).




rejection was in fact pretext." '95 By thus creating a presumption of
discrimination against minorities, the Court was acting to prevent
employers from evading Title VII by hiding discriminatory intentions
behind neutral facades.
McDonnell Douglas's disparate treatment model of discrimination
addressed employers' intentional actions. Was this theory consistent
with Griggs' disparate impact model? If the McDonnell Douglas
Court was reading the anti-discrimination principle as an anti-
oppression principle, the answer would be yes. Viewed in that light,
McDonnell Douglas would have been designed to discourage actions
that intentionally disfavored minorities. Such actions obviously
perpetuate if not increase the subordination of minorities, and thus
would also be barred by the anti-subordination interpretation applied
in Griggs. As previously observed, the anti-subordination
interpretation is broader than and encompasses the anti-oppression
interpretation.1 96 Thus, if the rule of McDonnell Douglas is read as a
protection for minorities against racially, ethnically, and sexually
oppressive behavior, it is perfectly compatible with that of Griggs.
The Court was not willing to abandon the original understanding of
the Civil Rights Act as an anti-differentiation principle so easily,
however. This was made clear in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co., 17 in which two Caucasian employees claimed they
were the victims of intentional discrimination when they were fired
for misappropriating cargo but an African-American guilty of the
same offense was not. The Court found the case to be
"indistinguishable from McDonnell Douglas,"19 and held that "Title
VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioners in this
case upon the same standards as would be applicable were they
Negroes."1 99  In thus construing Title VII as prohibiting the
differential treatment of the members of any race including
Caucasians rather than merely the oppressive treatment of minorities,
the Court was clearly reading it as an anti-differentiation principle.
The problem with this is that it makes McDonnell Douglas's
disparate treatment model of discrimination incompatible with
Griggs' disparate impact model. Griggs' disparate impact model is
based on an anti-subordination interpretation of Title VII that
requires employers to avoid practices that perpetuate the
subordination of minorities. As previously noted, under present
societal conditions, this can require giving preferential treatment to
minorities.00 But under McDonald, McDonnell Douglas's disparate
195. Id. at 804.
196. See supra text preceding note 29.
197. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
198. Id. at 282.
199. Id. at 280.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
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treatment model is based on an anti-differentiation interpretation of
Title VII that prohibits employers from intentionally treating
minorities differently than Caucasians. Under this state of the law, it
is possible for employers to find themselves liable for illegal
discrimination no matter what they do.
Three years after McDonald, the Court again considered the
problem of intentional discrimination in United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber."" Like McDonald, the complainant in Weber was a
Caucasian employee who claimed he had been denied a place in an in-
plant craft-training program because of his race. The company,
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation, had voluntarily instituted
an affirmative action plan that reserved fifty percent of the openings
in the training program for African-Americans until the percentage of
African-American craftworkers in the plant matched the percentage
of African-Americans in the local labor force. As a result of the plan,
Weber had been denied admission to the training program even
though African-Americans with less seniority had been accepted. In
keeping with the ruling in McDonald, the District Court and Court of
Appeals ruled that because Kaiser's plan treated its employees
differently on the basis of their race, it constituted a violation of Title
VII.
In reversing the Court of Appeals decision, the Court seemed to
again be changing its interpretation of the Civil Rights Act. In
holding that Title VII "left employers and unions in the private sector
free to take such race-conscious steps to eliminate manifest racial
imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories,""" ° the Court
appeared to be shifting from McDonald's anti-differentiation
interpretation, which would forbid all racial differentiation, to an anti-
oppression interpretation, which would permit racial differentiation
intended to benefit minorities. In Weber, the Court treaded close to
an explicit rejection of the anti-differentiation interpretation in
declaring that
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern
over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of
those who had "been excluded from the American dream for so
long," constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary,
private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of
racial segregation and hierarchy. °3
Had Weber truly signaled a rejection of the anti-differentiation
interpretation, the Civil Rights Act could have been applied
consistently. The disparate treatment model of discrimination could
then be understood as the implementation of an anti-oppression
201. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
202. Id. at 197.
203. Id. at 204 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6552 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
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principle prohibiting oppressive actions intended to retard the
opportunities of minorities, something that would imply that only
minorities could bring charges of discrimination under the Act.
Under such an anti-oppression interpretation, there could be no
"reverse discrimination" against Caucasian males. This would render
the disparate treatment model consistent with the disparate impact
model's anti-subordination approach. In effect, the disparate
treatment model could be seen simply as a specific application of the
disparate impact model-the application that addressed intentional
actions that subordinated minorities. This would leave the more
general disparate impact model to address the non-intentional actions
that had this effect.
The Court soon made it clear, however, that Weber represented not
a rejection of the anti-differentiation interpretation but merely a
narrow exception to it. In Johnson v. Transportation Agency,2"4 the
Court essentially reaffirmed McDonald's earlier anti-differentiation
interpretation by holding that preferential treatment could be
afforded to minorities only under strictly circumscribed conditions.
Unless an employer was hiring according to a valid affirmative action
plan, i.e., one designed as a temporary measure to remedy "a
'manifest imbalance' that reflected underrepresentation of
[minorities] in 'traditionally segregated job categories,""'2 5 he or she
could not legally differentiate between Caucasians and minorities. In
holding that a valid affirmative action plan could not unnecessarily
trammel the rights of Caucasians by requiring their discharge or acting
as an absolute bar to their advancement0 6 and could not be designed
to maintain a racially, ethnically, or sexually balanced workforce, 07
the Court made it clear that Title VII protected Caucasian males as
well as minorities. Thus, it could not be understood as an anti-
oppression principle.
This rendered the Civil Rights Act a confused amalgam of the three
different interpretations. Under the disparate treatment model, Title
VII acts as an anti-differentiation principle with a narrow anti-
oppression exception that prohibits employers from drawing most, but
not quite all distinctions between Caucasians and minorities.
Employers can intentionally favor minorities only if they do so
according to a plan designed to remedy a conspicuous
underrepresentation of minorities in a traditionally segregated job
category. Under the disparate impact model, Title VII acts as an anti-
subordination principle that prohibits actions that have a negative
effect on the status of any minority group.
This creates quite a conundrum for employers. On the one hand,
204. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
205. Id. at 631 (citation omitted).
206. Id. at 630.
207. Id. at 639.
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because, under present societal conditions, neutral hiring practices can
have a negative effect on minorities, employers who wish to avoid
disparate impact liability have a strong incentive to give preferential
treatment to minorities.2"" On the other hand, the disparate treatment
model's anti-differentiation orientation does not permit employers to
grant preferential treatment to minorities in order to avoid liability
under Title VII, but only to remedy a conspicuous imbalance in a
traditionally segregated job category. For employers not dealing with
both a traditionally segregated job category and a conspicuous
underrepresentation of minorities, efforts to avoid disparate impact
liability by engaging in affirmative action can render them liable for
the disparate treatment of Caucasian males, while efforts to avoid
disparate treatment liability by employing strictly neutral hiring and
promotion practices can subject them to disparate impact liability.2"9
This confused mix of incompatible principles has remained the
Court's interpretation of the Civil Rights Act to the present day.""
208. It is, of course, not logically necessary for employers to give preferential
treatment to minorities to avoid disparate impact liability. They could instead make
all hiring and promotion decisions according to employment practices that meet the
legal criteria for the validation necessary to show that they "measure the person for
the job and not the person in the abstract." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
436 (1971). Doing so, however, can be so time consuming and expensive as to be
beyond the reach of all but the largest companies. See James Gwartney, et.al.,
Statistics, the Law and Title VII: An Economist's View, 54 Notre Dame L. Rev. 633,
658 (1979) (arguing that validation procedures are impractical and infeasible); Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 1235
(1995) ("Formal validation of even relatively straightforward objective selection
devices is an expensive and time-consuming process, often requiring several years and
hundreds of thousands of dollars in professional fees and employee time."); Barbara
Lerner, Employment Discrimination: Adverse Impact, Validity and Equality, 1979
Sup. Ct. Rev. 17, 18 n.6 (reporting that adequate criterion-related validity studies
generally cost between $100,000 and $400,000 and require approximately two years to
complete). As a result, most employers face the strongest possible incentive to ensure
that their hiring and promotion practices do not produce a disparate impact in the
first place, something that can be done only by differentiating on the basis of race,
ethnicity, and sex.
209. This tension between disparate impact and disparate treatment liability has
long been recognized. See Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 652
(1989) ("The only practicable option for many employers will be to adopt racial
quotas, insuring that no portion of their work forces deviated in racial composition
from the other portions thereof .... ); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 210 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("If Title VII is read literally, on the
one hand [employers] face liability for past discrimination against blacks, and on the
other they face liability to whites for any voluntary preferences adopted to mitigate
the effects of prior discrimination against blacks.").
210. Subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court have addressed the evidentiary
requirements of and relationships among the plaintiff's prima facie case, the
defendant's response, and the plaintiff's showing of pretext for both the disparate
treatment model, see, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Tex.
Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); N.Y. City Transit Auth. v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), and
the disparate impact model, see, e.g., Ward's Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. 642; Watson
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Being internally inconsistent, this state of the law has given all
political persuasions legitimate grounds on which to criticize the
application of the Act. Conservative adherents of the anti-
differentiation principle regard the Weber-Johnson exception for valid
affirmative action plans as an unjust and unjustifiable loophole that
violates citizens' fundamental right to equal treatment and the Griggs
disparate impact theory as a malignant step toward a system of racial
quotas. Liberal adherents of the anti-oppression principle argue that
there is no principled reason why departures from strict racial, ethnic,
or sexual neutrality should be limited to plans designed to remedy
conspicuous imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories.
They regard affirmative action efforts designed to provide minority
role models for the next generation, increase workplace or
educational diversity, or counteract the effects of ongoing societal
stereotyping and discrimination as morally justified, and an
interpretation of the Civil Rights Act that prohibits them as morally
perverse. Radical adherents of the anti-subordination principle view
the anti-differentiation basis of the disparate treatment theory as both
without moral foundation and as a reactionary roadblock to the
achievement of a more racially, ethnically, and sexually just society.
Given this state of affairs, it is entirely unsurprising that the field of
employment discrimination law has become one of the favorite
playgrounds of law review authors."'
2. The Equal Protection Clause
The anti-differentiation interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause the Court adopted during the period between Brown and
Loving disintegrated almost as rapidly, if not as completely, as the
anti-differentiation interpretation of the Civil Rights Act. Once
government is prohibited from acting in ways that are inimical to
minorities, the anti-differentiation interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause loses much of its appeal. In this context, a
requirement of racial, ethnic, and sexual neutrality merely bars
government from taking steps to improve the condition of those who
had been the victims of past oppressive measures. President
Johnson's famous declaration that, "[y]ou do not take a person who,
for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up
to the starting line of a race and then say, 'you are free to compete
with all the others,' and still justly believe that you have been
completely fair ' 212 sounded as a clarion call for benign racial, ethnic,
and sexual classification by government.
v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440
(1982). Such decisions, however, have not altered the underlying theory of either
model.
211. See supra note 11.
212. See Kull, supra note 41, at 186-87 (quoting Lyndon Johnson's speech given at
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The Court responded to this call by shifting its understanding of the
Equal Protection Clause from an anti-differentiation interpretation to
a fluctuating mixture of anti-differentiation and anti-oppression
interpretations. Unlike the Civil Rights Act, however, the Court did
not adopt an anti-subordination interpretation of the Clause,
something it explicitly rejected in the case of Washington v. Davis.2 13
In Davis, African-American applicants to the District of Columbia's
police force brought a constitutional challenge to the District
government's use of an employment test that had a disparate impact
on African-Americans. To grant the complainants relief, the Court
would have had to hold that the disparate impact model of
discrimination it had created under the Civil Rights Act in Griggs
applied in the constitutional context as well, i.e., that unintentional
governmental actions that have the effect of perpetuating the
subordination of minorities violated the Equal Protection Clause.214
The Court refused to do this, stating "[w]e have never held that the
constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial
discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under Title VII,
and we decline to do so today." '215
It is interesting to note that in rejecting the anti-subordination
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court seemed to be
acting more out of fear of its consequences than out of a moral
commitment to the anti-differentiation interpretation. In ruling that
the disparate impact theory "involves a more probing judicial review
of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of
administrators and executives than is appropriate under the
Constitution,"2 6 the Court was apparently concerned that allowing
disparate impact challenges under the Equal Protection Clause could
significantly undermine government's ability to function.
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless
invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or
burdens one race more than another would be far-reaching and
would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole
range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing
statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the
average black than to the more affluent white.217
Howard University on June 4,1965).
213. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
214. Because the challenge was brought against the District of Columbia, it was
based on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment rather than the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court applied the same
constitutional standard for equal protection challenges to the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, however. Id. at 239.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 247.
217. Id. at 248.
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In order to avoid such unpalatable consequences, the Court refused to
"embrace[] the proposition that a law or other official act, without
regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is
unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate
impact. '218  Thus, the Court rejected the anti-subordination
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause predominantly on the
ground of its impracticability.2 9
Moral considerations were the impetus behind the Court's shift in
the direction of the anti-oppression interpretation, however; the first
indication of which came in the 1971 case of Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education.22 Swann involved a challenge to a
court-ordered public school desegregation plan that included the race-
conscious assignment of teachers and students. In upholding the plan,
the Court specifically rejected the contention that courts are bound to
act in an entirely color-blind manner, holding that it is constitutional
to classify citizens by race for the purpose of remedying past
governmental discrimination. 22' As a purely logical matter, this
decision does not constitute a departure from the anti-differentiation
interpretation, which bars classification on the basis of irrelevant
characteristics. Because the purpose of court-ordered desegregation
plans is to reverse the effects of government-mandated racial
segregation, the race of the individuals involved is obviously relevant.
However, by specifically approving race-conscious governmental
action in pursuit of a morally benign end, Swann opened the door to
subsequent arguments for the anti-oppression interpretation of the
Clause.
The Court walked through that door in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke.222 In Bakke, a Caucasian applicant to the
University of California at Davis Medical School challenged the
school's program of reserving a certain number of the seats in its
entering class for minorities. Although the Court struck down the
particular program used by Davis that made race the determining
factor for admission, it held that state universities could consider the
race and ethnicity of applicants in deciding whether to grant
admission. Specifically, the Court iuled that it was constitutionally
permissible for state universities to attempt to achieve a diverse
student body by employing "an admissions program where race or
ethnic background is simply one element-to be weighed fairly
218. Id. at 239 (emphasis omitted).
219. The moral significance of this is addressed below in Part III.B.4. See also infra
note 317.
220. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
221. See id. at 19 ("[T]he... school board has argued that the Constitution requires
that teachers be assigned on a 'color blind' basis. It also argues that the Constitution
prohibits district courts from using their equity power to order assignment of teachers
to achieve a particular degree of faculty desegregation. We reject that contention.").
222. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2002]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
against other elements-in the selection process," '' and thus that
''race or ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus' in a particular
applicant's file." '224
Bakke represented a true shift in the direction of the anti-
oppression interpretation. Unlike a court-ordered school
desegregation plan, the state's essential purpose in maintaining a
university is not to remedy past discrimination, but to provide a higher
education for its citizens. Because a student's race is irrelevant to his
or her academic ability, a strict adherence to an anti-differentiation
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause would therefore require
a color-blind admissions process. An anti-oppression interpretation,
on the other hand, would allow government to treat its citizens
differently on the basis of their race for benign, non-oppressive
purposes such as the creation of a diverse student body within state
universities. Thus, Bakke suggested that, for some purposes, the
Court was willing to view the Equal Protection Clause as an anti-
oppression principle.
The Court's shift toward an anti-oppression orientation was
confirmed in Fullilove v. Klutznick,225 in which the Court upheld the
minority business enterprise provision of the Public Works
Employment Act,226 which required that ten percent of every federal
public works grant be directed to minority-owned businesses. The
Court characterized this provision as "a strictly remedial measure," '227
designed to counteract the effect of past racial discrimination in public
works projects, albeit one "that functions prospectively, in the manner
of an injunctive decree." '228 Citing Swann, the Court then "reject[ed]
the contention that in the remedial context the Congress must act in a
wholly 'color-blind' fashion," '229 holding that Congress may classify
citizens by race for the benign purpose of counteracting the effects of
past discrimination.
223. Id. at 318.
224. Id. at 317. The opinion of the Court announced by Justice Powell was actually
much more restrictive than that of the other four members of the Court to address the
constitutional issue, who would have explicitly adopted an anti-oppression
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. They supported a rule that would
allow government to "adopt race-conscious programs if the purpose of such programs
is to remove the disparate racial impact its actions might otherwise have and if there is
reason to believe that the disparate impact is itself the product of past discrimination,
whether its own or that of society at large." Id. at 369 (Brennen, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
225. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
226. Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
227. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 481.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 482.
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Fullilove essentially converted the Equal Protection Clause into a
limited anti-oppression principle.230 It was limited in the sense that
the Court did not declare that government can classify citizens on the
basis of irrelevant characteristics for any non-oppressive purpose, but
only for the purpose of remedying the effects of past discrimination
(and, per Bakke, to achieve diverse student bodies in state
universities). Within that sphere, however, Fullilove permitted
government to intentionally treat its citizens differently on the basis of
their race, ethnicity, and sex-characteristics that are obviously
irrelevant to citizens' ability to perform public works contracts.
Fullilove thus rendered the Equal Protection Clause a mixture of an
anti-differentiation principle generally and an anti-oppression
principle when government acts to remedy past discrimination or to
achieve diverse student bodies in state universities.
Subsequent cases have addressed where to draw the line between
the anti-differentiation and anti-oppression elements of this mixture,
shrinking and enlarging the scope of the anti-oppression
interpretation by turns."' Thus, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
230. Like Davis, Fullilove construed the equal protection component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, not the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 455; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 239 (1976); supra note 214. Because this article is intended as a philosophical
analysis of the anti-discrimination principle contained in both the Constitution and
the Civil Rights Act and not as an analysis of constitutional doctrine, I have chosen,
for purposes of concision and simplicity, to speak in terms of the Equal Protection
Clause exclusively, even though doing so is technically inaccurate. I ask the
constitutional scholars who will be rankled by this to bear with me on this point. See
infra note 231.
231. To some extent, the fluctuation simply reflects the highly divided nature of the
Court on this issue, as evidenced by the number of cases that could manage only
plurality opinions with no five justices agreeing on any single line of reasoning. As a
result, as the individuals serving as justices changed, so did the place where the line
between the anti-differentiation and anti-oppression interpretations was drawn.
As I did in discussing Fullilove, see supra note 230, in the discussion that
follows, I speak strictly in terms of the Equal Protection Clause, ignoring the
difference between it and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
differing standards the Court at times applied to each. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990). I do so to keep the article's focus on the Court's
understanding of the nature of the anti-discrimination principle rather than on the
intricacies of constitutional analysis-and to prevent an already long article from
becoming excessively so. Accordingly, the discussion addresses solely the purposes
the Court was willing to let government, whether state or federal, pursue by means
involving racial, ethnic, or sexual classification, and ignores any differences in the
stringency of the restrictions placed on the states as opposed to the federal
government. A non-idealistic reading of the cases may suggest that to the extent that
the Court employed different standards for the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the equal protection component of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, this may be as much a function of which faction of
the Court could command a majority at the relevant time as of any theoretical
commitment to the difference between the application of the amendments. If so, my
practice of disregarding the distinction between them may not be entirely
inappropriate.
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Education,232 which involved an agreement by which the school board
gave minorities preferential protection against layoffs, the Court
refused to extend the reach of the anti-oppression interpretation to
cover governmental efforts to remedy societal as opposed to past
governmental discrimination. In rejecting the school board's
argument that its "interest in providing minority role models for its
minority students, as an attempt to alleviate the effects of societal
discrimination, was sufficiently important to justify the racial
classification embodied in the layoff provision," the Court held that
societal discrimination is insufficient to justify a racial classification,
insisting "upon some showing of prior discrimination by the
governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of racial
classifications in order to remedy such discrimination." '233 This
restricted scope of application for the anti-oppression interpretation
was reaffirmed in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,234 in which the
Court held that "a generalized assertion that there has been past
discrimination in an entire industry" '235 could not justify a minority set-
aside program similar to that in Fullilove.
The anti-oppression element of the mixture was greatly expanded,
however, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,236 which considered the
constitutionality of Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
programs designed to encourage minority participation in the
broadcast industry to promote the diversification of programming. In
upholding the FCC programs, the Court explicitly added the
promotion of diversity to the list of purposes for which government
could engage in racial, ethnic, and sexual classification, stating,
Congress and the Commission do not justify the minority ownership
policies strictly as remedies for victims of this discrimination,
however. Rather, Congress and the FCC have selected the minority
ownership policies primarily to promote programming diversity, and
they urge that such diversity is an important governmental objective
that can serve as a constitutional basis for the preference policies.
We agree.237
Further, in doing so, the Court adopted an open-ended rule that came
close to transforming the interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause from a mixture of anti-differentiation and anti-oppression
elements to an outright anti-oppression principle. By holding that
benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress-even if
those measures are not "remedial" in the sense of being designed to
compensate victims of past governmental or societal
232. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
233. Id. at 274.
234. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
235. Id. at 498.
236. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
237. Id. at 566.
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discrimination-are constitutionally permissible to the extent that
they serve important governmental objectives within the power of
Congress and are substantially related to achievement of those
objectives,238
the Court authorized Congress to employ racial, ethnic, and sexual
classifications for potentially any non-oppressive purpose that does
not exceed its constitutional power.
Metro Broadcasting's expansive application of the anti-oppression
interpretation was relatively short-lived, however. Five years later in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,239 the Court did an about face,
abandoning the permissive rule of Metro Broadcasting for the more
restrictive requirements for racial classification that it had previously
applied. In Adarand, a non-minority subcontractor who had not been
awarded a project despite being the low bidder challenged the
constitutionality of a minority set-aside program similar to the one
approved in Fullilove. Applying the rule of Metro Broadcasting, the
lower courts upheld the program. Rejecting this rule, the Court
vacated and remanded the case, declaring,
we hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever
federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a
reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests. To the
extent that Metro Broadcasting is inconsistent with that holding, it is
overruled.24 °
Although it is reasonable to believe that Adarand simply returns
the anti-differentiation/anti-oppression balance back to what it had
been before Metro Broadcasting, the present scope of the anti-
oppression element of the Court's mixed interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause cannot be known with certainty. The Court's
statement that "[w]hen race-based action is necessary to further a
compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it
satisfies the 'narrow tailoring' test this Court has set out in previous
cases' 24 1 suggests that things have indeed returned to the status quo
ante. Further, the Adarand standard certainly permits racial, ethnic,
and sexual classification to remedy past governmental discrimination,
which was cited with approval in the opinion.242 However, in rejecting
238. Id. at 564-65 (footnote omitted).
239. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
240. Id. at 227.
241. Id. at 237 (emphasis added).
242. Id.
The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of
racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an
unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in
response to it. As recently as 1987, for example, every Justice of this Court
agreed that the Alabama Department of Public Safety's "pervasive,
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the rule of Metro Broadcasting, the Court by implication rejected that
decision's holding that government may engage in racial, ethnic, and
sexual classification for the purpose of promoting diversity. This casts
doubt on the constitutionality of the type of minority preferences
designed to produce diverse student bodies in state universities that
were approved in Bakke. Whether such preferences can meet the
Adarand standard is now an open question.243
The Court's mixed and fluctuating interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause reflects the same theoretical dissatisfactions that
beset the Civil Rights Act. Conservatives regard the anti-oppression
element of the mixture as an unjustifiable departure from the ideal of
a color-blind Constitution that opens a Pandora's box of racial, ethnic,
and sexual politics. Liberals argue, as they did in the context of the
Civil Rights Act, that there is no principled reason to limit the non-
oppressive purposes for which government may employ racial, ethnic,
and sexual preferences to those of remedying past governmental
discrimination and creating diverse student bodies in state
universities. Radicals regard the Court's unwillingness to employ the
disparate impact theory of discrimination in the constitutional context
as evidence of entrenched power's resistance to the demands of social
justice. Thus, in the case of the Equal Protection Clause as well as the
Civil Rights Act, the judicial understanding of the anti-discrimination
principle seems to have arrived at a theoretical impasse. Perhaps an
examination of the moral underpinnings of this principle can show us
a way out.
III. THE PROPER LEGAL INTERPRETATION OF THE ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE
Our historical survey of congressional intent and the evolution of
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
and Civil Rights Act shows how political and legal forces transformed
what was originally understood as an anti-oppression principle into
the confused mixture of incompatible principles that burdens the
systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct" justified a narrowly
tailored race-based remedy.
Id. (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987)).
243. See, e.g., Justin Schwartz, A Not Quite Color-Blind Constitution: Racial
Discrimination and Racial Preference in Justice O'Connor's "Newest" Equal
Protection Jurisprudence, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 1055, 1087-93 (1997).
This question is likely to be resolved in the near future. The recent Sixth
Circuit decision in the case of Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (2002) (approving the
use of racial and ethnic preferences to achieve a diverse student body at the
University of Michigan) is in direct conflict with the Fifth Circuit decision in
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (1996) (declaring the use of such preferences to be a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause). Should the Supreme Court grant certiorari
in the Grutter case, the balance between the anti-differentiation and anti-oppression




Court today. Perhaps the only way out of the theoretical cul-de-sac in
which the Court now finds itself lies in a return to first principles, i.e.,
in leaving aside political and legal considerations long enough to seek
the moral foundation of the principle we wish our law to reflect.
Accordingly, in this part of the article, I undertake a strictly normative
analysis of both legal provisions in an effort to determine the morally
proper interpretation of each. The conclusion I reach is that for
American anti-discrimination law to accurately reflect the underlying
moral anti-discrimination principle, the Civil Rights Act must be
interpreted as an anti-oppression principle and the Equal Protection
Clause must be interpreted as an anti-differentiation principle. Let us
consider the Civil Rights Act first.
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
The Civil Rights Act is a federal statute. In seeking the proper
interpretation of the anti-discrimination principle it is intended to
embody, we are seeking an interpretation that yields a morally
justified statute. It is therefore worth taking a moment to reflect upon
what it means for a statute to be morally justified.
Regulatory statutes, whether federal, state, or municipal, are
designed to restrain the behavior of the individual members of
society.244 Put bluntly, their purpose is to restrict the realm of
autonomous action open to individuals, i.e., to curtail individual
liberty, in order to attain what is considered a more valuable societal
end.245 Because individual autonomy has significant moral value, the
minimum requirement for such legislation to be morally justified is
that the societal end to be attained have greater moral worth than the
autonomy that must be sacrificed to attain it.246  This suggests that
244. H.L.A. Hart pointed out that not all statutes are regulatory in nature. Many
types of legislation are designed to enhance individuals' ability to engage in
autonomous action. The rules of contract law, for example, allow individuals to
coordinate their behavior so that each party's ability to achieve his or her desired
ends are increased. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 26-48 (1961). The present
discussion, however, is limited to statutes like the Civil Rights Act that are regulatory
in nature, and the comments regarding the moral evaluation of statutes should be
understood as limited to that context.
245. Statutes, of course, regulate the behavior of corporate entities such as
businesses and other private organizations as well as that of individuals. However,
the purpose of creating such corporate entities is to enhance individuals' ability to
achieve their personal ends through coordinated collective action. As a result,
regulating the behavior of private corporate entities is simply a mediated way of
regulating individual citizens' pursuit of their personal ends. It is therefore not
inappropriate to evaluate statutes exclusively in terms of their effects on individuals.
Because doing so greatly simplifies the description of the evaluative process, I have
adopted this expedient for purposes of this article.
246. This is certainly a necessary condition for a statute to be morally justified,
although it is not necessarily a sufficient one. If the condition is not met, if the
societal end of legislation is not of greater moral value than the autonomy that must
be sacrificed to attain it, then the legislation is not morally justified. The fact that a
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there are at least two questions that must be answered to evaluate the
moral quality of legislation: 1) Does the societal end that is its object
possess genuine moral value?, and 2) Is this value great enough to
justify the cost in personal autonomy?
Determining whether the Civil Rights Act can meet this
fundamental moral requirement should be relatively straightforward.
The basic premise underlying the Act is that a society free of racial,
ethnic, and sexual discrimination is a more just society. The Act aims
to achieve this more just society by restricting the liberty of individual
citizens to treat each other in a discriminatory manner. By plugging
the definition of discrimination supplied by each of the candidate
interpretations of the Act into this formulation, we can begin to
evaluate the moral quality of the relevant interpretation. With regard
to the first question, we would want to know whether a society free of
the type of discrimination identified by the anti-oppression, anti-
differentiation, or anti-subordination interpretation truly is a more
just society. If so, then with regard to the second question we would
want to know whether the improvement is morally significant enough
to justify the loss of personal autonomy that results from depriving
citizens of the liberty to engage in the relevant type of discrimination.
1. Evaluating the Anti-Oppression Interpretation
There is a strong argument that under the anti-oppression
interpretation, the Civil Rights Act serves a societal end of genuine
moral value at a reasonable cost in personal autonomy. This
argument rests on the observation that the anti-oppression
interpretation of the anti-discrimination principle can be directly
derived from a more fundamental moral principle: the principle of
respect for persons.2 47 To show the connection, however, requires a
statute's societal end is of greater value than the autonomy that is lost, however, does
not in itself imply that the statute is morally justified. There may be other conditions
to be met as well.
For example, a libertarian adherent of John Stuart Mill's harm principle, see
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859), might contend
that in order to be justified, legislation must be designed to prevent physical harm to
others. Such a libertarian might argue that not all morally worthy goals may be
pursued through the mechanism of state coercion. Because all interpretations of the
Civil Rights Act propose to curtail individual liberty to prevent actions that do not
cause direct physical harm to others, such a libertarian may argue that no
interpretation of the Act is morally justified and that the elimination of private
discrimination that does not cause physical harm is not a proper state function.
I do not address such arguments in this article or, indeed, the question of
whether there are additional necessary conditions for morally acceptable legislation.
In this article, I propose to show no more than that because only the anti-oppression
interpretation of the anti-discrimination principle meets the instant condition, it yields
the only potentially morally justified interpretation of the Civil Rights Act. I leave the
question of whether the Civil Rights Act actually is morally justified for another day.
247. As described below, see infra text accompanying notes 248-251, the principle
of respect for persons requires that individuals act with respect for others'
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brief excursion into Kantian moral philosophy to explain the nature of
the principle of respect for persons.
Kantian ethics posits a fundamental moral distinction between
persons and all other things.248 Persons are rational agents-beings
capable not only of initiating action, but also of reasoning about how
to act. The ability to value ends and deliberate about and choose
among various courses of action in order to achieve them invests
every person with a dignity, an absolute or unconditional moral worth.
For this reason, Kant argued that all persons have intrinsic moral
value. This sets them apart from other things such as tools, which
have instrumental value, but are not valuable in themselves. A
hammer has value to a carpenter because it aids the carpenter in
driving nails and achieving his or her end of constructing useful
wooden objects. The hammer has no value to or in itself, however.
The carpenter may be foolish or a wastrel for destroying a hammer in
a fit of pique after hitting his or her thumb with it, but in doing so the
carpenter does not morally wrong the hammer. Persons, on the other
hand, do have value to and in themselves. To fail to respect this value,
to treat a person as though he or she was merely a tool for the
achievement of one's own ends, is, according to Kant, to act wrongly.
Kant embodied this insight in a fundamental moral principle, his
autonomous choices as to how to live their lives. Although widely accepted, there
are, of course, moral philosophers who do not agree that the principle of respect for
persons is a legitimate moral principle. For example, thoroughgoing utilitarians deny
that there are any legitimate moral principles other than the principle of utility and
ethical relativists or particularists deny that there are any legitimate moral principles
at all. See generally Richard B. Brandt, Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative
and Critical Ethics (1959). Fortunately, there is no need for us to debate the position
of these theorists in the present context.
Those who advocate the inclusion of the Equal Protection Clause in the
Constitution and the Civil Rights Act within the body of federal law do so on the
ground that these provisions provide legal sanction to an important underlying moral
principle. Theorists who deny that there are any legitimate moral principles at all
would not, and could not consistently, argue for the Equal Protection Clause or Civil
Rights Act on this basis in the first place. Further, as discussed in Part II, see supra
text accompanying notes 8-9, supporters of the Equal Protection Clause and Civil
Rights Act see them as containing a moral principle that must be observed even when
doing so may impede the efficient attainment of important social benefits. They
emphatically do not see these provisions as declarations that state governments and
individuals should not discriminate unless there are societal gains from doing so, which
is the only way they could be understood by utilitarian moral theorists.
Because most of the moral philosophers who would deny the legitimacy of the
principle of respect for persons do so on grounds that also undermine the moral
significance of the Equal Protection Clause and Civil Rights Act, they may be safely
ignored for purposes of this work, which proceeds on the assumption that the Equal
Protection Clause and Civil Rights Act do have moral significance. This is done in
full recognition of the fact that if any of their positions are correct, then the present
project is a futile exercise and the national consensus on the moral significance of the
anti-discrimination principle is merely a reflection of widespread moral error.
248. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (H.J. Paton trans.,
1964) (1785).
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"categorical imperative," that instructs human beings to "[a]ct in such
a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or
in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the
same time as an end." '249 This basic injunction to treat every person as
an end and never merely as a means,25 i.e., to treat every person with
the respect due to entities with intrinsic moral value, is the principle of
respect for persons.
In this abstract form, the principle of respect for persons can usually
command a high degree of assent. Implementation is another matter.
Applying the principle to resolve specific ethical dilemmas can be a
complex and daunting task. However, it is clear that at a minimum
the principle of respect for persons prohibits oppression. We act
oppressively when we exploit others by completely disregarding their
desires, interests, and choices in order to enhance our own wealth,
status, or power or when we otherwise denigrate their humanity by
reducing them to the status of second-class citizens. This is precisely
what it means to fail to treat a person as an end.
The essence of the injunction to treat all persons as ends in
themselves is that we must always recognize that they are autonomous
moral agents, beings with goals and desires of their own and the
ability to act upon them. Thus, treating others as ends requires that
we respect their autonomy, i.e., that we recognize them as authors of
their own actions entitled to make certain fundamental choices for
themselves. This does not mean that we may never use other persons
as means to the achievement of our own ends,25' but it does mean that
we may not so use them without their autonomously given consent. It
also means that we may not treat them as though they were not
capable of thinking for themselves and making their own decisions
about how best to live their lives, i.e., as though they were less than
fully human. We may not act so as to denigrate their humanity. In a
word, we may not oppress them.
Once this is understood, it is clear that the principle of respect for
persons entails the anti-oppression interpretation of the anti-
discrimination principle. The principle of respect for persons
prohibits the oppressive treatment of all persons. The anti-oppression
249. Kant, supra note 248, at 96 (footnotes omitted). This is the second of Kant's
three formulations of the categorical imperative, and is the formulation most
frequently invoked in the context of applied ethics. See Tom Beauchamp & LeRoy
Walters, Contemporary Issues in Bioethics 24 (3d ed. 1989). As this is our present
context, this is the only formulation I discuss.
250. It is important to note that the categorical imperative does not prohibit using
other people as means to one's own ends; it prohibits using them merely as means.
Because life in society is based on trade and the division of labor, we cannot live
without continually using others as means to accomplish our ends. The categorical
imperative instructs only that in doing so, we must always simultaneously recognize
that such individuals possess a dignity and inherent moral value in themselves.
251. See supra note 250.
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interpretation of the anti-discrimination principle prohibits one
particular form of oppressive treatment-oppressive discrimination.
In forbidding the drawing of racial, ethnic, or sexual distinctions for
purposes of oppressing the members of the non-dominant group, the
anti-oppression interpretation of the anti-discrimination principle
simply acts as a specific instantiation of the more general principle of
respect for persons. There is a strong moral argument for prohibiting
oppressive discriminatory treatment of minorities, i.e., for the anti-
oppression interpretation of the anti-discrimination principle, because
there is a strong moral argument for prohibiting any type of
oppressive treatment of anyone.
The intimate connection between the anti-oppression interpretation
of the anti-discrimination principle and the principle of respect for
persons provides a strong normative grounding for the anti-
oppression interpretation of the Civil Rights Act. Under its definition
of discrimination, the societal end the Act is intended to achieve is the
elimination of the oppressive unequal treatment of racial, ethnic, or
sexual minorities. This end clearly has genuine moral value since the
principle of respect for persons demonstrates that the elimination of
any type of oppression is morally valuable. Thus, under the anti-
oppression interpretation, the Civil Rights Act truly does promote a
more just society.
As always, the promotion of this societal end carries a cost in
personal autonomy. Under the anti-oppression interpretation,
however, this cost is rather small. Citizens will be deprived of the
liberty to act oppressively toward racial, ethnic, or sexual minorities.
In practice, this means that they will be not be permitted to act out of
racial, ethnic, or sexual animus in deciding who should be granted
access to public accommodations and educational and employment
opportunities. Thus, they could not refuse to hire or educate African-
Americans as part of a widespread practice designed to keep them
sufficiently impoverished and dependant to be subject to economic
exploitation, or because of racist beliefs that African-Americans are
inherently inferior or constitute a degraded form of humanity. The
liberty lost would be the liberty to attempt to reduce the prospects of
members of minority groups for happy and successful lives in order to
benefit from their exploitation or indulge one's racism, i.e., the liberty
to take a type of action that has a negative moral value.
Thus, there is very good reason to believe that when interpreted as
an anti-oppression principle, the Civil Rights Act satisfies the
threshold requirement for a morally justified statute. The Act
produces a genuine moral improvement in society at the minimal cost
of excluding from the realm of autonomous actions open to the
citizenry only actions that are themselves morally insupportable.
Hence, to the extent that the national consensus in support of the
Civil Rights Act is based on understanding it as a statute designed to
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prevent harmful racist and exploitative actions being directed against
the members of minority groups, it is morally well-grounded.2
2. Evaluating the Anti-Differentiation Interpretation
It is perhaps unsurprising that the anti-oppression interpretation of
the Civil Rights Act can meet the basic requirement for a morally
justified statute since, as the weakest, least restrictive of the three
interpretations, it imposes the lowest cost on citizens' personal
autonomy. The anti-differentiation interpretation of the anti-
discrimination principle is considerably stronger-prohibiting all
irrelevant racial, ethnic, or sexual classification and requiring
decisions concerning education and employment to be made strictly
on the basis of qualifications and ability. Can an anti-differentiation
interpretation of the Civil Rights Act meet the threshold requirement
for a morally justified statute?
I believe the answer is no. Under the anti-differentiation
interpretation, the type of discrimination the Civil Rights Act would
be designed to eliminate is the unequal treatment of individuals on the
basis of characteristics not relevant to the tasks they will be called on
to perform. This implies that the goal of the Civil Rights Act is the
creation of a society in which all employment and educational
opportunities are allocated strictly on the basis of qualifications and
ability. The problem is that there is no reason to believe that the
production of such a meritocratic society has genuine moral value.
Neither the principle of respect for persons nor any other readily
identifiable moral principle generates a moral obligation to evaluate
individuals strictly on the basis of their qualifications and abilities and
no such obligation can be derived from a utilitarian moral perspective.
If there is a legitimate moral ground for this obligation, I am unable to
identify it.
Consider the principle of respect for persons first. This principle
does not entail an anti-differentiation principle. The moral obligation
to treat all persons as ends in themselves does not require employers
and educators to judge potential employees and students solely on the
basis of characteristics directly related to job performance or
educational ability.
As noted above,253 treating persons as ends in themselves means
that we must recognize them as autonomous moral agents-as beings
252. Opponents of the Civil Rights Act could reasonably argue that this is an
overstatement because all I have shown is that when interpreted as containing an anti-
oppression principle, the Act meets one necessary condition for a morally justified
statute. I recognize the possibility that the Civil Rights Act could be morally
unjustified because it fails to meet some other necessary condition. As stated
previously, however, this issue is be addressed in the present work. See supra note
246.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 247-251.
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who are the authors of their own actions and entitled to make
fundamental decisions about how to lead their lives for themselves.
Thus, treating persons as ends requires us to respect their autonomy,
which means we may not force them to serve our interests without
their consent or otherwise treat them as though they were incapable
of thinking and deciding for themselves. In short, we may not deprive
them of control over their lives.
In the context of employment and educational opportunities
addressed by the Civil Rights Act, this has many implications. It
means we may not force persons to work for us either directly by
coercively conscripting their labor or indirectly by preventing them
from offering their services to others. It means we may not prevent
persons from pursuing an education or dictate what type of education
they may receive as a means of rendering them dependant and
exploitable. It means we may not refuse to hire or educate them
because of racist beliefs about their natural inferiority or sub-human
or degraded status. The moral obligation to treat all persons as ends
in themselves requires us to allow others to offer their labor to and
seek educational opportunities from whomever they choose, and to
regard them as fully human in deciding whether to employ or educate
them. It does not, however, require us to evaluate them on the basis
of merit or any other particular set of (non-oppressive) criteria.
If there is something wrong with refusing to hire a more qualified
individual because one's nephew would be a bigger help to the
company softball team, it is not that one has failed to recognize the
more qualified individual as an autonomous agent or has otherwise
attempted to denigrate his or her humanity. In deciding not to
employ, educate, or otherwise associate with the most qualified
person available, one does not deprive that person of control of his or
her life or use him or her merely as a means. One does not use the
person at all. Denying an applicant a position he or she desires and is
qualified for may disappoint that person, but it implies nothing more
than that one would prefer to associate with someone else. It is not
oppression and it does not indicate that the person lacks intrinsic
moral value or is a mere tool for the advancement of one's own ends.
It certainly does not imply that one regards the applicant as less than
fully human. Hence, it does not violate the principle of respect for
persons.
And this is necessarily the case because employers and educators
are persons as much as are those applying for jobs or academic
positions. As such, they too are entitled to be treated as ends in
themselves, which means that their autonomy is of value and must be
respected, and therefore that they may not be forced to serve others'
interests without their consent or be deprived of control over their
lives. In the contexts in which the Civil Rights Act applies, this can
only mean that they may not be forced to hire or educate those they
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would prefer not to associate with simply to advance those others'
interests. As much as the principle of respect for persons implies that
respect for the autonomy of applicants requires that they be permitted
to offer their services to or seek an education from whomever they
choose, it implies that respect for the autonomy of employers and
educators requires that, as long as they are not acting oppressively,
they be permitted to accept the applications of whomever they
choose. The principle of respect for persons not only does not require
employers and educators to judge applicants solely on the basis of
qualifications and job or educational performance, it suggests that in
the absence of an oppressive design, they must be permitted to make
such judgments on the basis of their own autonomously chosen values
and personal preferences.
This, of course, only demonstrates that the moral value of a
meritocratic society cannot be derived from the principle of respect
for persons, not that a meritocratic society is without independent
moral value. However, there does not seem to be any other moral
principle that entails the conclusion that a meritocratic society is a
more just society. Outside of the employment and educational
contexts governed by the Civil Rights Act, there is no duty to decide
whether to associate with others on a meritocratic basis. In general,
we do not act immorally in judging others on the basis of our personal
preferences. We often choose our friends, spouses, tennis partners,
and favorite baseball teams on irrational or purely emotional grounds,
not because they are the most qualified or will perform the best in
these capacities. Yet in doing so, we do nothing wrong. It is not
immoral to decide not to be friends with an otherwise worthy person
simply because one does not like him or her. It is not immoral to
refuse to marry a potentially ideal mate because one is not in love or
to refuse to play tennis with the ideal doubles partner because one
would rather play with one's athletically challenged spouse. It is not
immoral to root for the Chicago Cubs rather than the New York
Yankees. In each of these cases, we evaluate others on the basis of
our personal preferences rather than their qualifications and abilities,
and yet we do them no wrong.
Perhaps things change when we enter the employment and
educational contexts. But if so, it is not clear why. It cannot simply be
the importance of the decisions being made. Decisions concerning
where one works or goes to school are certainly important decisions,
but, although they may be more important than who one plays tennis
with, they are not more important than who one will marry and spend
the rest of one's life with. Indeed, even within these contexts, it is not
clear how broadly any principle requiring meritocratic judgments
would apply. It has been noted that the one hundred persons who
serve as Senators were not chosen because and almost certainly are
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not the most qualified persons for their jobs.254 Is there anything
morally objectionable about one who has personally built a company
from the ground up appointing himself or herself CEO even though
there are others who would certainly do the job better?
The problem is that there is no reason to believe that qualifications
and abilities are a ground of moral entitlement. For this to be the
case, there must be some morally significant connection between the
possession of superior qualifications and abilities and the right to
preference in the assignment of employment and educational
opportunities. But none is readily apparent.
To be at all persuasive, the argument must be that those who are the
most qualified deserve to receive the benefits (the job, the place in
law school, etc.) because they are the most qualified. And there is
just no reason to think that this is a correct premise. There is a
logical gap in the inference that the person who is most qualified to
perform a task, e.g., be a good student, deserves to be admitted as a
student. Of course, those who deserve to be admitted should be
admitted. But why do the most qualified deserve anything? There
is just no necessary connection between academic merit (in the sense
of qualification) and deserving to be a member of a student body.
Suppose, for instance, that there is only one tennis court in the
community. Is it clear that the two best tennis players ought to be
the ones permitted to use it? Why not those who were there first?
Or those who will enjoy playing the most? Or those who are the
worst and therefore need the greatest opportunity to practice? Or
those who have the chance to play least frequently? 255
Furthermore, this logical gap cannot be filled by claiming that
individuals morally deserve their qualifications and abilities since
these arise largely as a matter of chance or as a result of past societal
inequities.
Most of what are regarded as the decisive characteristics for higher
education [or employment] have a great deal to do with things over
which the individual has neither control nor responsibility: such
things as home environment, socioeconomic class of parents, and, of
course, the quality of the primary and secondary schools attended.
Since individuals do not deserve having had any of these things vis-
a-vis other individuals, they do not, for the most part, deserve their
qualifications. And since they do not deserve their abilities they do
not in any strong sense deserve to be admitted [or hired] because of
their abilities.256
254. See Wasserstrom, supra note 11, at 619.
255. Id. at 619-20.
256. Id. at 620. One's genetic or natural endowments are usually added to the list
of undeserved characteristics that produce superior qualifications and abilities. See
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 104 (1971).
It seems to be one of the fixed points of our considered judgments that no
one deserves his place in the distribution of native endowments, any more
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It is of course true that if an employer or educational institution
makes an affirmative representation that it will hire or admit
applicants strictly on the basis of qualifications and abilities and then
fails to do so, applicants who relied on that representation have been
wronged. But the wrong inheres in the fraudulent behavior of the
employer or educational institution," 7 not in the violation of an
independent moral entitlement to be judged purely on one's
qualifications and abilities. The wrong would be equally great if the
employer or educational institution represented itself as accepting
applications strictly on the basis of need and then also considered the
applicants' qualifications and abilities.
Although there does not appear to be any moral principle that
generates an obligation to evaluate others on a meritocratic basis, the
possibility remains that such an obligation could be derived from a
utilitarian moral perspective. This may appear initially promising
because, especially with regard to employment matters, the anti-
differentiation interpretation of the Civil Rights Act is often defended
on grounds of efficiency, i.e., on the grounds that hiring strictly on the
basis of qualifications and abilities yields the most productive
workforce and thereby maximizes the overall wealth of society.
Despite appearances, however, the appeal to utilitarianism fails for
both theoretical and empirical reasons.
As a moral theory, utilitarianism cannot support an anti-
differentiation principle because it cannot support any moral principle
other than the principle of utility.5 8 For a utilitarian there is only one
than one deserves one's initial starting place in society. The assertion that a
man deserves the superior character that enables him to make the effort to
cultivate his abilities is equally problematic; for his character depends in
large part upon fortunate family and social circumstances for which he can
claim no credit. The notion of desert seems not to apply to these cases.
Id.
257. There is no difficulty finding a legitimate moral grounding for the obligation
to keep one's word. Inducing one to act on the basis of a falsehood is simply a
nonviolent way overriding another's autonomous consent. As such, it is a way of
using the other merely as a means to one's own ends and runs afoul of the principle of
respect for persons.
258. In fact, this statement is true only of one of the two common variants of
utilitarian moral theory. Utilitarians often distinguish between pure or "act"
utilitarianism and restricted or "rule" utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism, the variant
discussed in the text, requires every action to be evaluated on the basis of its tendency
to produce the greatest amount of good consequences, and thus can recognize no
moral principles that might conflict with this directive. Rule utilitarianism, on the
other hand, instructs individuals to abide by a set of "utilitarian rules"-rules which, if
followed by all, would produce the greatest amount of good consequences. This
variant of utilitarianism can recognize the moral force of principles and rules other
than the principle of utility, as long as they qualify as utilitarian rules. See generally
Brandt, supra note 247.
I do not discuss rule utilitarianism in the text because although distinct from
act utilitarianism, it fails to provide a grounding for the anti-differentiation
interpretation of the anti-discrimination principle for precisely the same reasons as act
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moral injunction, to act so as to maximize the sum total of good
consequences that are produced, however the good is defined. Even
for those who define the good in terms of material wealth, the most a
utilitarian could consistently advocate would be an obligation to hire
or accept applicants strictly on the basis of qualifications and abilities
whenever doing so increases societal wealth. But as noted in Part 1,259
the supporters of the Civil Rights Act are pointedly not arguing for a
ban on discrimination unless there are societal gains from engaging in
it, but for a ban on discrimination per se. This suggests that
utilitarianism could provide a moral grounding for an anti-
differentiation interpretation of the Civil Rights Act only if as a
matter of empirical fact, hiring job applicants and accepting students
strictly on the basis of qualifications and abilities always leads to an
increase in societal wealth. This, however, is patently not the case.
There are many forms of economically rational discrimination,
discrimination on the basis of characteristics unrelated to
qualifications and abilities that enhances business performance, and
hence societal wealth. For example, hiring a workforce with a
common linguistic or cultural background can greatly reduce a firm's
governance costs. 260 Hiring people who speak the same language or
dialect has obvious efficiencies, but hiring those with common cultural
understandings not only tends to reduce workplace conflicts and
hence the costs of creating and utilizing workplace grievance
procedures, but also facilitates collective decision-making. It is easy
to see how a firm all of whose workers are fundamentalist Christians
will run more smoothly than one in which there is a mix of
fundamentalist Christians and dedicated supporters of abortion rights.
It is also apparent that the first firm will have an easier time deciding
whether to close up shop on Good Friday.261 In addition, hiring on the
basis of one's ethnic, religious, or racial background can also reduce
the firm's security and search costs. With regard to security costs, a
common heritage can be a basis for trust that can reduce a firm's loses
due to employee dishonesty.
[I]nformal enforcement becomes more effective when the members
of a firm are all drawn from the same ethnic or racial group. The
party who cheats at work now knows that he faces stricter sanctions,
given the strong likelihood that the information will be brought
utilitarianism. It would thus be redundant to discuss both. For a fuller explanation,
see infra note 266.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
260. For an extended discussion of this, see Epstein, supra note 36, ch. 3.
261. Richard Epstein points out that considering how well one with the applicant's
ethnic, religious, or racial background will fit into the firm's workforce can influence
how easy it is to decide upon "the music played in the workplace, the food that is
brought in for lunch, the holidays on which the business is closed down, the banter
around the coffeepot, the places chosen for firm outings, and a thousand other small
details that contribute to the efficiency of the firm." Id. at 68.
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home to him at play, at church, or in other business and social
settings. The complex network of human interactions thus induces
persons to honor their deals.
26 2
Part of the reason that Orthodox Jews dominate the diamond trade in
New York is that the greater trust generated by their group solidarity
reduces the security costs associated with the handling of small,
extremely valuable objects. 63 With regard to search costs, hiring by
word of mouth or referral from ethnically restricted self-help groups
can both lower the cost of seeking employees and provide "a better
chance of getting a reliable employee, because all referrals were
implicitly bonded by the referring organizations who wanted to
continue to be able to place their people. '21 Finally, hiring on the
basis of characteristics other than qualifications and abilities can
increase a firm's income as well as reduce it costs. It is well-known
that hiring physically attractive employees can generate increased
sales in businesses in which there is frequent client contact as can
hiring salespeople of the same ethnic background as the customers
they will be serving.265
Thus, the problem with the efficiency-based argument for the anti-
differentiation interpretation is that its conclusion is too strong for its
premises. It is certainly true that considering an applicant's
qualifications and abilities will produce a more productive workforce
than will hiring without regard to qualifications and abilities. But it is
not true that hiring exclusively on the basis of qualifications and
abilities will produce a more productive workforce than will taking
other factors into consideration in addition to qualifications and
abilities. This suggests that the efficiency argument actually supports
the anti-oppression rather than the anti-differentiation interpretation
of the anti-discrimination principle. Because those who seek to
262. Id. at 70.
263. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. of Legal Stud. 115, 140-41 (1992).
264. Epstein, supra note 36, at 71 (discussing the Daniel Lamp case in which the
employer lowered his search costs by accepting employment referrals from the
Spanish Coalition and Latino Youth Organization).
265. Similar arguments can be and are made with regard to educational matters.
For example, considering a prospective student's geographical home, life experiences,
and ethnic, religious, or racial background can be relevant to assembling a class with
sufficient diversity of viewpoint to generate the vigorous discussion that advances the
educational mission.
It must be noted that the problem rational discrimination poses for the anti-
differentiation interpretation cannot be addressed by simply expanding what counts
as a job qualification to include any characteristic that improves a firm's profitability
since this would render the anti-differentiation interpretation vacuous. Hiring on the
basis of qualifications and abilities would then become hiring on any basis at all,
including one's ethnic, religious, or racial background, as long as profits are thereby
increased. Although this may represent a position that a utilitarian could support, it is
certainly not what the advocates of a color-blind society have in mind in arguing for
the anti-differentiation interpretation of the Civil Rights Act.
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oppress members of minority groups will refuse to hire them despite
superior qualifications or abilities, their actions produce a less
productive workforce than would hiring significantly or exclusively on
the basis of qualifications and abilities. Oppressive discrimination is
indeed inefficient. By banning inefficient oppressive discrimination
but not efficient non-oppressive rational discrimination, the anti-
oppression interpretation would improve overall business
performance, increasing societal wealth. Therefore, the anti-
oppression interpretation can probably be justified on utilitarian
grounds as well as on the basis of the principle of respect for persons.
On the other hand, by banning both inefficient oppressive
discrimination and efficient rational discrimination, the anti-
differentiation interpretation would result in less improvement in
business performance than would the anti-oppression interpretation,
and hence less increase in societal wealth. Therefore, it cannot be
justified on utilitarian grounds. 66
This analysis indicates that there is simply no moral obligation to
evaluate others strictly on the basis of their qualifications and abilities
either in general or in the more limited contexts of employment and
education. No identifiable moral principle entails such an obligation
and no such obligation can be derived from utilitarian moral theory.
Thus, there is no reason to believe that the production of a society in
which all employment and educational opportunities are allocated on
a strictly meritocratic basis has independent moral value. This
suggests that the anti-differentiation interpretation of the Civil Rights
Act cannot meet the first of the two threshold requirements for a
morally justified statute, that the societal end it is designed to serve
possess genuine moral value. Is there, then, any way to escape the
conclusion that the anti-differentiation interpretation of the Civil
Rights Act yields a morally unjustified statute?
Perhaps. Although the anti-differentiation interpretation possesses
no independent moral value, it might still be justified on the ground
that it is a useful instrument for realizing a state of affairs that does.
We have seen that the anti-oppression interpretation of the anti-
discrimination principle can be justified on the basis of the principle of
266. It may be objected that the possibility remains that the anti-differentiation
interpretation could find support in rule utilitarianism. See supra note 258. This
would be the case if the injunction to hire (or admit students) strictly on the basis of
qualifications and abilities was a utilitarian rule, one which if followed by all, would
produce the greatest amount of good consequences. However, the same argument
that shows the anti-differentiation interpretation cannot be derived from act
utilitarianism shows that it is also not a utilitarian rule. Following a rule that requires
employers (or educators) to refrain from both oppressive and rational discrimination
would produce less efficient businesses and hence less good consequences than
following a rule that required them to refrain only from oppressive discrimination.
Therefore, there is no need to consider rule utilitarianism separately to conclude that
the anti-differentiation interpretation cannot be grounded on utilitarian moral theory.
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respect for persons and perhaps on utilitarian grounds as well. Thus,
we can have a high degree of confidence that creating a society free of
oppressive discrimination has genuine moral value. If interpreting the
Civil Rights Act as an anti-differentiation principle provided an
effective means of eliminating oppressive discrimination, then the
anti-differentiation interpretation might be derivatively justified as a
mechanism for realizing the morally significant goal of the anti-
oppression interpretation.
An argument can be made for the anti-differentiation interpretation
on this ground. As the stronger of the two interpretations, the anti-
differentiation interpretation encompasses the anti-oppression
interpretation, prohibiting oppressive discrimination along with all
irrelevant racial, ethnic, and sexual differentiation. Therefore, its
implementation would realize the morally valuable goal of eliminating
oppressive discrimination as much as would the implementation of the
anti-oppression interpretation. Furthermore, the perpetrators of
oppressive discrimination often try to disguise it as non-oppressive
rational discrimination, making it difficult to identify and eliminate. If
banning all non-meritocratic hiring and admissions practices was a
more effective means of eliminating oppressive discrimination than
going after oppressive discrimination directly, then the anti-
differentiation interpretation could possess the moral value of a
necessary means to an anti-oppression end. The anti-differentiation
interpretation could then be justified as a prophylactic measure
designed to protect against covert oppressive discrimination.
If successful, this argument would get the anti-differentiation
interpretation of the Civil Rights Act over the first hurdle for a
morally justified statute-it would show that it served a societal end of
genuine moral value. However, there remains the second hurdle-the
requirement that the moral improvement be great enough to justify
the cost in personal autonomy. This is where the instrumental
justification for the anti-differentiation interpretation founders.
Under the instrumental justification we are presently considering,
the moral value of the anti-differentiation interpretation, although
definite, is relatively small. It lies not in the elimination of the
oppressive discrimination that is the province of the anti-oppression
interpretation, but in the elimination of cases of covert oppressive
discrimination that it can catch, but which would escape even the
vigorous application of a statute embodying the anti-oppression
interpretation.
Although the world would be a better place, morally speaking, if
the anti-differentiation interpretation of the Civil Rights Act caught
even one instance of oppressive discrimination that an anti-oppression
interpretation would not-if it prevented even one instance of a
refusal to hire or educate on the basis of racial, ethnic, or sexual
animus or one attempt to degrade or exploit someone because of his
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or her minority status-it must be recognized that isolated instances
of such conduct can inflict only limited harm on its victims. In a
market environment, oppressive discrimination must be widespread to
cause serious harm to its targets. To see why, consider the situation of
one seeking employment. What matters to the job seeker is his or her
ability to secure one desirable job. Although it would be nice if every
prospective employer was willing to consider his or her application,
the job seeker's life prospects will not be significantly harmed unless
so many are unwilling that not even one desirable offer of
employment is forthcoming. To be sure, even isolated instances of
oppressive discrimination can impose heavier search costs and greater
inconvenience on its targets than that incurred by individuals not
subjected to racial, ethnic, or sexual animus. Nevertheless, in an
environment in which a prohibition on oppressive discrimination is
vigorously enforced, it is extremely unlikely that the amount of such
discrimination that would escape detection would be sufficiently
widespread to prevent its targets from obtaining acceptable
employment.267 In such a situation, the harm suffered consists more in
the loss of an opportunity for gain than in a serious material
deprivation.
The person who wishes to discriminate against another for any
reason has it in her power only to refuse to do business with him, not
to use force against him. The victim of discrimination, unlike the
victim of force, keeps his initial set of entitlements-life, limb, and
possession-even if he does not realize the gains from trade with a
particular person.
268
Thus, in a market environment in which the anti-oppression
interpretation of the Civil Rights Act prevents the widespread
practice of oppressive discrimination, the harm that can be inflicted by
undetected individual acts of oppressive discrimination is relatively
267. Richard Epstein explains this as follows:
[I]n a world in which 90 percent of the people are opposed to doing business
with me, I shall concentrate my attention on doing business with the other 10
percent, secure in the knowledge that as long as the tort law (with its
prohibitions against the forceful interference with contract or prospective
trading advantage) is in place, my enemies are powerless to block our
mutually beneficial transactions by their use of force. The universe of
potential trading partners is surely smaller because some people bear me
personal animus and hostility. I would prefer that everyone be willing to do
business with me, even if I have no wish to do business with them. But the
critical question for my welfare is not which opportunities are lost but which
are retained. Even for persons who find themselves in relatively isolated
minorities, the opportunities retained will not be trivial as the number of
persons in society increases from the tens to the hundreds, thousands, and
millions. Viable trading economies have thrived in much smaller
populations.
Epstein, supra note 36, at 30-31 (footnote omitted).
268. Id. at 30.
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small because the presence of other trading partners renders their
effects avoidable.269 Hence, the moral improvement that can be
gained by adopting an anti-differentiation interpretation of the Act is
relatively small as well.
This small improvement, however, must be purchased at an
excessively high price in the personal autonomy of those not behaving
immorally. The anti-differentiation interpretation produces an
extremely restrictive statute that prohibits anyone offering an
employment or educational opportunity from acting on any of their
non-oppressive personal preferences. It outlaws not only rationally
discriminatory hiring and admission practices that help employers and
educators accomplish their legitimate ends, but also practices designed
to effectuate group self-help27 or motivated by charitable purposes
including sympathy for those less well-off or those who were treated
unfairly in the past. This both makes society as a whole poorer by
driving up the material cost of doing business and educating students
and prevents individuals and institutions from acting in accordance
with intimate and potentially deeply held personal values.
Consider, for example, an African-American business person who
had to overcome poverty and racial prejudice in order to succeed and
who believes that he or she should "give something back to the
community" by according hiring preference to other African-
Americans in his or her situation. Or consider a group of women
attorneys who believe they have been denied advancement in male-
dominated law firms and who wish to "break the glass ceiling" and
269. This conclusion is not based on any unrealistic assumptions about the
rationality of individual market actors.
It might be said in response that this argument presupposes that firms are
rational in their behavior, which they often are not. But again there is the
confusion between the competence of the marginal and the average firm.
The argument works, provided there is one firm that understands that it is in
its interest to seek gold in a new mine after the old mine has been worked
out. Thus, if most firms are unaware of the way in which the quality of the
pool changes as items are taken from it, then the firm that is aware of the
shift will prosper enormously. Even if other firms are not aware of the
problem at the outset, their internal feedback mechanism will tell them that
their second round of new hirings is inferior to the first. Experience and
example will educate where abstract calculation fails. The rationality of the
market system qua system is therefore far higher than the rationality of its
average participant or than the sole government bureaucrat asked to make
job assignments. It is very hard to envision any state of affairs in which all
firms would adopt the strategy of hiring only workers in the preferred class
before taking any from the second. At the margin someone will break ranks.
Id. at 35-36.
270. Group self-help, in which disfavored minorities create their own businesses
and schools in order to provide other members of the group with the employment and
educational opportunities denied them by the larger society, has been a traditional
route out of poverty and social subordination. The anti-differentiation interpretation
of the Civil Rights Act cuts off this route to self-improvement by prohibiting the
preferential hiring and academic admissions practices that are its heart.
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help create what they believe to be a more caring legal system by
forming their own firm in which they can give hiring or advancement
preferences to women.7 In both cases, the employers wish to
exercise their autonomy in ways that are profoundly important to
them and reflect their views of what it means to live a good life. And
in both cases, our analysis of moral theory shows their intended
actions to be morally unobjectionable. By prohibiting such actions,
the anti-differentiation interpretation seriously restricts citizens'
autonomy and impedes their ability to pursue genuinely good ends.
Unlike the anti-oppression interpretation, which bans only actions
that are morally insupportable, the anti-differentiation interpretation
deprives citizens of the liberty to take many actions that have positive,
and potentially great, moral value.
Thus, the conclusion to which we are driven is that the anti-
differentiation interpretation of the Civil Rights Act cannot satisfy the
threshold requirement for a morally justified statute. There is no
genuine moral value in purely meritocratic decision-making in itself,
and whatever instrumental value it can derive as a means to a morally
valuable anti-oppression end is insufficient to justify the serious
infringement on citizens' personal autonomy that it entails. Hence, to
the extent that the national consensus in support of the Civil Rights
Act is based on understanding it as a statute designed to ensure that
all employment and educational opportunities are distributed strictly
on the basis of qualifications and ability, it is not morally well-
grounded.272
3. Evaluating the Anti-Subordination Interpretation
There remains the question of whether the anti-subordination
interpretation of the Civil Rights Act can meet the threshold
requirement for a morally justified statute. It is the strongest of the
three interpretations, prohibiting all conduct that has the effect of
subordinating or continuing the subordination of a minority group.
Under it, the Civil Rights Act would require individuals to scrutinize
every action assigning employment or educational opportunities to
ensure that it neither intentionally nor unknowingly adds to or
perpetuates the subordinated status of any minority group. Unlike
the anti-differentiation interpretation, which requires color-blind
decision-making, the anti-subordination interpretation mandates the
intense color-consciousness necessary to make sure that one does not
engage in apparently neutral practices that can differentially and
negatively impact minorities. It is clear that the societal end of such a
271. See Ann Davis, Women's Networking Spreads Work Around, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 9,
1995, at Al.
272. For an explanation of why there is such a widespread belief to the contrary,
see infra text accompanying notes 324-327.
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statute is the creation of a radically more egalitarian society in which
no group is legally or socially subordinated to any other. It is equally
clear that the achievement of this end requires a significant restriction
on the liberty and autonomy of business people and educators.
Morally evaluating the anti-subordination interpretation in the
same manner as I have the anti-oppression and anti-differentiation
interpretations would be a complex, difficult, and time-consuming
task. Such an evaluation would require a determination of the moral
value inherent in producing an egalitarian society as well as a metric
by which to compare it to the value of the liberty that must be
sacrificed to achieve it. This would require a resolution of the dispute
over the relative value of equality and liberty that has been at the
heart of public moral discourse since at least the publication of John
Rawls' A Theory of Justice,273 if not forever. An attempt to merely
describe the contours of this debate, much less resolve it, would be
considerably beyond the scope of this article. Fortunately, no such
attempt is necessary because, regardless of the relative value of
equality and liberty, the anti-subordination interpretation can be
shown not to be the proper interpretation of the Civil Rights Act on
completely independent grounds-specifically, on the ground that it
would render the Civil Rights Act impracticable.
In analyzing the moral foundations of the anti-oppression and anti-
differentiation interpretations of the anti-discrimination principle, I
focused exclusively on substantive moral principles and theories.
Much like the law, however, there are also purely procedural moral
principles that apply universally across all substantive positions. One
of the most fundamental of these is the principle that "ought implies
can." '274 This holds that one can be morally obligated to do only that
which it is possible for him or her to do. No substantive analysis of
the relative value of equality and liberty is required to determine that
a statute that violates this principle, i.e., that requires the impossible,
is not morally justified.
To appreciate the significance of the principle that "ought implies
can," one must understand that it requires more than merely that it be
physically possible for citizens to act in accordance with a statute. It
requires that it be epistemically possible as well. That is, citizens must
be able to acquire the knowledge necessary to determine whether
their actions will contravene the requirements of the statute. A
statute that requires citizens to refrain from any economic transaction
that could have a negative effect on the nation's gross domestic
product is just as impossible to comply with as one that requires them
to walk a hundred miles a day.
273. See Rawls, supra note 256.




The problem with the anti-subordination interpretation of the Civil
Rights Act is that it is epistemically impossible for citizens to comply
with it. This is because there is simply no way for citizens to know in
advance which of their actions will have a subsequent subordinating
effect. The American economy and American culture are the
products of the individual actions and beliefs of hundreds of millions
of people. No individual employer or educator is capable of
calculating how his or her individual hiring or admission decisions and
practices will alter the ultimate structure of these complex matrices.
Over half a century ago, Friedrich Hayek demonstrated that there are
inherent limitations on human beings' ability to gather and utilize the
dispersed information that determines the structure of such dynamic
social systems. 275 Because it is impossible to acquire "knowledge of
the particular circumstances of time and place '276 upon which others
will base their reactions to changes in their societal environment, it is
impossible to predict how one's particular inputs into the system will
alter the greater social fabric.2 7  Hence, it is impossible to know in
advance whether one's actions will in fact perpetuate or add to the
societal subordination of any minority group.
Consider, for example, the case of Bradley v. Pizzaco.278 In that
case, Domino's Pizza had a policy that required its pizza delivery
personnel to be clean shaven. Bradley was an African-American
delivery man who suffered from pseudofoliculitis barbae (PFB), a skin
condition that is exacerbated by shaving. When Bradley refused to
comply with Domino's no-beard policy, he was fired. It turns out,
however, that PFB affects a significant percentage of African-
Americans but very few Caucasians. As a result, "Domino's policy
necessarily excludes black males from the company's work force at a
substantially higher rate than white males, ' 279 and thus has a disparate
impact on African-Americans.
In retrospect, armed with the knowledge that PFB affects African-
Americans to a much greater extent than Caucasians, it is easy to see
that a policy requiring male employees to be clean-shaven can have
the effect of adding to the subordination of African-Americans. But
how could the operators of a pizza delivery service know in advance
that adopting this policy would have a subordinating effect? For this
to be the case, Domino's managers would not only have to have
275. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519
(1945).
276. Id. at 521.
277. Hayek's observations were directed toward the difficulty that dispersed
knowledge presented for central economic planning. It should be clear, however, that
our inability to obtain the information necessary to predict particular human reactions
to societal changes makes it equally, if not more, difficult to effect consciously
intended changes in society's culture.
278. 939 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1991).
279. Id. at 612.
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knowledge of a rather obscure medical condition, but would have to
think to ask whether a no-beard policy could have a racially
subordinating effect in the first place. Is it reasonable to expect
ordinary business people to have this level of foresight and
knowledge?
History is replete with examples of our inability to anticipate the
subordinating effect of our actions. In the early part of the twentieth
century, many members of the progressive movement believed that
women were a vulnerable group that needed protection against
exploitation in the workplace. To protect them against
"unconscionable employers['] .... selfish disregard of the public
interest,"2"" the progressives supported measures designed to prevent
women from being worked excessively long hours281 and to ensure
that they received a minimum wage. 2' In retrospect, we know that
these and other protective measures that "put women on a pedestal"
also put them at a competitive disadvantage in the labor market. By
making it more difficult for them to find work outside the home, these
measures had the effect of perpetuating women's economic and
societal subordination, precisely the opposite of what their authors
intended.
In the middle of the twentieth century, political liberals believed
that requiring a strict adherence to meritocratic hiring and educational
admissions procedures would break down racial barriers to entry into
the market and was the most effective way of improving the life
prospects of African-Americans. In retrospect, we know that
subjecting those who had previously been denied the employment and
educational opportunities necessary to develop their qualifications
and abilities to evaluation on a strictly meritocratic basis has the effect
of perpetuating their subordination, a result clearly not within the
contemplation of the mid-century liberals.
The situation is no different today. In Part I, I noted that the anti-
subordination interpretation of the anti-discrimination principle
apparently requires affirmative action.8 3 But not just any form of
affirmative action will do. The anti-subordination interpretation
requires only that form of affirmative action that does not itself have
the effect of adding to or perpetuating the subordination of any
minority group. But how can we know before the fact which forms of
affirmative action have this character? Many advocates of affirmative
action argue that the best way to improve the social position of
disfavored minority groups is to institute programs that provide hiring
and admission preferences for members of these groups. This may be
correct. On the other hand, critics of affirmative action believe that
280. W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399-400 (1937).
281. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
282. See W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 379.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
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such programs will retard the prospects of minorities. They argue that
by placing minorities in direct academic and career competition with
those who are better prepared and more experienced than they are,
affirmative action programs will cause minorities to fail at a greater
rate than would be the case if they attended universities and began
their careers with jobs for which they were better qualified.2&4 Such
failure, the critics contend, will not only reinforce racist beliefs about
the inferiority of minorities in the dominant community, but will also
undermine feelings of self-worth among the members of minority
groups themselves. If the critics are correct, then the implementation
of the proposed affirmative action programs will have the effect of
perpetuating or perhaps increasing the subordination of the minorities
they are intended to benefit. Do we really have sufficient ability to
predict the future performance of individuals and societal reaction to
it to know whether or not preferential hiring and admissions programs
will ultimately reduce or increase the subordination of minorities?
This question actually minimizes the knowledge problem since even
if we could know that an affirmative action program would improve
the societal standing of the members of a subordinated group, it could
still run afoul of the anti-subordination interpretation if it increased or
perpetuated the subordination of the members of another minority
group in doing so. For example, a hiring practice that enhances the
employment opportunities for Hispanics in a geographical area would
violate the anti-subordination interpretation if it had the unintended
consequence of reducing employment opportunities of African-
Americans in that area.28 Similarly, academic affirmative action
programs that enhance the educational opportunities of African-
Americans would violate the anti-subordination interpretation if they
did so by curtailing the educational opportunities of Asian-
Americans.2 86 Feminist scholars have recently suggested that racial
and sexual affirmative action as currently practiced may actually
284. See, e.g., Alexandra D. Mease-White, Hopwood v. Texas: Challenging the Use
of Race as a Proxy for Diversity in America's Public Universities, 29 Conn. L. Rev.
1293, 1309-10 (1997); Note, Lasting Stigma: Affirmative Action and Clarence
Thomas's Prisoners' Rights Jurisprudence, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, 1334-35 (1999).
285. See, for example, the case of the Daniel Lamp Company, in which the EEOC
found the company to have engaged in illegal discrimination against African-
Americans by recruiting workers from two Hispanic organizations, the Spanish
Coalition and the Latino Youth Organization, discussed in Epstein, supra note 36, at
70-71.
286. Until ended by Proposition 209, California's academic affirmative action
program increased African-American and Hispanic enrollment by providing members
of these groups with preferences over not only Caucasian but also Asian-American
applicants. See M. Ali Raza et al., The Ups and Downs of Affirmative Action
Preferences 122-26 (1999); Jennifer C. Brooks, The Demise of Affirmative Action and
the Effect on Higher Education Admissions: A Chilling Effect or Much Ado About
Nothing?, 48 Drake L. Rev. 567, 578-79 (2000).
2002]
510 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
contribute to the subordination of women of color by failing to
recognize the dual nature of the discrimination they suffer.8 7
As these examples illustrate, inherent limitations on human
knowledge coupled with the immutable law of unintended
consequences implies that even the most knowledgeable and highly
educated academic and professional experts have a limited ability to
predict the effects of particular inputs on the overall configuration of a
dynamic social system. How much more must this be the case for the
ordinary business person or educator? Yet by prohibiting any action
that has the effect of perpetuating or increasing the societal
subordination of any minority, the anti-subordination interpretation
of the Civil Rights Act requires precisely this ability. To comply with
the statute, citizens must know at the moment of action what the
effects of that action will be on the overall structure of society.
Because such knowledge is unattainable, i.e., because compliance is
epistemically impossible, the anti-subordination interpretation of the
Civil Rights Act violates the "ought implies can" principle, and hence
cannot be the morally proper interpretation of the statute.
It is essential to understand just how limited the present point is. I
am not contending that it is morally unacceptable to prohibit citizens
287. See Angela D. Hooton, Constitutional Review of Affirmative Action Policies
for Women of Color: a Hopeless Paradox?, 15 Wis. Women's L.J. 391, 422-24 (2000).
Ironically, affirmative action policies, which tend to treat people as group
members rather than as individuals, also fail to address the unique situation
women of color are in given their susceptibility to dual forms of
discrimination....
The troubling statistics on women of color, coupled with the
potentially growing divide between those who have been traditionally
grouped together, such as minority and white women, beg the question: Can
affirmative action continue to exist in its present form and improve
opportunities for women of color?
Id.; see also Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place,
Asserting Our Rights, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 9, 9-10 (1989).
The economic, political, and social situation of black women in America is
bad, and has been bad for a long time. Historically, they have borne both
the disabilities of blacks and the disabilities which inhere in their status as
women. These two statuses have often combined in ways which are not only
additive, but synergistic--that is, they create a condition for black women
which is more terrible than the sum of their two constituent parts ....
Despite, or perhaps because of, this dual disability and its negative effects
on life opportunities for black women, the problems of black women often
go unrecognized. Black women have not been seen as a discrete group with
a unique history, unique strengths and unique disabilities. By creating two
separate categories for its major social problems-"the race problem," and
"the women's issue"-society has ignored the group which stands at the
interstices of these two groups, black women in America. For example,
social reformist discussion tends to focus on the need to protect "minorities
and women" from the hardships of discrimination. Although this term is
intended to be inclusive, in fact, it misleads by overlooking those Americans
who are both "minorities" and "women."
Id. (footnote omitted).
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from acting to perpetuate or increase the subordination of minorities,
only that it is unacceptable to prohibit them from doing so when they
cannot know that they are doing so. A certain percentage of actions
that are intended to harm the life prospects of members of minority
groups will succeed in doing so. Preventing subordination by
prohibiting such intentional action presents no epistemic problem.
Everyone knows the contents of his or her own mind and this is all
that is required to refrain from acting on a specified intent. An
interpretation of the Civil Rights Act that enjoins citizens from
purposely acting to subordinate minorities, as the anti-oppression
interpretation does, is entirely unproblematic. The epistemic
objection applies only to an interpretation that enjoins citizens from
taking any action that has the effect of perpetuating or increasing the
subordination of minorities, whether intentional or not. Such an
injunction requires more than merely knowledge of one's own mental
state. It requires employers and educators to have sufficient empirical
knowledge of the way particular policies and decisions will alter the
overall structure of society to be able to screen all of their actions that
are not intended to perpetuate or add to the subordination of
minorities to ensure that none of them has this effect. But this level of
knowledge is unattainable. There is no epistemological problem with
prohibiting a Domino's Pizza manager who is aware that PFB affects
many more African-Americans than Caucasians from instituting a no-
beard policy for the purpose of excluding African-Americans from the
workforce. There is an epistemological problem with prohibiting
Domino's Pizza managers, who have never heard of PFB and think a
no-beard policy will increase the success of their business, from
adopting such a policy because of its unknown effects on African-
Americans.2"'
288. By allowing the punishment of citizens whose actions have produced a
subordinating effect even though it was impossible for them to know that this would
be the case, the anti-subordination interpretation creates strict liability for
subordinating action. Strict liability can make sense where the object of legislation is
not to encourage people to act more carefully, but to discourage certain types of
action entirely. For example, imposing strict liability on blasting in heavily populated
areas discourages the use of blasting as a method of demolition. See Richard A.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 163 (3d ed. 1986); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability
versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980). Strict liability is inappropriate in the
present context because the purpose of the Civil Rights Act is not and could not be to
discourage citizens from engaging in business or educational pursuits or, more
narrowly, from making employment and admissions decisions. The most that could
be hoped for in this context is that the Civil Rights Act will encourage citizens to
exercise more care to ensure that their decisions do not perpetuate or increase the
subordination of minorities.
This consideration points out that there is logical space for a type of action
that is not addressed by either the anti-oppression or the anti-subordination
interpretations, i.e., negligent action. An anti-discrimination principle could require
employers and educators to both refrain from intentional subordinating actions and to
exercise reasonable care to ensure that their actions did not have a subordinating
2002]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
I am also not contending that the state and federal governments
may not act to end the societal subordination of minorities, only that
they may not do so by imposing an obligation on individual citizens
that the citizens cannot possibly meet. The anti-subordination
interpretation of the Civil Rights Act seeks to end subordination by
requiring the diverse individual members of society to make particular
employment and educational decisions that cumulatively have this
effect. This is morally unacceptable because limitations on human
knowledge make it impossible for the citizens to comply with the
requirements of the statute. But the fact that this particular method
of reducing subordination is impracticable does not imply that
government may not act in other ways to achieve anti-subordination
ends. Assuming for the moment that the substantive moral dispute
over the proper balance between liberty and equality were resolved in
favor of equality, there are many steps that governments could take to
produce a more egalitarian society. States could alter the method by
which they fund public education or create job training programs so as
to improve the status of subordinated groups. The federal
government could alter tax policy or reform its welfare system to
more effectively reduce differences in income and wealth.
Constitutional amendments could be passed requiring legislation to
comply with Rawls's difference principle.289 Hate crime and anti-
harassment laws could be strengthened or more vigorously enforced.
Measures such as these in which government acts directly to reduce
societal subordination rather than by deputizing the citizenry to do so
are not subject to the epistemic objection. None of them require
citizens to know the unknowable. Hence, none of them violate the
"ought implies can" principle.2 9" The epistemic objection, which
shows the anti-subordination interpretation of the Civil Rights Act to
effect, a more stringent interpretation than the anti-oppression interpretation, which
prohibits only intentional action. Such an interpretation would not run afoul of the
"ought implies can" principle because it does not require employers and educators to
know the unknowable, but only to know what the reasonable and prudent employer
or educator would know. Although this fourth interpretation of the anti-
discrimination principle is conceptually distinct from the three under consideration, it
has probably not been previously remarked because it would have little practical
significance. This is because a reasonable and prudent employer or educator would
probably know next to nothing about the subordinating effect of his or her actions
that are not intended to produce this result, and so the fourth interpretation would
essentially collapse into the anti-oppression interpretation.
289. See Rawls, supra note 256, at 83 ("Social and economic inequalities are to be
arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity.").
290. This is not to say that such measures are morally acceptable, merely that they
are not subject to the objection I am bringing against the anti-subordination
interpretation of the Civil Rights Act. Whether they run afoul of any other moral




be morally unacceptable, carries no implications for the moral
acceptability of other government policies designed to reduce the
societal subordination of minorities.
4. Conclusions
Careful moral analysis shows that for the Civil Rights Act to be
morally well-grounded, it must be interpreted as an anti-oppression
principle. Under the anti-oppression interpretation, the Civil Rights
Act functions as a specific instantiation of the fundamental moral
principle of respect for persons, and accordingly derives direct support
from that principle. There is thus no difficulty establishing a
legitimate moral basis for this interpretation. Further, the anti-
oppression interpretation imposes fairly minimal restrictions on the
personal autonomy of the citizens, and even then, deprives them only
of the liberty to engage in action that is itself morally illegitimate.
On the other hand, no moral support can be found for the anti-
differentiation interpretation at all. A duty to judge others strictly on
the basis of qualifications and abilities can be derived neither from the
principle of respect for persons nor any other identifiable moral
principle. It also cannot be derived from utilitarian moral theory
because strictly meritocratic hiring and admissions practices are not
efficient means of maximizing societal wealth. Further, such a duty
cannot be justified purely as a means to the morally valuable goals of
the anti-oppression interpretation because the relatively small
improvement it can bring to achieving those goals is overborne by its
large cost in citizens' personal autonomy and restrictions on their
liberty to engage in morally unobjectionable action.
Finally, the anti-subordination interpretation can be rejected out of
hand as impracticable. Individuals have moral obligations to do only
that which it is possible for them to do. Because compliance with the
anti-subordination interpretation requires a level of knowledge
unattainable by human beings, it violates the fundamental moral
principle of "ought implies can" and thus must be rejected regardless
of the moral value of the ends it seeks to achieve.
B. The Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause is part of a constitutional amendment.
Unlike statutes, the purpose of constitutional amendments is not to
regulate the behavior of individual citizens, but of government itself.
Constitutions create governments and invest them with their powers.
Constitutional amendments alter the internal structure of
governments and expand or contract the scope of their powers. The
Equal Protection Clause is part of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
like the Bill of Rights and other post-Civil War amendments, is
specifically designed to restrain governmental power.
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Governments are not persons. They are instrumentalities created
by persons to provide them with certain services. The relationship
between government and citizenry is that of agent to principal;
governments exist to perform those tasks, and only those tasks,
delegated to them by their citizens. As such, governments can have
no desires, goals, or values of their own. They possess no morally
valuable personal autonomy that needs to be respected. Unlike the
situation in which a statute restrains the liberty of individual citizens,
nothing of intrinsic moral value is lost in restraining a government's
liberty of action. Therefore, to morally evaluate a constitutional
amendment that restrains government power, the only question that
must be asked is whether the amendment improves the moral
functioning of the government.
A government functions morally when it exercises its powers to
achieve morally appropriate ends by morally appropriate means.
Thus, constitutional amendments that restrain governmental power
can attempt to improve the moral functioning of a government by
placing restrictions on either the ends it may pursue or the means by
which it may pursue them. The Equal Protection Clause contains a
restriction of the latter type. Each state possesses a police power that
authorizes it to act for the end of protecting the health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens.29' The Equal Protection Clause is designed to
impose a restriction on the means by which the police power may be
exercised. It forbids states from acting to promote health, safety, or
welfare in ways that afford lesser legal protection to some citizens
than others; that is, it restrains states from exercising their police
power in a discriminatory manner. Therefore, we can evaluate the
moral adequacy of the various interpretations of the Equal Protection
Clause by plugging their definitions of discrimination into the
ianguage of the amendment. The interpretation that most effectively
curtails governments' ability to employ morally objectionable means
to promote what they consider the public's health, safety, or welfare
will be the proper one.292
291. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
There are, however, certain powers, existing in the sovereignty of each State
in the Union, somewhat vaguely termed police powers, the exact description
and limitation of which have not been attempted by the courts. Those
powers, broadly stated and without, at present, any attempt at a more
specific limitation, relate to the safety, health, morals and general welfare of
the public.
Id.
292. For reasons previously discussed, see supra notes 230-231, 1 am writing as
though the Equal Protection Clause, which applies only to the states, applies to the
federal government as well.
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1. Evaluating the Anti-Oppression Interpretation
Under the anti-oppression interpretation, the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits government from taking any actions that draw
distinctions among its citizens for the purpose of oppressing or
imposing disadvantages on minorities. This interpretation prohibits
racial, ethnic, or sexual rent-seeking293 by forbidding government from
acting to improve the welfare of the politically or socially dominant
portion of the citizenry at the expense of racial, ethnic, or sexual
minorities. It also forbids any action designed to degrade or
dehumanize members of minority groups or otherwise reduce them to
a second class political or societal status. Under the anti-oppression
interpretation, the Equal Protection Clause demands that government
exercise its police power only for the purpose of improving the health,
safety, or welfare of all of its citizens and only in ways that treat all
citizens with the respect due to full members of the body politic.
Little new need be said to show that the anti-oppression
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause produces a morally
justified constitutional amendment. We saw in our consideration of
the Civil Rights Act that the anti-oppression interpretation of the
anti-discrimination principle follows directly from the principle of
respect for persons.294 This principle prohibits oppressive conduct of
any kind. If oppressive conduct of any kind is morally unacceptable,
then oppressive discriminatory conduct that targets minorities is
obviously morally unacceptable. This applies to actions taken by
government as much as it does to actions taken by individuals.
Oppressive governmental measures directed against minorities are
wrong because oppressive governmental measures of any kind are
wrong. An interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause that
prevents government from exercising its police power in a way that
oppresses minorities clearly improves its moral functioning, and hence
meets the test for a morally justified constitutional amendment. As
was the case with the Civil Rights Act, to the extent that the national
consensus underlying the Equal Protection Clause is based on
understanding it as designed to prevent government from adopting
racist and exploitative polices aimed at minorities, it is morally well-
grounded.
293. In economic terms, rent-seeking refers to the expenditure of resources to
bring about an uncompensated transfer of goods or services from another person or
persons to one's self as the result of a "favorable" decision on some public policy. See
Anne 0. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 Am. Econ.
Rev. 291 (1974); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft,
5 W. Econ. J. 224 (1967).
294. See supra text accompanying notes 247-251.
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2. Evaluating the Anti-Differentiation Interpretation
At this point, it is reasonable to ask whether any further analysis is
required. Won't the evaluations of the anti-differentiation and anti-
subordination interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause merely
mirror those of the Civil Rights Act? Why re-cover old ground? The
answer is that although the moral principles involved are indeed the
same, they are being applied in widely divergent contexts. Placing
restrictions on governmental action rather than on the liberty of
individual citizens requires consideration of factors not addressed in
our discussion of the Civil Rights Act. Unlike individuals,
government has no personal autonomy at stake and is burdened with
the fiduciary duty that all agents have to act in the interest of its
principal. Although our analysis of the underlying moral principles
may be the same for the Equal Protection Clause as it was for the
Civil Rights Act, these contextual factors change the manner of their
application sufficiently to alter our conclusion about how the two
provisions should be interpreted.29
Under the anti-differentiation interpretation, the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits government from drawing distinctions among its
citizens on the basis of irrelevant characteristics. This means that
government may not treat members of different racial, ethnic, or
sexual groups differently unless doing so is necessary to achieve a
legitimate legislative end. Although this may allow the government to
direct funds for the treatment of sickle cell anemia to African-
Americans and to maintain separate bathrooms for men and women
in state-owned facilities, it permits little else in the way of racial,
ethnic, or sexual differentiation. It certainly forbids government from
assigning legal, material, or educational benefits and burdens on the
basis of these characteristics. Under the anti-differentiation
interpretation, government is required to perform its functions in a
color-blind manner, employing only "relevant" means to its legislative
ends, i.e., those that most efficiently lead to their attainment. For
example, the anti-differentiation interpretation of the Equal
295. These factors played no role in the analysis of the anti-oppression
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, just completed. This is because under
the anti-oppression interpretation there is little difference between the Equal
Protection Clause and Civil Rights Act with regard to either factor. The anti-
oppression interpretation of the anti-discrimination principle deprives individuals of
morally valuable personal autonomy to a very limited extent. As a result, its
application to individuals via the Civil Rights Act is, in this respect, virtually
indistinguishable from its application to governments that have no morally valuable
personal autonomy to lose. Further, oppressive conduct violates the principle of
respect for persons regardless of whether one is acting as an agent or in one's
individual capacity, again rendering the principle's application the same in both
contexts. Consequently, the reasoning that shows the anti-oppression interpretation
of the Civil Rights Act to be morally justified works equally well for the anti-
oppression interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.
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Protection Clause would forbid the state or federal governments from
considering the race, ethnicity, or sex of an applicant in awarding
government contracts, requiring such contracts to be awarded strictly
on the basis of quality and price.
Our analysis of the anti-differentiation interpretation of the Civil
Rights Act showed that there was no independent moral value in the
creation and maintenance of a color-blind society in which individuals
are evaluated and benefits and burdens distributed on a strictly
meritocratic basis. Neither utilitarianism nor any identifiable moral
principle entails an obligation to refrain from drawing distinctions on
the basis of race, ethnicity, or sex for non-oppressive purposes. In the
context of the Equal Protection Clause, this implies that there is no
independent moral requirement that government function in a color-
blind manner. Such a government is not inherently morally superior
to one that classifies its citizens on the basis of race, ethnicity, sex, or
any other irrelevant characteristic as long as none of these
classifications are designed to oppress minorities.
However, as noted in our consideration of the Civil Rights Act,29 6
this is not the end of the matter. Although a government that
functions in a color-blind manner is not inherently morally superior to
one that does not, there still may be an instrumental justification for
requiring a government to function in such a manner. For example, if
requiring governments to abide by the anti-differentiation
interpretation of the anti-discrimination principle was necessary to
prevent the oppression of minorities, then the anti-differentiation
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause could be justified as a
means to morally valuable anti-oppression ends. With regard to the
Civil Rights Act, we saw that no such instrumental justification was
available. Because the anti-differentiation interpretation of the Act
significantly curtailed individuals' ability to act upon their personally
important, morally unobjectionable value decisions for only marginal
reductions in oppression, the moral cost of adopting that
interpretation was too high. However, the situation is considerably
different in the case of the Equal Protection Clause, which restrains
governmental rather than individual conduct. The combination of the
government's status as an agent and the difference in incentives
between individuals acting in a market and government officials acting
politically is sufficient to alter the balance of equities in favor of the
anti-differentiation interpretation in this context.
Consider government's status as an agent of the citizenry first. As
an agent, it is empowered to act only in the interest of the citizens.
Government is not a person, and possesses no morally valuable
personal autonomy that can be lost. Hence, placing restraints on its
activities carries no inherent moral cost. Further, government is the
296. See supra text following note 266.
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agent of all the citizens, each of whom possesses equal status as a
principal. There are no classes of citizenship as there are of stock
ownership; no "preferred" and "common" citizens with the former
entitled to privileges not possessed by the latter. All citizens are
required to support the government with their taxes and all must live
out their lives subject to the law government creates and enforces.
Hence, all citizens have an equal stake in the governmental enterprise.
As the agent of all citizens, government has a fiduciary duty to act
exclusively in the interests of all citizens, i.e., in the common interest.
A government that acted to advance the interests of some citizens
over those of others would be violating this duty. Thus, government
has a duty to refrain from treating members of different racial, ethnic,
or sexual groups differentially, not because there is anything
inherently valuable about refraining from such differentiation, but
because its fiduciary duty to act in the interest of all prohibits it from
advancing or retarding the interests of these or any other particular
subgroups of the citizenry. The anti-differentiation interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause follows not from an independent moral
obligation to engage in purely meritocratic decision-making, but from
the contingent moral obligation that arises out of government's role as
agent for all its citizens.
Individuals have lives to live. To do so, they must decide what goals
to pursue and what activities make life worth living. They must make
value determinations and act upon them. As long as they are not
attempting to oppress others, they do no wrong in valuir.g the
interests of their loved ones, friends, co-religionists, or members of
their race or sex over those of other members of society. They are
morally entitled to give preference to these groups because they are
morally entitled to exercise their autonomy. In contrast, governments
have no corporeal existence. They are not alive and have no personal
goals or interests that they are entitled to pursue. They possess no
personal autonomy that permits them to value the interests of some
members of society over others. They exist solely to advance the
common good of the entire body of the citizenry, and hence act
wrongly when they treat different groups of citizens differently on the
basis of characteristics that are irrelevant to the achievement of
constitutionally authorized legislative ends. Thus, where an anti-
differentiation interpretation of the Civil Rights Act would
unjustifiably curtail individuals' morally valuable personal autonomy,
an anti-differentiation interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
not only does not curtail such autonomy, but is apparently required by
government's role as an agent for the entire citizenry.
Now let us turn our attention to the different cost and incentive
structures of individual and governmental action. In discussing the
Civil Rights Act, we considered the argument that the anti-
differentiation interpretation could be instrumentally justified as a
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means of preventing oppressive discrimination. Because some people
would try to disguise their oppressive conduct as non-oppressive
differentiation, an anti-differentiation interpretation of the statute
would catch instances of such covert oppressive discrimination that
the anti-oppression interpretation might miss. In that discussion, I
characterized the moral improvement that this would produce as
relatively small because relatively little harm would be suffered by the
victims of covert oppressive discrimination in a market vigorously
policed by an anti-oppression interpretation of the Civil Rights Act.
2 7
In contrast, the costs of attempting to eradicate the cases of
undetected oppressive discrimination by adopting an anti-
differentiation interpretation of the Civil Rights Act would be
excessively large, not merely to society as a whole, but to the members
of minority groups themselves. Because the anti-differentiation
interpretation prohibits minorities from offering preferential hiring
and educational opportunities to members of their own group, it bans
what has historically been one of the most effective strategies by
which minorities improve their condition. Adopting an interpretation
of the Civil Rights Act that forbids this type of group self-help in
order to eliminate the relatively small harm caused by uncoordinated
instances of covert oppressive discrimination can hardly seem like a
good bargain from the minorities' point of view. This would appear to
be a classic case of a cure that is worse than the disease.
In addition, the incentives in a marketplace policed by an anti-
oppression interpretation of the Civil Rights Act make acts of
oppressive discrimination expensive. Without the ability to engage in
the type of widespread collusive oppressive discrimination banned by
the Civil Rights Act, those who wish to discriminate against minorities
on racist or oppressive grounds incur a cost for doing so. Our
discussion of the anti-differentiation interpretation of the Civil Rights
Act revealed that there are several forms of economically rational
discrimination-situations in which drawing distinctions on the basis
of characteristics irrelevant to employees' qualifications and abilities
provide economic advantages that enhance business performance.298
It also revealed that drawing such distinctions for purposes of
oppressing members of minority groups was not among them. Unlike
rational discrimination, oppressive discrimination involves considering
employees' race, ethnicity, or sex not in addition to their qualifications
and abilities, but in derogation of them. Engaging in such hiring
practices in a market policed by the anti-oppression interpretation of
the Civil Rights Act, in which other employers remain free to hire
those one rejects, tends to saddle one with a relatively less productive
workforce. This places those with "a taste for discrimination.., at a
297. See supra text accompanying notes 267-69.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 260-66.
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substantial cost disadvantage relative to their competitors" '299 who do
not engage in oppressive discrimination:
[P]eople who decide that they do not want to trade with or hire
certain people because of race, sex, or age are making a decision
that has more than just external costs. They bear a large part of the
costs themselves, for their decision will surely limit their own
opportunities for advancement and success, even as it leaves others
free to pursue alternate opportunities. The greater the class of
persons who are regarded as off-limits, and the more irrational the
preferences, the more the decision will hurt the people who make it,
and the more numerous the options it will open to rival traders.M)
Thus, oppressive discrimination in a market vigorously policed by an
anti-oppression version of the Civil Rights Act will tend to be self-
limiting.3"1
The situation is entirely different in the case of governmental
action. Not only are the costs associated with governmental acts of
oppressive discrimination excessively high, political actors have strong
incentives to engage in them. Consider costs first. We saw that the
reason that individuals operating in a market could inflict relatively
little harm on minorities by refusing to deal with them was because
the presence of other trading partners made the consequences of this
discrimination avoidable. Government action, on the other hand, is
by its nature unavoidable. Government acts by issuing rules with
which all citizens under its jurisdiction must comply. Should a
government oppressively discriminate against a minority group, there
is no way for the members of that group to escape the consequences
of such discrimination. Should a state government bar women from
the practice of law, for example, no woman could obtain employment
as an attorney no matter how well-qualified or talented she may be
and no matter how many law firms believe they could benefit from
employing her. When dealing with governmental action, the harm
that would result from even a single instance of oppressive
discrimination can be very great.
Further, under the anti-oppression interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause, the risk that such measures will be upheld is
significant. Our own history leaves little doubt that just as private
actors who wish to oppress minorities try to do so covertly when
confronted with the anti-oppression interpretation of the Civil Rights
Act, political actors who wish to pass oppressive measures will
299. Epstein, supra note 36, at 43.
300. Id. at 41-42; see also Gary S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination ch. 3
(2d ed. 1971).
301. As noted in our discussion of the anti-differentiation interpretation of the
Civil Rights Act, analogous arguments show oppressive discrimination to be equally
inefficient and thus equally self-limiting in the educational context as well as in the
employment context. See supra note 265.
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disguise them with neutral language when confronted with the anti-
oppression interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. This is
precisely the genesis of Jim Crow. During the period in which the
Equal Protection Clause was interpreted as an anti-oppression
principle, state governments continually sought for the neutral-
sounding formulation of measures aimed at African-Americans that
would meet with the Court's approval. Once this was discovered in
cases such as Pace and Plessy, the pattern was copied throughout the
South and the era of separate but equal was born. Given the
judiciary's traditional deference to the legislature's characterization of
its purposes, the risk that disguised oppressive measures can slip
through an anti-oppression version of the Equal Protection Clause
should not be discounted. Jim Crow was not introduced as legislation
designed to oppress African-Americans, but as measures necessary to
protect public morals, prevent social unrest, and maintain order.112
There is little reason to believe that such legislative subterfuge is
necessarily a thing of the past. Given present cultural conditions, it is
not unreasonable to suspect that oppressive measures aimed at
homosexuals or Islamic men of Middle Eastern extraction may be
introduced under the guise of precisely the same benign purposes
today. Under the anti-oppression interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause, the risk that covert oppressive legislation will be
found constitutionally acceptable will always be a real one.
Under an anti-differentiation interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause, on the other hand, this risk is greatly reduced. By denying
government the ability to draw any racial, ethnic, or sexual
classification not directly related to the purpose of legislation, the
anti-differentiation interpretation relieves courts of the necessity of
determining whether the legislature's purpose was oppressive or
benign. This removes the possibility that covertly oppressive
measures introduced under the guise of a benign purpose will be
upheld. The anti-differentiation interpretation thus acts as an
effective prophylactic against any future Paces or Plessys.
Further, employing the anti-differentiation interpretation as a
prophylactic measure in this context incurs little moral cost. In the
context of the Civil Rights Act, the anti-differentiation interpretation
was rejected in part because of the excessive cost in morally valuable
302. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896).
So far, then, as a conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the
case reduces itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana is a
reasonable regulation, and with respect to this there must necessarily be a
large discretion on the part of the legislature. In determining the question of
reasonableness it is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages,
customs and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of
their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order.
Id.; see also Jennifer Roback, The Political Economy of Segregation: The Case of
Segregated Streetcars, 46 J. Econ. Hist. 893, 900-01 (1986).
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personal autonomy that it imposed on individual citizens. Because
government possesses no personal autonomy, there is no comparable
cost in adopting the anti-differentiation interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Thus, the moral cost of adopting an anti-
differentiation interpretation consists solely in the loss of
government's ability to pursue truly non-oppressive, beneficial ends
by racially, ethnically, or sexually conscious means. Although this cost
is real, I characterize it as relatively small because preventing
government from pursuing beneficial ends by racially, ethnically, or
sexually conscious means does not prevent it from pursuing those
same ends by neutral means. If minorities comprise a
disproportionate share of those below the poverty line, the anti-
differentiation interpretation will prevent government from creating
anti-poverty programs for which only minorities are eligible, but not
from creating general anti-poverty programs that will
disproportionately benefit minorities. Similarly, if minorities
constitute a disproportionate percentage of the students receiving
substandard education in public schools, the anti-differentiation
interpretation will prevent government from creating scholarships
available only to minorities or giving them preference in admission to
state universities, but not from improving the quality of the public
schools generally or creating need-based scholarship programs from
which minorities will disproportionately benefit. Thus, although the
anti-differentiation interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause may
reduce the efficiency of governmental efforts designed to benefit
minorities, it does not prevent government from taking actions that
ultimately have this effect. This seems a reasonable price to pay for
protection against the great harm that can be done by oppressive
governmental discrimination.3 "3
This conclusion is significantly reinforced when the incentives of
governmental actors are taken into account. Unlike individuals acting
in a market environment, political actors not only do not bear the cost
of governmental oppressive discrimination themselves, they often
stand to benefit from it. The currency of politics is not dollars, but
votes. Politicians can gain votes by meeting the demands of their
constituents. When a majority of their constituents (or even a
politically dominant minority) constitute a single racial, ethnic, or
sexual group, politicians can advance their careers by meeting these
constituents' demand for the oppression of minorities.
Oppressive discrimination can consist either in the exploitation of
minorities by using them merely as tools for the enhancement of the
303. Indeed, this is precisely what we would expect of a legal provision designed to
embody a moral principle. As noted in Part I, see supra text accompanying notes 8-9,
the purpose of a moral principle is to protect values of such exceptional moral
significance that their preservation justifies reductions in the efficiency of individuals'
or government's ability to realize their otherwise legitimate and worthy ends.
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wealth, status, and power of the dominant group or in denigrating the
humanity of minorities by treating them as less than fully human.
These two forms of oppression correspond to the two types of "rents,"
economic and psychic, that politicians can deliver to their majority
constituents by enacting discriminatory legislation."4 Placing legal
restrictions on the economic opportunities of minorities that make it
difficult for them to compete with members of the dominant group or
force them to deal with members of the dominant group on
unfavorable terms effectively transfers wealth from the minorities to
the dominant majority. Politicians can significantly enhance their
electoral fortunes by delivering such economic rents."" Thus, in the
Jim Crow era, Southern politicians earned political capital by
sponsoring highly restrictive labor laws designed to suppress the
wages of African-Americans and thereby provide an economic boon
to the politically dominant Caucasian landowners and employers.3"6
Further, even when no economic advantage is conferred, politicians
can deliver psychic rents by advancing racially, ethnically, or sexually
denigrating legislation that allows the dominant majority to indulge its
sense of inherent superiority. Thus, Southern politicians could attract
votes by supporting railway segregation even though it provided no
economic benefit to their Caucasian constituents.
White passengers seemed to be indifferent about segregation;
streetcar companies resisted segregation; certainly black passengers
resisted segregation. Who then wanted it badly enough to work for
its introduction? The most likely candidates are politicians who
believed that there existed latent sentiment in favor of segregation
among whites. Political entrepreneurs could offer white voters
something they valued enough to vote for, but not enough to bear
the costs privately. 307
304. See Jennifer Roback, Racism as Rent Seeking, 27 Econ. Inquiry 661, 673-76
(1989).
305. See id. at 676 ("Organizing ethnic groups into economic cartels is a promising
field for political entrepreneurs. Exclusion of ethnic groups from economic activities
such as occupations, education or land ownership is a typical device for generating
rents for the dominant ethnic groups.").
306. See Jennifer Roback, Southern Labor Law in the Jim Crow Era: Exploitative
or Competitive?, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1161 (1984).
307. Roback, supra note 304, at 674. This also accounts for politicians' support for
measures enforcing segregation in private schools and colleges.
The economic motives for forcing Berea to segregate appear to have been
minimal. That is, there were no obvious resources transferred from black to
white hands by this legislation.... Evidently, the major motivation in the
Berea case was the desire of lawmakers to associate themselves with the
widespread demand for segregation in a manner that was relatively
inexpensive for themselves and their constituents.
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Indeed, when dealing with racial, ethnic, and sexual classifications, the
incentive for political actors to sponsor oppressive legislation is
especially strong.
Ethnic groups can be powerful rent-seeking bodies because the
identities of the winners and losers are clear from the outset. People
cannot readily change their ethnic identity, making many race-
specific transfers difficult to evade. That is, a black person cannot
evade a restriction on blacks owning land by becoming not
black .... More importantly, those who initiate race-specific
legislation know that they will never be members of the dispossessed
group, and hence they also know that they will never be one of the
direct victims of the legislation. Few other rent-seeking activities
can offer such a guarantee.3"8
Thus, in contradistinction to private acts of oppressive discrimination
which impose a personal expense on the actor and thus tend to make
such acts self-limiting, governmental acts of oppressive discrimination
offer a potential for political gain that ensures that "political
entrepreneurs" will continually pursue legislation implementing it.
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the anti-
differentiation interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause curtails a
government's ability to employ its police power in morally
objectionable ways more effectively than does the anti-oppression
interpretation, and thus better meets the test for a morally justified
constitutional amendment. Although there may be no inherent moral
value in a government which functions in a color-blind manner,
requiring government to do so serves the genuinely valuable end of
preventing the oppression of minorities to a greater degree than does
merely directly prohibiting oppressive governmental discrimination.
In contradistinction to the individual acts of oppressive discrimination
regulated by the Civil Rights Act, oppressive governmental
discrimination poses the risk of great harm to minorities unless
entirely eliminated, something political incentives make very difficult
to do. Indeed, because "[t]he publicness of social norms means that
opportunities exist for political entrepreneurship[, i]n the absence of
some explicit constitutional prohibitions or sanctions, race relations
are bound to be politicized, in one direction or the other."3 "9 Further,
because the anti-differentiation interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause carries no cost in morally valuable personal autonomy and
does not prevent government from acting to improve the condition of
minorities in race-, ethnic-, and sex-neutral ways, the moral costs of
adopting it are well worth the heightened protection it buys. When
we add that as the agent of the entire citizenry government has the
contingent moral duty to refrain from favoring the interests of some
308. Id. at 675.
309. Id. at 679.
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citizens over others, the instrumental argument for the anti-
differentiation interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause becomes
compelling.
The history of the struggle from 1868 to 1967 to end governmental
oppressive discrimination recounted in Part II of this article provides
the strongest possible evidence for the observation that
[t]he color-blind proposition... is the product.., of a radical
skepticism about our political capabilities where race is concerned.
Because neither legislators nor judges may be trusted to choose
wisely in this vexed area, and because we know that racial
classifications are often highly injurious, our only safety lies in
foreclosing altogether a power of government we cannot trust
ourselves to use for good.31
The anti-differentiation interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause,
then, is morally justified not because of anything inherently valuable
about a meritocratic society, but because it is a necessary prophylactic
against the political temptation to engage in racial, ethnic, or sexual
rent-seeking. In evaluating the anti-oppression interpretation, we saw
that to the extent that the national consensus underlying the Equal
Protection Clause was based on an understanding of the Clause as
designed to prevent government from adopting racist and exploitative
polices aimed at minorities, it was morally well-grounded.31 1 Although
the anti-oppression interpretation serves this end and thus produces a
morally justified constitutional amendment, the anti-differentiation
interpretation does so more effectively. Thus, it, rather than the anti-
oppression interpretation, provides the morally proper interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause.
3. Evaluating the Anti-Subordination Interpretation
Logically speaking, the conclusion that the anti-differentiation
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause is the morally proper
one is premature since the anti-subordination interpretation has yet to
be evaluated. This apparent oversight is quickly remedied, however,
because the anti-subordination interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause can be dismissed on the same ground as was the anti-
subordination interpretation of the Civil Rights Act-its
impracticability.
Under the anti-subordination interpretation, the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits government from taking action that has the effect of
increasing or perpetuating the subordination of any minority group.
This requires government to refrain not only from intentionally acting
to subordinate minorities, but also from taking any action that does so
310. Kull, supra note 41, at 5.
311. See supra text following note 293.
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inadvertently. Thus, government must monitor all its activity to
ensure that it does not negatively impact the societal status of any
minority group.
In the context of the Civil Rights Act, we saw that the anti-
subordination interpretation ran afoul of the procedural moral
principle of "ought implies can." Although it is not physically
impossible for the citizens of the United States to refrain from all
action that has the effect of increasing or perpetuating the
subordination of the members of any minority group, it is
epistemically impossible for them to do so. Because of the inherent
limitations on human ability to centralize knowledge, individuals
cannot gather enough information to know in advance which of their
actions will have the unintended effect of subordinating minorities or
even what questions they should ask to make such a determination. 12
Because there can be no moral obligation for individuals to refrain
from actions that they cannot know to be forbidden, the anti-
subordination interpretation cannot be the morally proper
interpretation of the Civil Rights Act.
The situation is no different when the actor to be restrained is
government rather than individual citizens. It is of course true that
with its greater resources and access to social science expertise,
government can be expected to know more about the effects of its
actions on the structure of society than can individual employers or
educators. But the problem is not merely one of resources and
scientific skill. The problem is that in a dynamic society of any
significant size, individuals' reactions to changes in the legal
environment are always partially dependent on their particular
interests, abilities, and opportunities-that is, on knowledge that
"never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the
dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge
which all the separate individuals possess." '313 Friedrich Hayek's
observation that "the importance of the knowledge of the particular
circumstances of time and place"31 4 makes it impossible in principle
for government to gather the information necessary to engage in fully
determinate and successful economic planning is equally true for
governmental efforts to influence the distribution of wealth and power
and the relative status of social groups. No matter how much care and
scientific acumen politicians bring to the legislative process, the law of
unintended consequences guarantees that their measures will have
ripple effects that are unforeseeable, some of which may increase or
perpetuate the subordination of minorities.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 274-277.
313. Hayek, supra note 275, at 519.
314. Id. at 522.
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The examples introduced in our discussion of the Civil Rights Act
apply with equal force to the Equal Protection Clause.315 Affirmative
action programs granting minorities preference for government jobs
or admission to state universities are intended to reduce the societal
subordination of minorities. However, even some advocates of the
anti-subordination interpretation recognize that such programs have
the potential to backfire because,
In some places, race-conscious judgments have stigmatized their
purported beneficiaries, by making people think that blacks are
present only because of their skin color. In some places, such
judgments have fueled hostility and increased feelings of second-
class citizenship. Some people who would do extremely well in
some good institutions-schools or jobs-are placed by affirmative
action in programs or positions in which they perform far less well,
with harmful consequences for their self-respect. Ironically,
affirmative action programs can aggravate problems of caste by
increasing the social perception that a highly visible feature like skin
color is associated with undesirable characteristics.316
Under the anti-subordination interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause, if programs of preferential hiring and admission would reduce
the societal subordination of minorities, then government is required
to institute them. If they would in fact increase the subordination of
minorities, however, then government is prohibited from instituting
them. Government must either institute such programs or not. But
because the effects of the programs depend on how they influence
majority group members' perception of minorities as well as the
minorities' perception of themselves; because this in turn depends on
everything from general economic conditions to the programs'
particular impact on the life prospects of and interrelationships among
the myriad individuals affected by them; and finally, because such
information cannot be gathered and known in advance, no amount of
social scientific study will enable legislators to predict the programs'
effects on the subordination of minorities at the time of their
enactment. Under these circumstances, an interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause that instructs government to take no action that will
have the effect of increasing or perpetuating the subordination of
minorities saddles it with an impossible burden. And if this is the case
with regard to measures intended to address the subordination of
minorities directly, how much more must it be so for legislation
concerned with matters of ordinary government concern such as taxes,
commercial regulation, crime, etc.317
315. See supra text accompanying notes 280-287.
316. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 2453.
317. In rejecting the anti-subordination interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause because it "would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and
perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and
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Although government is an institution, it is ultimately comprised of
individual human beings. As such, the inherent limitations on the
abilities of individuals apply to it as well. Neither government nor
individuals can know in advance the effects of their actions on the
overall structure of social relationships in a large and dynamic society.
Therefore, for government as well as for individuals, the anti-
subordination interpretation of the anti-discrimination principle
violates the moral principle of "ought implies can."
If this is indeed the case, if the anti-subordination interpretation is
truly impossible to apply, why does it continue to command significant
support among academics and intellectuals? Why do so many fail to
recognize its impracticability? To some extent, this may be due to
intellectuals' tendency to overestimate the power of human reason-
what Hayek called "the fatal conceit that man is able to shape the
world around him according to his wishes."3 ' But to a greater extent,
I believe it is because the anti-subordination interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause is usually confused with something that is not
impracticable, i.e., with governmental efforts to remedy the
subordination of minorities.
It is entirely reasonable for advocates of the anti-subordination
interpretation to argue that government should take no action
intended to subordinate or continue the subordination of minorities,
and further, that it should undertake positive efforts to alleviate such
subordination. Under the anti-oppression interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause, such efforts could include race-, ethnic-, and sex-
conscious measures designed to improve the status of minorities and
create a more egalitarian society. Under the anti-differentiation
interpretation, the efforts would have to be the race-, ethnic-, and sex-
neutral ones described in the previous section. 19  Arguing that
government should take steps to remedy subordination, however, is
not the same thing as arguing that government take no steps that have
the effect of perpetuating or increasing subordination. The former is
licensing statutes," Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976), the Supreme Court
seems to have dimly (and belatedly, given Griggs) recognized the impossible burden
that interpretation places on government. Indeed, even advocates of the anti-
subordination interpretation such as Cass Sunstein admit the difficulty, although not
the impossibility, of its implementation.
The judiciary simply lacks the necessary tools to implement the anticaste
principle....
... The anticaste principle, if taken seriously, calls for significant
restructuring of social practices. For this reason, legislative and
administrative bodies, with their superior democratic pedigree and fact-
finding capacities, can better implement the principle than can the courts.
Sunstein, supra note 5, at 2440. For an explanation of why advocates fail to recognize
the impossibility of applying the anti-subordination interpretation, see infra text
accompanying notes 318-320.
318. F.A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit 27 (1988).
319. See supra text accompanying note 303.
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perfectly possible and presents no epistemic problem. It is true that
the limitations on human knowledge mean that some of the intended
remedial efforts will go awry and will eventually have to be
abandoned. But neither the anti-oppression nor anti-differentiation
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause require government to
act with perfect foresight. As long as government is acting for the
purpose of alleviating subordination (and in the case of the anti-
differentiation interpretation, in a race-, ethnic-, and sex-neutral
manner), the measures would be constitutional. The latter, on the
other hand, is impossible. Because government officials cannot know
ahead of time which actions will unintentionally continue or increase
the subordination of minorities, government cannot be required to
refrain from all such action.
The distinction, though subtle, is crucial. As part of a constitutional
amendment whose purpose is to improve the moral functioning of
government, the Equal Protection Clause is designed to embody a
moral principle that restrains the means government may employ to
promote the public's health, safety, and welfare.32 To accomplish this
end, it must function prospectively. It must inform the legislators
subject to it which measures are off-limits in advance of their
enactment. Moral principles, like foul lines in baseball, can serve their
purpose only if they are visible to those who must remain within their
bounds. Thus, an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause that
makes it impossible to know which legislative actions are forbidden
until after they have been enacted and their societal effects made
manifest is untenable. In contrast, legislation designed to remedy
subordination functions retrospectively as a response to the myriad of
governmental and private factors that produce the societal
subordination of minorities. Human inability to fully predict the
future societal consequences of present actions is no impediment to
efforts to alleviate the manifested consequences of past actions.
I believe that much of the appeal of the anti-subordination
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause derives from the
erroneous belief that such an interpretation is necessary for
government to act to remedy the societal subordination of minorities.
But such remedial legislation requires only the positive exercise of
government power within Article I, § 8 boundaries, not a prospective
prohibition on all governmental action that may have a subordinating
effect, whether intentional or not. Further, neither the anti-
oppression nor anti-differentiation interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause would ban such legislation, although the anti-
differentiation interpretation would prohibit the race-, ethnic-, and
sex-conscious forms of it. Once it is recognized that legislation
designed to remedy the societal subordination of minorities does not
320. See supra text accompanying notes 291-292.
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require the anti-subordination interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause, I would expect much of the support for this interpretation to
melt away.
4. Conclusions
Careful moral analysis shows that the Equal Protection Clause is
most appropriately interpreted as an anti-differentiation principle.
The fundamental moral principle of respect for persons requires that
government refrain from all oppressive unequal treatment of
minorities. This suggests that the anti-oppression interpretation of the
Clause would produce a morally justified constitutional amendment.
Although this is the case, the high cost that even isolated instances of
governmental oppressive discrimination imposes on society, the
strong incentives for political actors to engage in such discrimination,
and our own historical experience all suggest that the anti-oppression
interpretation is unlikely to provide adequate protection against such
oppressive unequal treatment by government. In contrast, the anti-
differentiation interpretation provides a much greater level of
protection at the relatively small cost of potential reductions in the
efficiency with which government may seek to improve the welfare
and societal status of minorities. This is in keeping with the essential
function of moral principles, which is to protect values of exceptional
moral significance, in this case, the personal autonomy and basic
dignity of all individuals, even if doing so makes it more difficult to
achieve otherwise worthy goals. Thus, although there is nothing
inherently morally valuable about a government that functions in a
color-blind manner, one that does has great instrumental value for
realizing the genuinely valuable end of eliminating the oppressive
unequal treatment of members of minority groups. This, taken in
conjunction with the fact that as an agent of all its citizens government
is bound to act in the interest of all and possesses no morally valuable
personal autonomy that can be lost, demonstrates that the anti-
differentiation interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause is
morally superior to the anti-oppression interpretation.
Finally, as in the case of the Civil Rights Act, the anti-subordination
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause is unacceptable because
of its impracticability. Because government, like individuals, cannot
determine in advance which of its actions will have the unintended
effect of increasing or continuing the societal subordination of
minorities, it has no ability to comply with an injunction to refrain
from taking any such actions. Thus, the anti-subordination
interpretation violates the procedural moral principle of "ought
implies can" and must be rejected.
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IV. EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Having surveyed the legal history of the anti-discrimination
principle and performed a normative analysis of the Civil Rights Act
and Equal Protection Clause, I am now in a position to offer an
explanation for much of the contemporary ideological strife over the
issue of discrimination as well as draw some implications about how
the Civil Rights Act and Equal Protection Clause should be applied.
To begin with, the legal evolution of the anti-discrimination principle
suggests that the ideological strife over its interpretation may not be a
result of divergent and irreconcilable moral intuitions and value
judgments as much as a failure to appreciate the different contexts in
which the principle is being applied and the distinction between
inherent and instrumental moral value.
It should be completely unsurprising that the anti-discrimination
principle began its legal career as an anti-oppression principle. When
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the nation had just endured
a bloody civil war, fought in part to end the scourge of slavery.
Having secured the Northern victory on this point with the Thirteenth
Amendment, the Thirty-ninth Congress was immediately confronted
with the Southern states' effort to reinstitute the official oppression of
African-Americans through the black codes. Such state-sponsored
oppression was precisely the evil that the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed to eradicate. Because the black codes constituted such clear
violations of the fundamental moral principle of respect for persons,
the moral intuitions of the Amendment's authors would naturally lead
them to understand it as an anti-oppression principle.
Understood in this way, the Equal Protection Clause was perfectly
effective against its initial targets. Under it, the Supreme Court had
no difficulty declaring the overtly oppressive black codes to be
unconstitutional."' Given the incentives of the political marketplace,
however, this victory was destined to be short-lived. As long as
Southern politicians could reap political capital by delivering the
economic and psychic rents associated with oppressive discriminatory
legislation, the "political entrepreneurs" among them would seek to
do so. As a result, the overt oppression of the black codes was soon
replaced with facially neutral but nonetheless racially oppressive
legislation introduced under the guise of protecting public morals or
maintaining good order. Although the courts could recognize and
strike down the more transparent examples of such legislation,322 the
judiciary's traditional deference toward the legislature's
characterization of its own purposes limited its ability to second guess
legislative intent. This ensured that the Southern legislatures would
321. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
322. For example, see the discussion of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), in
the text accompanying notes 98-99.
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eventually find a putatively neutral formula for oppressive
discriminatory legislation sufficient to pass constitutional muster-a
goal that was achieved in cases such as Pace and Plessy.323
This situation meant that for the Equal Protection Clause to serve
its anti-oppression purpose, the courts could not continue to treat
racially classificatory legislation the same way they did other types of
legislation. As Plessy demonstrated, judicial deference toward the
legislature's stated goals and judgments as to the necessity of racial
classification for their achievement completely undermined the
Clause's ability to eliminate oppressive discriminatory legislation. For
the courts to give the Equal Protection Clause its intended effect, they
would have to view racially classificatory legislation with suspicion;
they would have to "strictly scrutinize" all such legislation to ensure
that it was not functioning as a facade for covert oppressive
discrimination; they would have to treat such legislation as guilty, i.e.,
as unconstitutional, until proven innocent. In other words, they would
have to interpret the Equal Protection Clause as an anti-
differentiation principle.
The evolution of the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
from an anti-oppression principle to an anti-differentiation principle
chronicled in Part II reflected the growing judicial recognition that the
anti-differentiation interpretation of the Clause was a necessary
means to its anti-oppression end. The half-century of struggle against
Jim Crow hammered home the lesson that the only way to protect
minorities against oppression was to prohibit government from
differentiating among its citizens on the basis of their race or ethnicity.
In battling segregation, however, it was not unnatural for the
distinction between means and end to become blurred. As a result,
most of those involved in the civil rights movement came to view
racial classification itself as the evil they were fighting, rather than the
oppressive use to which it was put.324 Over time, the belief that racial
differentiation was wrong per se, i.e., that there was inherent rather
than merely instrumental moral value in a society free of irrelevant
racial, ethnic, and sexual classification, became widespread. By the
early 1960s, it was generally believed that morality required
a complete, resolute, and credible commitment never to tolerate in
one's own life-or in the life and practice of one's government-the
differential treatment of other human beings by race. Indeed, that is
the great lesson for government itself to teach: in all we do in life,
whatever we do in life, to treat any person less well than another or
to favor any more than another for being black or white or brown or
red, is wrong. 325
323. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92 and 100-104.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 169-173.
325. Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 809-10.
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The conventional moral wisdom of the time was well-captured by
Alexander Bickel, who declared that "[t]he lesson of the great
decisions of the Supreme Court and the lesson of contemporary
history have been the same for at least a generation: discrimination
[meaning differentiation] on the basis of race is illegal, immoral,
unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic
society."326
This understandable but erroneous attribution of inherent moral
value to the anti-differentiation interpretation of the anti-
discrimination principle sowed the seeds of moral confusion and
ideological strife that was to beset the next generation. Having come
to regard the elimination of irrelevant racial, ethnic and sexual
differentiation as a morally worthy end in itself, the members of the
civil rights community were blind to the difference in context between
the Equal Protection Clause, which restrained state action, and the
newly introduced civil rights bill, which was intended to restrain the
actions of the citizenry. If treating individuals differently on the basis
of their race, ethnicity, or sex was wrong per se, then it was just as
wrong for individuals to engage in it as it was for government. Hence,
the supporters of the Civil Rights Act argued for and obtained
passage of a statue embodying an anti-differentiation principle.
As the normative analysis of Part III demonstrates, however, this is
not the morally proper interpretation of the Act. Because the anti-
differentiation interpretation neither exemplifies nor is entailed by a
legitimate moral principle,327 it does not have the inherent moral value
the Act's supporters ascribed to it. And because the moral
improvement it can achieve over the anti-oppression interpretation of
the Act is insufficient to justify the loss of personal autonomy it
imposes on the citizenry,328 it cannot be justified on instrumental
grounds. In the latter respect the Civil Rights Act is unlike the Equal
Protection Clause, but this is due to contextual factors such as
government's status as an agent and the different cost and incentive
structures of political and market action;3 29 precisely the factors that
the mistaken belief that racial, ethnic, and sexual differentiation were
wrong per se would cause civil rights advocates to overlook.
With the passage of the Civil Rights Act, there was widespread
consensus that American law now embodied the dictates of morality
on the issue of discrimination -that both the Equal Protection Clause
and Civil Rights Act enforced a fundamental moral principle
prohibiting irrelevant racial, ethnic, and sexual differentiation.
Because this consensus was based on an error, however, it could not
long endure. Liberal groups seeking to improve the condition of
326. Alexander Bickel, The Morality of Consent 133 (1975).
327. See supra text accompanying notes 253-266.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 267-271.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 296-308.
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African-Americans and other minorities soon recognized that,
construed as an anti-differentiation principle, the Civil Rights Act
constituted a serious impediment to the achievement of that end. As
early as 1965, Daniel Patrick Moynihan had pointed out that
three centuries of sometimes unimaginable mistreatment have taken
their toll on the Negro people. The harsh fact is that as a group, at
the present time, in terms of ability to win out in the competitions of
American life, they are not equal to most of those groups with which
they will be competing.330
A construction of the Civil Rights Act that mandated a society in
which all employment and educational decisions were made on a
strictly meritocratic basis would virtually ensure their continued
societal subordination. Confronted with this reality, liberals quickly
rediscovered the moral truth that differentiating on the basis of race,
ethnicity, and sex for non-oppressive purposes is not in itself morally
objectionable; i.e., that the anti-discrimination principle is essentially
an anti-oppression rather than an anti-differentiation principle.
Accordingly, they began to press for affirmative action.
With this, an ideological rift opened up. Conservatives adhered to
the belief erroneously extrapolated from the civil rights struggle that
racial, ethnic, and sexual discrimination is wrong per se. As a result,
they regarded the liberals who advocated affirmative action as
departing from moral principle to curry favor with their minority
adherents. Liberals, on the other hand, who correctly perceived that
only oppressive discrimination was wrong per se, failed to recognize
that in the context of the Equal Protection Clause, a strict adherence
to an anti-differentiation interpretation was a necessary prophylactic
measure. As a result, they regarded conservative opposition to
government-sponsored affirmative action as a departure from moral
principle designed to protect the privileged societal position of
Caucasian males. By overlooking the importance of the context in
which the anti-discrimination principle was applied, both sides not
only drew erroneous conclusions, but were led to question the good
faith of the other.
This rift is a fair reflection of the one that has split the Supreme
Court over the proper interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
for the past thirty years. The liberal justices who formed the majority
in Metro Broadcasting correctly understood that the anti-
discrimination principle is inherently valuable only when interpreted
as an anti-oppression principle, but failed to appreciate that an anti-
differentiation interpretation of the Clause is justified by its
instrumental value in preventing governmental oppression. Thus,
Justice Marshall, who perceived that the heart of the Equal Protection




Clause was "the cardinal principle that racial classifications that
stigmatize -because they are drawn on the presumption that one race
is inferior to another or because they put the weight of government
behind racial hatred and separatism-are invalid without more,"33'
found it "inconceivable that the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to prohibit all race-conscious relief measures." '332 The
conservative justices who formed the majority in Adarand, on the
other hand, correctly supported the anti-differentiation interpretation
of the Clause, but did so on the mistaken ground that there is inherent
moral value in prohibiting unequal treatment on the basis of
irrelevant characteristics. Chief Justice Rehnquist, for example,
expressly believes that
[t]he evil inherent in discrimination against Negroes is that it is
based on an immutable characteristic .... The characteristic
becomes no less immutable and irrelevant, and discrimination based
thereon becomes no less evil, simply because the person excluded is
a member of one race rather than another.... I find a prohibition
on all preferential treatment based on race as elementary and
fundamental as the principle that "two wrongs do not make a
right." 333
In the context of the Civil Rights Act, this ideological rift was
exacerbated by the fact that the initial interpretation of the Civil
Rights Act as an anti-differentiation principle created a strong
incentive for those interested in improving the conditions of
minorities to argue not for the morally appropriate anti-oppression
interpretation of the Act, but for the more radical anti-subordination
interpretation. The Act's initial anti-differentiation interpretation
inappropriately prohibited all benevolently-intended race-, ethnic-, or
sex-conscious efforts to improve the employment and educational
prospects of minorities as well as minorities' own efforts at group self-
help. This left bringing lawsuits against employers and educators for
illegal discrimination as the only legal alternative to a meritocratic
competition in which African-Americans and certain other minority
groups were systematically disadvantaged by past oppression. Just as
when one's only tool is a hammer, everything looks like a nail, when
one's only tool is a discrimination lawsuit, everything that
disadvantages minorities looks like discrimination. In these
circumstances, the most logical course for parties seeking to reduce
the subordination of minorities to follow was to argue for the broadest
possible interpretation of discrimination. Where the morally proper
331. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 518 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(quotation omitted).
332. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 398 (1978) (Opinion of
Marshall, J.).




definition of discrimination as the oppressive unequal treatment of
minorities would counterproductively limit discrimination lawsuits to
cases of intentionally oppressive action, a definition of discrimination
as doing anything that subordinates or continues the societal
subordination of minorities would extend the range of such suits to all
actions that negatively impact minorities. Responding rationally to
incentives, the staff of the EEOC, whose mission was to improve the
relative condition of minorities,334 promptly defined discrimination as
"all conduct which adversely affects minority group employment
opportunities." 35 When the Supreme Court endorsed this definition
in Griggs,336 the disparate impact model of discrimination was born.
The introduction of an anti-subordination interpretation into the
ideological mix not only widened the gulf between conservative and
liberal opinion on discrimination, it also skewed the debate. The
broad anti-subordination definition of discrimination may have arisen
as a response to the mistaken initial interpretation of the Civil Rights
Act as an anti-differentiation principle, but it nevertheless constituted
a serious over-correction. Now, rather than arguing for the correct
anti-oppression interpretation of the Act, a significant portion of
liberal opinion was arguing for the philosophically untenable and
epistemically impracticable anti-subordination interpretation.
Further, because of the lack of attention to the context in which the
anti-discrimination principle was applied, many began to argue for an
anti-subordination interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause as
well. 37 As a result, the debate over the anti-discrimination principle
moved from a struggle between the anti-differentiation and anti-
oppression interpretations, each of which was correct in one context,
to a struggle between the anti-differentiation interpretation, valuable
only instrumentally and only in the governmental context, and either a
pure anti-subordination interpretation or a conflated mixture of anti-
subordination and anti-oppression interpretations that was not correct
in any context. In this confused state, it is not surprising that the
debate over the proper interpretation of the anti-discrimination
principle has raged on for as long as it has.
It is perhaps ironic that the most divisive political issue of our time
arose from the simple failure to distinguish between inherent and
instrumental moral value. Ironic or not, however, this, rather than
any deep-seated normative disagreement, is the source of the
dissension besetting the effort to legally prohibit discrimination in the
United States.
334. See Graham, supra note 1, at 247-54.
335. See Blumrosen, supra note 188, at vii.
336. See Graham, supra note 1, at 383-89.
337. See, e.g., Colker supra note 11; Fiss, supra note 5; West, supra note 30;
Sunstein, supra note 5.
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Having explained the lack of consensus on the issue of
discrimination, all that remains is to draw some implications for the
proper application of the Equal Protection Clause and Civil Rights
Act. Consider the Civil Rights Act first. Properly interpreted as an
anti-oppression principle, the Civil Rights Act would prohibit
employment and educational decisions made on the basis of racial,
ethnic, or sexual animus or those intended to degrade or exploit
minorities, but would not otherwise require that such decisions be
made according to any specified set of criteria. As a result, there
would be no legal restriction on citizens' ability to engage in non-
oppressive racial, ethnic, or sexual classification. All forms of private
affirmative action would be legally permitted. Women and members
of minority groups who want to give employment or educational
preference to members of their own group as a means of combating
their societal subordination would be perfectly free to do so, as would
anyone else who wishes to remedy the effects of past discrimination,
prevent present or prospective prejudice, create a more diverse
environment, or otherwise pursue a personal ideal of social justice.
This interpretation directly entails the abolition of the disparate
impact model of discrimination. To the extent that this model had any
reason for existing, it was because the anti-differentiation
interpretation of the Act cut off other avenues by which disfavored
minorities could improve their societal standing. Because when
properly interpreted the Act imposes no such restraints, there can be
no excuse for holding individuals liable for actions that cannot be
clearly identified in advance. Therefore, only the disparate treatment
model of discrimination should be recognized by the courts.
The disparate treatment model, too, would undergo a change.
Under a properly interpreted Civil Rights Act, a complainant would
have to prove not just that he or she had been treated differently
because of his or her membership in a minority group, but that he or
she had been treated differently and oppressively. This, of course,
implies that there is no right to equal opportunity as it is currently
understood. One is not morally entitled to be evaluated by others
strictly on the basis of his or her qualifications and abilities. One is
morally entitled only to be evaluated by others in a manner consistent
with his or her equal dignity as a human being. Thus, whether or not
it is foolish, an employer or educator does not wrong an applicant by
preferring his or her less qualified and less able nephew or one who
would be a bigger help to the company or university soccer team to
the applicant.338 The cost of removing the restraints on affirmative
action is that others are allowed to pursue their non-oppressive visions
of justice and personal preferences as well.
338. Unless the employer or educator has made a previous representation that all
employment or admission decisions will be made on a strictly meritocratic basis which
he or she is now violating.
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This does not call for abandoning the McDonnell Douglas method
of proving discrimination, however. Because those who wish to
engage in oppressive discrimination will attempt to disguise their
intentions behind a neutral faqade, McDonnell Douglas's presumption
of discrimination whenever an adverse employment or educational
decision is taken against a qualified minority would still be justified.
The change would come in the second step of the evidentiary process
in which the employer or educator is required to offer "legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for the employee's [or student's]
rejection." '339 Under the proper interpretation of the statute, such
reasons would include not only the currently acceptable business- or
educationally-related justifications, but also those involving the
genuine pursuit of the defendant's non-oppressive vision of justice or
personal preferences. Thus, as embarrassing as it might be for the
employer or educator to offer it, courts should accept the verified
claim that the complainant was passed over because the boss wanted
to hire his or her nephew or because someone else would better help
the university soccer team as a legally adequate justification for the
complainant's rejection. Amended in this way, the evidentiary
requirements for proving discrimination would reflect the moral fact
that although there may be justification for prohibiting individuals
from oppressing minorities, there is none for prohibiting them from
pursuing their non-oppressive personal values, as foolish or
idiosyncratic as these may be.
Turning to the Equal Protection Clause, this is properly interpreted
as an anti-differentiation principle. Designed as a prophylactic against
governmental oppression of minorities, the Clause must deprive
government of virtually all power to classify its citizens on the basis of
race, ethnicity, and sex to serve its purpose. Political logic and history
demonstrate that government should be trusted with the power to
draw racial, ethnic, and sexual distinctions only to attain a goal of
overriding moral significance, and then only when there are no racial-,
ethnic-, or sex-neutral ways to achieve that end. Thus, the scrutiny
with which courts should examine governmental actions that classify
citizens on the basis of race, ethnicity, or sex should indeed be so strict
as to prove "fatal in fact ' 3411 to almost all such measures.
As currently interpreted, the Equal Protection Clause permits
racial, ethnic, and sexual classification for purposes of remedying past
governmental discrimination and perhaps to obtain a diverse student
body in state universities.341 The latter certainly does not constitute a
goal of sufficiently overriding moral significance to open the door to
339. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
340. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972).
341. See supra text accompanying notes 239-243.
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the governmental assignment of advantages on the basis of race,
ethnicity, or sex. And even assuming that the former does, it may be
achieved by the race-, ethnic-, and sex-neutral means described in Part
III with only a moderate loss of efficiency.342 Thus, under the proper
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, neither of these
exceptions to the bar on governmental classification by race, ethnicity,
or sex would be permitted. It is difficult to imagine many that would.
Desegregating public schools in states with Jim Crow legislation may
have been one of these. It, like the assignment of medical treatment
for sickle cell anemia or Tay-Sacks syndrome, may be one of the rare
situations in which racial, ethnic, or sexual classification is truly
necessary to the end to be achieved. But in all but the most extreme
circumstances, a properly interpreted Equal Protection Clause will
require color-blind government.
At any point in history, there is a tendency to view government
oppression of minorities as a thing of the past-as an evil that we have
evolved beyond. This tempts each generation to undervalue the
prophylactic effect of the anti-differentiation interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause and believe that government can now be
trusted to employ racial, ethnic, and sexual classifications for
beneficent purposes. But this is a temptation best resisted. The
internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II was upheld
by the Supreme Court on the ground that "in the crisis of war and of
threatened invasion, [the government may adopt] measures for the
public safety, based upon the recognition of facts and circumstances
which indicate that a group of one national extraction may menace
that safety more than others." '34 3 How confident can we be in the
wake of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon that measures directed against Muslims or men of middle-
eastern extraction will not be taken on the same ground today? In
times of economic hardship, anti-immigrant sentiment often runs high.
Are we truly certain that today's politicians will not try to exploit this
by offering legislation that targets Hispanics or Asian-Americans?
Are we really sure that political entrepreneurs will not seek political
capital by introducing anti-gay legislation under guise of protecting
public health and morals?
The Siren's song of our desire to use government power to do good
can blind us to the risks posed by the powerful political incentives to
classify citizens by race, ethnicity, or sex in order to deliver economic
and psychic rents to the politically dominant group. For this reason,
we dare not loose ourselves from the mast of the anti-differentiation
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. Andrew Kull
342. See supra text in the paragraph accompanying note 303.
343. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 101 (1943).
2002]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
expressed this quite well when, commenting on Justice Harlan's
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, he stated,
The advocates of a color-blind Constitution have at every stage been
those who were unwilling to leave the proper use of racial
classifications to be settled by the political process, and who sought
therefore to put such distinctions beyond the reach of legislators andjudges alike. The nineteenth-century argument as distilled by
Harlan, at a time when the political objection to racial classifications
was their use in the systematic oppression of black citizens, was
careful to place the legal objection on racially neutral grounds.
However we appraise the strength of Harlan's argument today, it
applies with equal force to circumstances in which racial
classifications may be thought to work a different harm:
The sure guarantee of the peace and security of each
race is the clear, distinct, unconditional recognition by
our governments, National and State, of every right that
inheres in civil freedom, and of the equality before the
law of all citizens of the United States without regard to
race.
Harlan's prescription gains in force if for "each race"-by which he
meant the black and the white-we substitute a reference to the
present components of a diverse, multiracial, multiethnic society.
His statement is more a political judgment than a constitutional
reading. The judgment is essentially pessimistic: that tools of
government we know to be capable of much harm, and that we
cannot confidently use for good, should be abjured altogether. The
experience of the intervening century has not yet proved Harlan
wrong.344
CONCLUSION
What, then, of the case of Jacob's sons? Their actions clearly
violate both the anti-differentiation and anti-subordination
interpretations of the Civil Rights Act. The brothers are purposely
differentiating among their job applicants on the basis of religion and
national origin, and by preferring Caucasian applicants to more
qualified Hispanics and African-Americans, they are acting in a way
that tends to increase the subordination of those groups. Under the
present interpretation of the Civil Rights Act, a successful case of
discrimination could be brought against them using either the
disparate treatment or the disparate impact models of discrimination.
This should not be. The Civil Rights Act is morally justified only
when interpreted as an anti-oppression principle. This means that one
should be liable for discrimination only if he or she has subjected an




individual to oppressive unequal treatment because of that
individual's membership in a minority group. Jacob's sons have
treated their Hispanic and African-American applicants differently
than their Caucasian applicants, but they have not treated them
oppressively. They are giving Romanian Jews preferential treatment
because of their belief that they have a moral obligation to discharge
their family's debt to the Verein, not because they regard Hispanics or
African-Americans as inferior, degraded, or less than fully human or
because they wish to exploit the members of either group. The
brothers are using the business that they and their father built to
realize a value of profound personal significance to them, and, in a
sense, to fulfill the demands of their personal vision of social justice.
A properly structured Civil Rights Act would not prohibit such
actions. Under such a statute, there would be no disparate impact
liability and although a Hispanic or African-American complainant
could make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment, the
brothers' reason for giving preferential treatment to Romanian Jews
would constitute a legally adequate justification for the complainant's
rejection.
The brothers' hiring practices also run afoul of both New York
City's and the federal government's affirmative action requirements.
New York City's requirement is intended to remedy the lingering
effects of past discrimination by the construction industry and its
unions, while that of the Federal government is intended to help
reduce the general societal subordination of minorities. Both of these
may be morally worthy goals and both may be goals that federal,
state, and local governments are entitled to pursue. And under the
anti-oppression and anti-subordination interpretations of the Equal
Protection Clause, which permit non-oppressive race-, ethnic-, and
sex-conscious governmental action, both affirmative action
requirements would be unobjectionable. But the Equal Protection
Clause is morally justified only when interpreted as an anti-
differentiation principle. And this means that governments should be
constitutionally required to pursue even morally worthy goals by race-
,ethnic-, and sex-neutral means.
Under the proper interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause,
government is prohibited from actions that treat individuals
differently on the basis of irrelevant characteristics. The race,
ethnicity, and sex of a company's employees is completely irrelevant
to the company's ability to engage in construction, supply equipment
to the construction industry, or fulfill Federal government contracts.
Therefore, under the proper interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause, both New York City's and the Federal government's
affirmative action requirements would be unconstitutional and the
brothers would not be subject to legal liability for failing to comply
with them.
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The resolution of the case of Jacob's sons and the conclusion of this
article may be simply stated. Jacob's sons do nothing morally wrong
by paying their father's debt to the Verein. For American anti-
discrimination law to be properly structured, they should not be
punished for doing so.
